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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, a State's Aimed Forces have been 
regarded as its ultimate instruments of power, and 
war as the extreme form of the application of 
military force. In more recent times this view has 
been challenged (see Chapter 1). The purpose of 
this Dissertation is to examine the effectiveness of 
Armed Forces, and military power as instruments of 
foreign policy, in the post-war era. To this end,
the Thesis is divided into two sections - Part I and 
Part II - the former of seven, the latter of four. 
Chapters.
Part i provides the theoretical framework for the 
Dissertation, which is the essential prerequisite 
for understanding and evaluating the actual practice 
of military power. To this end, in Chapter 1, the
concept of power itself is examined, for this is the
basic concept without which Armed Forces and 
military power have no meaning or purpose. 
Following on from this. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
phenomenon of war, by an examination of the works of 
some of the great theorists of war. Soecific forms 
of military power and war are +•' . red - Sea
Power (Chapter 3), Air Power (Ctv , U.S. and
Soviet Nuclear strategies (Chapter 5 and 6) and 
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency (Chapter ?).
Having established the nature of power and war, and 
how Armed Forces should best be employed to obtain 
the ends desired by the State, it is necessary to 
examine the application of Armed Forces, and thus 
military power, in practise. This is the purpose of 
Part XI, which contains three Case Studies, each of 
which is directly linked to one of the theoretical 
Chapters of Part I, and each of which is concerned 
with the examination of a different type of Armed 
Service and a different form of military power. 
Thus Chapter 8 {linked directly with Chapter 2 for 
the purposes of analysis) examines Conventional land 
war through a study of the Israeli campaign in the 
Sinai in 1956. Chapter 9 (linked to Chapter 3) 
focuses on Saa Power through an analysis of the 1982 
Falklands War, and Chapter 10 (linked with Chapter 
7) covers the Dhofar campaign ''965-1975} in order 
to examine the practice oi b Insurgency and 
Counter-Insurgency.
As there have (fortunately) been no nuclear wars to 
date, there are no Case Studies to examine with 
regard to Chapters 5 and 6. These analyses of
nuclear strategy are included, however, for nuclear
weapons form the unavoidable background to 
contemporary international relations in general and 
conflicts in particular. Indeed, as will be 
apparent from Chapter 7, the existence of nuclear
weapons has had a direct influence upon the
occurrence of the localized wars that have so marked 
the post-1945 era. Similarly, there is no Case 
Study specifically for Air Power; this is because of 
its nearly all t/ervasive presence in modern warfare.
Finally, the results of all three Case Studies are 
brought together, along with the theoretical 
insights of Part 1, to produce a final conclusion to 
the Dissertation, in Chapter 11.
T H E O R E T I C A L  F R A M E W O R K  
POWER, WAR AND STRATEGIES
<*■ - w. .drtfe*
wCHAPTER 1: CONCEPTS O F POWER
Power is, and lias o.;wnys been, one of the central
themes and concornc of interotato relations. One of
the earliest recorded oxi'ositionfi of this theme was
in the 5th Century BC by Tnucydides, in his The
relercnaeria_n__^-.'Which relates how:
"In those years the Athenians made their 
empire more and more string, and greatly 
added to their own power at home ... So 
finally the point was reached when 
Athenia* strength attained a peak plain 
for all to sue and the Athenians began to 
encrcaen upon Sparta's allies. It was at 
this point that Sparta felt the position 
to be no longer tolerable and decided oy 
starting this present war to employ a*! 
her energies in attacking and, if 
possible, destroying the power of Athens’
(1).
Thucydides alec offers us probably one of the
tluntes1. statements on the relationship between
power and international affairs in the famous Melisn
dialogue, wherein he has the Athenian delegation
expound upon power politics in the mosr
unconstrained manner:
"... we recommend that you should try to 
get what it is possible tor you to get ... 
when these mutt'-rs are discussed by 
practical i eople, the standard of justice 
depends on the equality of power to compel 
and that in fact the strong do what they 
have the power to co and the weak accept 
what they have to accept .... Our opinion 
of the gods and our knowledge of men lead 
us to conclude that it is a general and 
necessary law of nature to rule wherever 
one can ... we know that you or anybody 
else with the same power would be acting 
in precisely the same way .... What is 
looked for. is n positive preponderance of
power in action ibis is the safe rule
- to stand up to o;; $zs equals, to behave 
with deference towards one's superiors, 
and to treat one's inferiors with 
moderation’ (2).
Approximately twenty one centuries later, the peace 
settlement of Utrecht (AD 1713) announced its 
intention
•to establish the peace and tranquility of 
Christendom by a just balance of power, 
which is the best and most solid basis of 
mutual friendship ..." (3).
Indeed, the question of power and the need to 
balance it became the central issue of the modern 
states system following Utrecht. Frederick the 
Great, of Prussia, in 1736 went as far as to argue 
that an equilibrium of power between states was 
essential to the health of the European body politic 
(4).
Treaties continually reflected this concern. Thus
the anti-Bonaparte Treaty of Chaumont (1814)
stipulated that it had:
"for its object the maintenance of the
balance of Europe, to secure the repose 
and independence of the powers, and to
prevent the invasions which for so many 
years have devastated the world" (5>.
In 1854 Palmerston proclaimed that:
"call it what you like - 'balance of 
power' or any other expression, it is one 
which has been familiar to the minds of 
all mankind from the earliest ages" (6).
Unsurprisingly, given the wide usage of the concept-, 
there is no concise, universally acceptable 
definition, of 'balance of power'. American
theorist Inis L. Claude, for example, assembled
seven different versions of the concept, grouping 
them into three categories, which he designated: 
balance of power as situation? balance of power as 
policy; the balance of power as a system (7).
Under the first category, Claude assembled those 
concepts of balance of power which saw it as an 
objective reality, as something which exists in the 
states system. In this context, he advanced three 
meanings. Firstly, balance of power as equilibrium
- a simple description indicating when states are in 
a rough state of equality with each other. 
Secondly, balance of power as disequlibrium - a 
balance, seen in Claude's descriptive analogy, as a 
bank balance, in which one seeks to deposit more
than one withdraws (in terms of states, a desire to
have a margin of strength ov'-r rivals). Finally, 
balance of power - as distribution of power - as a 
means to measure whether the power relationships 
between states are in equilibrium or disequilibrium 
(8 ) .
The second category, balance as policy, was concern­
ed with the treatment of power as . \te policy or as
a principle that could, or should, govern state 
policy. Again three concepts stand forth, 
equivalent to those in the first category. Thus, 
first, balance as a policy of creating or preserving 
an equilibrium between states; or, second, as a 
policy of creating or preserving a disequilibrium in 
favour of the policymaker's state, a policy often 
referred to as establishing a 'favourable balance'; 
finally, the balance of power can be identified with 
the struggle for power: states are said to 'join the 
balance of power' by being engaged in a power 
struggle amongst themselves (9).
Under the third category, balance of power as a 
system, the balance was seen as an operational 
arrangement governing the actual practice of inter­
national relations - an arrangement with understood 
rules, instruments and mechanics; hence references 
such as "regulated ... by the balance of power" 
(10).
British theorist Martin Wight's examination of the 
concept brought to light, by contrast, no less than 
nine different meanings of the term. These he 
summarised as follows:
”1. An even distribution of power.
2. The principle that power ought to be 
evenly distributed.
3. The existing distribution of power. 
Hence, any possible distribution of
4. The principle of equal aggrandizement 
of the Great Powers at the expense of 
the weak.
5. The principle that our side ought to 
have a margin of strength in order to 
avert the danger of power becoming 
unevenly distributed.
f. (When governed by the verb 'to hold';)
A special role in maintaining an even 
distribution of power.
7. fDitto:) A special advantage in the
existing distribution of power.
6. Predominance.
9. An inherent tendency of international
politics to produce an even 
distribution of power" (11).
the questions
ion exis'
ing the
But French is different.? the Frens,. .nguage 
distinguishes between pouvolr (power within a 
political unit) and puissance (power of a political 
unit - i.e. power at an international level) (12). 
This study is concerned, throughout, with 
puissance. But what is power? Max Weber defined it 
as:
"... the probability that one actor in a 
social relationship will be in a position 
to carry out his own will despite
resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests" (13).
It must be understood that since Weber regarded 
states as political associations interacting within 
social relationships with one another, his 
definition thus also applied to power at an inter­
national level (puissance) (14) . Kans Morgentiiau zs
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definition is not as concise:
"When we speak of power, we mean man's 
control over the minds and actions of 
other men. By political power we refer 
to the mutual relations of control among 
the holders of public authority and 
between the latter and the people at
"Political power is a psychological 
relation between those who exercise it and 
those over whom it is exercised ... the 
statement that A has or wants political 
power over B signifies always that A is 
able, or wants to be able, to control 
certain actions of B through influencing 
b 's mind* (15).
In Robert Dahl's opinion, power, in general terms, 
refers to:
"... subsets of relations among social 
units such that the behaviour or one or 
more units (the responsive units, R) 
depend in circumstances on the behaviour 
of other units (the controlling units, c}"
(16).
Klaus Knorr simply defines power as coercive
influents, where influence is defined as occurring
when one actor, B, adapts his behaviour to comply
with, or in anticipation of, another actor's (A's)
suggestions, requests, or demands. Coercive
influence occurs when a's policy adaptations are the
result of fear of actual or potential sanctions that
A will inflict if B does not adapt itself to a 's
demands (17). Raymond Aron argues that:
"In a general sense, power is the capacity 
to do, make or destroy .... On the
international scene I should define power
as the capacity of a political unit to 
impose its will upon other units. In 
short, political power is not an absolute; 
it is a human relationship" (18).
English- and German-speaking theorists are trapped 
by their languages when attempting to construct 
definitions which simultaneously cover pouvolr and 
puissance.
Given the diversity of definitions of the concept, 
it is unsurprising that virtually every theorist has 
his own concept of the form(s) of power. E.H. Carr 
divided power into three subsets: military power,
economic power, and power over opinion. Combined, 
these comprise political power at the international 
leve (i.e. puissance). Carr held them to be closely 
interdependant, and, in practice (as distinct from 
theory) inseparable (19).
According to Carr, military power is of "supreme 
importance" because war is "the ultima ratio of 
power in international relations" (20). War is the 
last resorc of every state, and, because of this, it 
is a dominant phenomenon in international politics. 
As a result, states must orientate their power with 
regard to the possibility of war. And that means 
military power. indeed, the grading of powers was 
(and is) usually the result of their success in war 
and/or perceived military strength. This was
- 9 -
especially true of Great Powers: entry into this
exclusive club of states was dependent on success in 
reasonably large-scale wars - for example, Germany 
after her victory in the iranco-prussian Mar, 
America after the Spanish-American War, Japan after 
the Russo-Japanese W ar. Indeed, because of its 
importance to the state, military power often 
becomes an end in itself (21).
With regard to economic power, Carr primarily saw
this in the light of the national economy's role in
strengthening the states power base by increasing
its military potential, arguing that:
"... economic strength has always been an 
instrument of political power, if only 
through its association with the military 
instrument" (22).
Carr approvingly quoted a German Staff Officer's 
comment to Engels in the 1880s that "the basis of 
warfare is primarily the general economic life of 
peoples* (23). Also important was the use of the 
economy as an instrument of foreign policy, by means 
of the export of capital and the control of foreign 
markets. Examples of the former included the 
purchase of shares in the Suez Canal company by the 
British government; Russian government financing of 
the Chinese Eastern Railway; and the classic 
example, the private loan in 1894 of £400 million to 
Russia by French investors, made at the instigation
1
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of the French government, rfhich was intended to (and 
successfully did) cement the new alliance between 
these powers (24). With regard to the control of 
foreign markets, in the modern era this has taken 
the form of reciprocal trade agreements between 
economically unequal states wherein the stronger 
provides a secure market for the weaker's products, 
and sometimes provides goods and/or services at very 
competitive or even below market prices. For 
example, in the interwar period, Germany provided 
Central European and Balkan countries with a secure 
primary market for their main exports, usually 
purchased at prices uLvv': . c-.ket level? in return, 
Germany gained political influence and a market for 
her own goods (25). a  contemporary example is 
provided by the Soviet Union and her client, Cuba, 
whereby the USSR buys Cuban sugar at roughly three 
times world market prices (26).
Carr's third category of power is power over 
opinion. Carr argued that, though this aspect of 
power had always been with man, it had become 
especially important in the modern era, with the 
development of modern means to employ it on an 
unprecedented scale. Modern mass propaganda was, 
itself, made possible by the development of modern 
mass education combined with the modern communic­
ations media. Only in the second half of the 19th
Century did t.r- •«« developments commence. The 
process came tr ^ruition with the First World War, 
in which major mass propaganda offensives were 
initiated by both sides in the struggle to gain 
cjntrol of the opinion of friends, foes and neutrals 
alike. It was not that propaganda was new; it was 
not; what was new was the mass nature it had 
developed. Following the termination of the war, 
the Bolsheviks in Russia took this development to 
its logical next step - propaganda as an instrument 
of policy in peacetime. This was the result in 
Carr's opinion of the USSR's initial extreme 
weakness coupled with its proclamation of, and 
pzoselytisation foe, a new, universalist, belief 
system (2?j.
Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the leading theorists of 
power, developed quite a comprehensive framework for 
the analysis of the phenomenon. He distinguished 
between power and influence, power and force, usable 
and unusable power, and legitimate and illegitimate 
power. in Morgenthau's view, influence was some­
thing the weak could have over the strong, but only 
-he strong could have power. with regard to force 
and power, Morgenthau saw the former as physical 
violence, as involving the abdication of political 
power in favour of military power, political power 
being seen as a psychological relationship and
T F
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military power as a physical one. The concept of 
unusable power stemmed from the development of a
situation of mutual nuclear deterrence - i.e. 
nuclear weapons are a form of power which cannot be 
used without bringing total destruction upon the 
user; usable power is, of course, non-nuclear. 
Legitimate pow*-*: was, in Morgenthau"s view, power 
that could be exercised legally and morally, as 
distinct from "naked power", power without 
justification (28).
In addition to this, Morgenthau broke the concept of 
power down into nine component elements - geography, 
natural resources, industrial capacity, military 
preparedness, population, national character, 
national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the
quality of government. In this he was neither first 
or unique, an earlier example being provided by the 
American geopolitician N.J. Spykman who, in 1942,
identified ten elements of power. Morgenthau is, 
however, the best known. For Morgenthau, geography
is the "most stable factor upon which the power of a 
nation depends" (29). The area, or lack of it, of a 
country; whether it has natural frontiers and/or
defences (e.g. high mountains); whether it is a
continental state, peninsula, )r an island; are all 
factors which directly relate to a country's power, 
by virtue of the degree of invulnerability (or lack
- 13 -
of it) that they impart to foreign invasion (30). 
Natural resources encom* "s both food and raw 
materials. With regard to food, lack of self- 
sufficiency is, in Morgenthau's view, a potential 
weakness to the state - the classic example being 
Britain - while permanent scarcity of food is a 
permanent source of weakness, as with many Third 
World countries. The same holds for raw materials, 
specifically those essential for waging war, though 
the importance of a specific raw material may vary 
over time depending upon advances in technology 
(e.g. today uranium is important? fifty years ago it 
was not). However, possession of raw materials does 
not automatically comprise a source of power? what 
is required before this can occur is the appropriate 
industrial capacity. A state rich in raw materials 
yet lacking in industrial capacity (e.g. 
contemporary Zaire) is not strong? rather, it
becomes a tempting target for powerful states.
Industrial capacity is essential because of the
technological nature of modern war - without 
industry one cannot develop and produce the tanks, 
guns, missiles, aircraft, etc. essential to victory 
in the contemporary era. The stronger the 
industrial capacity, the more power a state can 
deploy - thus Britain's dominance of the world 
coincided with, and was the result of, her position 
as by far and away the world's leading industrial
*6 -Run.
nation in the 19th Century (31). These two elements 
of Morgenthau combined roughly equate Carr's concept 
of economic power.
For Morgenthau, military preparedness:
"gives th*. factors of geography, natural 
resources, and industrial capacity their 
actual importance for the power of a 
nation” (32).
Military preparedness, equivalent to Carr's military 
power, requires the existence of an adequate
military establishment and is composed of the sub­
elements of military technology, military leader­
ship, and the quality and quantity of the armed 
^rces. superior technology immediately grants one 
an advantage in the military balance; inferior
technology automatically places one in a position of 
military inferiority. Thus Charles VII! 's possess­
ion and use of artillery during his invasion of 
Italy in 1494 gave him a decisive advantage over the 
Italian City States, who could not counter it.
Quality of military leadership is also of crucial 
importance - Prussia's rise to power in the 18th 
Century was almost entirely a reflection of
Frederick tne Great's military genius; the selfsame 
Prussian Army that had served Frederick so well 
failed disastrously when confronted by the great 
Napoleon. But for superior technology and leader­
ship to be able to take effect, they must be based
- 15 -
upon an adequate (both in terms of quantity and 
quality) military establishment. Just what com­
prises an adequate military establishment is a 
question each state must answer for itself (33).
Population, by itself, does not necessarily 
constitute a source of power; indeed, as Morgenthau 
points out, in Third World states it can be a cause 
of weakness? nevertheless, only countries with 
substantial populations can hope to become Great 
Powers, because only large populations can establish 
and maintain the military establishment required for 
great power status. Such factors as population 
trends (increasing or decreasing; predominantly 
young or predominantly old) also affect a state's 
power. National Character, as Morgenthau freely 
admits, is one of the most elusive elements of 
power, yet is, he believes, of great importance. 
National morale is another elusive element and, in 
addition, the most unstable one on Morgenthau's 
list. He defines it as "the degree of determination 
with which a nation supports the foreign policies of 
its government in peace or war" (34). It is of 
indisputable importance, permeating all branches of 
a nation'o activities, yet is very difficult to 
predict. However, the higher the quality of the 
society and government, the stronger national morale 
is likely to be. When Morgenthau talks about the
quality of diplomacy, he refers to the formulation 
and execution of foreign policy at all levels. 
Diplomacy is the essential instrument by which a 
state's potential power is converted into real 
influence; good diplomacy can magnify a country's 
power beyond its 'paper' capability,- poor diplomacy 
can diminish a state's power below its theoretical 
levels. All the aforementioned elements of power 
would come to naught, however, if a state suffered 
from poor quality of government. For Morgenthau, 
good government requires the fulfillment of three 
conditions: balance between the state's human and
material resources on the one hand, and the state's 
foreign policy on the other; balance among the 
resources; and popular support for foreign policies 
being pursued. Failure to achieve these conditions 
would undermine a nation's power (35).
It is to be noticed that Morgenthau ha? no 
equivalent to Carr's power over opinion in his 
listing; he does, however, discuss psychological 
warfare and propaganda in his work. For Morgenthau, 
psychological warfare and propaganda are synonymous, 
and form one of the three instruments by which, in 
his . view, foreign policy attempts to achieve its 
aims, the others being diplomacy and military force. 
He defines propaganda as:
"the use and creation of intellectual
convictions, moral valuations, and
- 1 7 -
emotional preferences in support of one's 
owi. interests" (36).
Morgenthau saw all foreign policy as a struggle for 
the minds of men? propaganda being the most direct 
means in this struggle. And although propaganda has 
existed since ancient timej, today it has a differ­
ent status because it is now, as not before, an 
autonomous instrument. To be successful, propaganda 
must adquately fulfil three relationships: the
relationship between the content of the propaganda 
and how effective it is? the relationship between 
the content of the propaganda and the actual
experiences of the target population; and the
relationship Detween the propaganda and the foreign 
policy it is intended to serve. With regard to the 
first relationship, it is not the truthfulness of 
the propaganda that will guarantee success, but
rather, whether it satisfies some need in the
intellectual and political life of the target
population - the outstanding example being Nazi 
propaganda in Germany. The second principle 
focusses on the necessity for the propaganda to fit 
into the life experiences of the target population; 
if it does not, then no matter how sophisticated it 
is, it will fail. Finally, if the propaganda does
not aim at the objectives sought by the Joreign
policy it is meant to serve, it is merely wasted 
effort. One problem of Morgenthau's discussion of
- 1 8 -
propaganda is that it is very unclear where it fits
into his schema of power (37).
Raymond Aron's approach is very different. Aron 
distinguishes between power and force (puissance et 
force/ Macht und Kraft). The former is a human 
relationship, the latter the means, the instruments 
available to the state, Force, or strength, can be 
military, economic, or even moral; power is the
actual functioning of these forces under given 
circumstances and with particular objectives in 
view. As these forces can be subject to approximate 
measurement, power can thus be estimated by 
reference to the available forces, though a margin 
for error should always be allowed.
The concept of force can be subdivided into
potential force - the total resources, human, moral 
and material, available to a state in theory {'on 
paper'} - and actual force - those of its resources 
that have actually been mobilised to support its 
foreign relations. In time of peace, actual force 
is not synonymous with military force. in wartime, 
however, actual force and military force come close 
to being identical. To proceed from potential to 
actual force, a state must mobilise its resources, 
and this mobilisation potential is of great 
importance, for the force available to a given state
is not proportional to its potential force but to
its 'potential of mobilisation'. And this
mobilisation potential is, in turn, dependent on the
state's capacity and will to mobilise;
"The conditions of economic or admin­
istrative capacity, and for collective 
will as affirmed by leaders and supported 
by the masses, are not constant throughout 
history, they vary from period to period"
(38).
Just as the concept of force can be subdivided into 
two categories, so too can power. For Aron, one can 
distinguish between defensive power and offensive 
power. The former comprising the capability of a 
state or political unit for resisting others att­
empts to impose their will upon it? the latter
representing the state's capability to impose its 
will upon others. Furthermore. Aron argues that 
there are three fundamental elements, or determin­
ants, of power - milieu, resources, and collective
Milieu refers to the space inhabited by the politic­
al unit - i.e. its geographical setting. Strong 
natu.-al boundaries greatly increase a state's defen­
sive power; they simultaneously severely restrict 
its offensive power. Open, exposed borders have the 
opposite effect: gravely reducing defensive power,
but amplifying offensive power. The ideal situation 
for a state is to occupy a position which simultan­
eously combines maximum defensive and offensive 
potential. And there is a geographic formation 
which provides such an optimimum combination - an 
island. Britain, for much of its history, enjoyed 
the situation of possessing a secure base (maximum 
defensive power) which was ideally suited to support 
distant expeditions (maximum offensive power).
Under the rubric of resources is subsumed the 
materials available to the s'-ate, and the technology 
whereby they can be transformed into weapons, as 
well as the number of men available and the 
capability of transforming them into soldiers, the 
whole being summed up by Aron as "the quantity of 
implements and combatants" (39).
Collective action is actually shorthand for a
state's collective capacity for action, that is, the
organisation and discipline of the armed forces, the
quality of the civil and military leadership, in
time of both war and peace, and the solidarity of
the country's people in the face of the vicissitudes
of conflict. For Aron, these three, abstract,
terms, are equivalent to the proposition:
"the power of a collectivity depends ozi 
the theatre of its action and on its 
capacity to use available material and 
human resources" (40).
As these fundamental elements (and the equivalent
proposition) automatically encompass the effects of 
historical and technological change, Aron feels that 
they do not merely equivalate to, but are superior 
than, listings such as Morgenthau's (41).
Aron further distinguishes between power in wartime
and power in peacetime. In wartime, power - both
offensive and defensive - depends primarily on
mobilised military force. Aron supports his
argument with a passage from Clausewitz:
"The conduct of war is not making powder 
and cannon out of a given quantity of 
charcoal, sulphur, saltpetre, of copper 
and tin: the given quantities for the
conduct of War are arms in a finished
state and their effects" (42).
Wartime power also depends on the use made of this 
military force.
Power in peacetime, however, is concerned with non­
violent means coupled with those violent means 
permitted in peacetime. Non-violent means include 
economic means,- again there is a distribution 
between defensive and offensive capability. The 
former comprises a state's ability to withstand
sanctions, the latter the state's ability to support 
and strengthen its client-states' economies by
offering secure markets, advantageous terms, invest­
ments, economic and technical aid, etc. Another 
non-violent means is propaganda. Originally used to
- 2 2 -
try and win support amongst members of the elite in 
the target country, in the modern era it is also - 
even predominantly - targetted on the mass of the 
population. Again there are offensive and defensive 
aspects to this - some states are better suited to 
wage propaganda campaigns by virtue of the palpable 
advantages of their system, or because of their 
institutionalised ruthlessness and unscrupulousness; 
other states are better able to withstand foreign 
propaganda onslaughts because of the cohesion of 
their societies. Fragmented societies are most 
vulnerable to foreign propaganda.
Permitted means of violence in peacetime are 
symbolic violence and clandestine violence. 
Symbolic violence was much more common in the 19th 
Century than it is today, the most common variety 
being known as Gunboat diplomacy - i.e. the sending 
of a warship by one state to another to support the 
former's demands against the latter. In other 
words, symbolic violence is the mobilisation of a
degree of military force to bring pressure on a
target nation for some specific purpose, without 
that military force actually being committed to any 
offensive action.
By contrast, clandestine violence is very much a
phenomenon of the 20th century, and involves one or
more states fighting against another state by means 
of terrorists and insurgents, the respective states 
being formally in a condition of peace (or, at 
least, ceasefire) with each other. Thus the Arab 
states have promoted terrorism against 1 Tael; 
Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt were involved in the 
training and supply of FLN terrorists fighting the 
French in Algeria (43).
Unlike most theorists of power, Aron also discusses 
the uncertainties of the measurement of power. 
These stem from key factors difficult to estimate 
and which often are only testable by conflict. They 
include: the administrative capacity of the state;
the ability of a state to withstand an initial 
onslaught and gain time to mobilise its potential; 
the quality of the military forces; the balance of, 
and progress in, technology; and the quality of 
diplomacy. The quality of these factors (i.e. how 
good or bad they are) can have a dramatic effect on 
a state's actual power, either magnifying or 
diminishing it (44).
The approach adopted by Klauo Knorr harks back, in 
certain respects, to that of Carr, for Knorr 
subdivides power into military power, economic 
power, and political penetrative power. Each 
category is further subdivided into putative power
pand actualised power. Finally, Knorr is also 
concerned with the concepts of weight, scope and 
domain of power. For Knorr, putative power is a 
means, a factor which a state can accumulate, a 
capability that permits a state to make strong 
threats. Actualised power is an effect, actually 
achieved influence, which can only ce enjoyed in a 
specific situation; its measure of success is the 
level of influence actually achieved.
Knorr regards putative military power as having 
three elements: military forces, military potential
and military reputation. The first refers to the 
actual military strength of the nation; the second 
to the state's capacity to improve and/or expand its 
military forces? and the last to the perception, by 
other countries, based on previous experience, of a 
particular state's greater or lesser inclination to 
employ military threats should its vital interests 
be interfered with. Actualised military power takes 
three forms: war, threats o£ military force, and the 
perception of other nationu that the state concerned 
might resort to military force in the event of a 
serious conflict of interooi-a between them. This 
last mechanism is often overlooked, because it is 
largely hidden in operation, but Knorr hypothesises 
that it is the most common form of actualised 
military power (45).
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But how is putative military powc-c converted into 
actualiccd military powor? Knorr arsuec that a 
'conversion model' c^n account for this. The 
'conversion model' identifies th% main conditions 
usually governing the convcrrion of putative power 
to actualized power, ai:d is nc follows (Knorr 
purrocnly kovrinn it simple):
1. B's estin«to of the costs of ccmplyinc with 
A'c threat
2. B's estimate of the costs of defying A's 
threat
3. B's bargaining skill relative to A's
•i. B's propensity to act rationally and to 
accu' e risks,
The four elements of the model are the factors upon 
which a military throat from A against B depends for 
itc success. The first two elements are largely 
self-explanatory, though in the first case 'costs' 
include both LU" stake in thi> original conflict with 
A of wo 13 on th-- additional loocvc that would be 
cuctainod by th«j capitulating to A'a threat; in the 
second case, 'costs' include calculations of all 
likely cot.iiuquuri^ ui.; - includii.-j pv^yible new 
additional domanda by A should n be defeated. All 
other things being -oqiuil, the higher the cost of 
compliance, the more likely B is to resist; the
higher the cost of defiance th more likely B is to 
capitulate. The third element covers the fact that 
sviilful diplomacy by B - effective bluffs, 
carefully staged indications of intransigence, 
effective maneouvres to involve third powers - can 
dissuade A from carrying out its threat*, or give 
the impression that it is beyond b 's ability to 
fulfill any or all of A's demands. The more 
skillful B is, the less likely a 's success. 
However, all these elements can act as a guide to 
B's likely behaviour only if B is rational. Knorr 
argues that most government are usually rational, 
and that unless there is any evidence to the 
contrary, a reasonable level of rationality should 
be assumed. Given rationality, B is likely to base 
its decision on how to react to A's threats on B's 
net estimates of the costs of defiance and
compliance.
Knorr alao proposes a model for the inverse 
situation, that is, one designed to try and 
ascertain the likelihood that A will, or will not, 
resort to threats. This model is even simpler than 
the first one, having only three elements:
1. A's estimate of the value of b's compliance
2. A's estimate of the diverse costs of making
a threat
3. A's propensity to act rationally and to
take risks.
Element one is calculated on tho basis of the 
original stake involved as we. 1 as possible benefits 
vis-a-vis other states from the successful 
application of a threat? the second element involves 
a calculation of the costs of being defied, the 
costs cf implementing the threat, and any costs that 
ma stem from effects on domestic and foreign 
opinion. The third element is, of course, directly 
equivalent to the fourth element of the previous 
model. Knorr emphasises that attempts to achieve 
coercive influence (i.e. power) must involve costs? 
the benefits of success may greatly outweigh costs, 
but costs there will be (46).
For Fiorr, like Carr, economic power acts directly 
as a basis for military power - pointing out that, 
at the height of the second World Mar, both Britain 
and Germany devoted approximately 50% of their 
economic strength solely to the waging of war. With 
regard to military power, economic power forms an
inextricable element of putative military power, 
being encompassed within military potential and
military forces. Moreover, economic power can be 
readily converted into, or used to support, 
virtually any type, or instrument, of power - such 
as political penetrative power, or intelligence
services, and so on.
However, economic power may be employed as a 
coercive instrument in its own right. Thus, A may 
seek f  deny some sort of economic advantage to B. 
As with military power, Knorr distinguishes between 
putative economic power and actualised economic 
power. Again, putative economic power is also 
composed of three elements: economic strength,
economic potential, and economic reputation. The 
first, equivalent to military strength, comprises 
the ability to halt investments, reduce economic 
aid, pre-empt sources cf supply and shut off 
valuable markets. The second element, equivalent to 
military potential, involves the ability to increase 
such international economic control. Finally, 
economic reputation, equivalent to military 
reputation, refers here to the state's inclination 
to resort to economic pressures if it felt they were 
in its national interest. Actualised economic power 
involves the implementation of any or all of the 
threats and capabilities available to a state as a 
result of its economic strength. Knorr argues that 
the two 'conversion models' developed with regard to 
military power cover the conversion process from 
putative to actualised economic power equally well. 
He further argues that the ability of a state to 
proffer economic rewards to another, instead of
threats, amounts to a source of non-coercive 
influence (i.e. not power} unless it is obvious that 
these rewards are being offered as substitutes for 
coercion (i.e. carrots, with the hint of sticks in 
the background), whereupon the normal power 
conversion models will apply. Knorr recognises that 
there is a 'passive aspect' to a state's economic 
capability, that is its ability to limit the damage 
other states can inflict on it; but Knorr does not 
really regard this as an element of power, as such 
(47).
Knorr devotes remarkably little attention to 
political penetrative power, arguing that it is not 
as well understood as the other elements of power. 
He focusses on various clandestine activities such 
as propaganda, the fomenting of unrest, support of 
opposition parties and/or revolutionary groups, and
bribery and corruption. He gives, asexamples, Nazi
Germany's successful use of these methods to under­
mine Austria and Czechoslovakia, as well as the
multiplicity of soviet front organisations, such as 
the World Federation of Trade Unions, the world 
Peace Movement, etc.. He further defines propaganda
"... the planned dissemination of 
information, arguments and appeals 
designed to influence the beliefs, 
thoughts and actions of specific foreign 
target groups".
Successful propaganda can provide a state with a 
basis to attempt coercion of another state (48).
Finally, Knorr also, though somewhat cursorily, 
distinguishes between the concepts of weight, scope 
and domain of power. Weight refers to the extent to 
which the policy of the target state is influenced; 
scope reflects the range of values or policy-areas 
within which the scate's policy is influenced; and 
domain refers to the number of states that are
influenced - influence can be multilateral as well
as bilateral (49).
The relatively straight-forward approaches of Carr, 
Morgenthau, Aron and Knorr were challenged during 
the nineteen sixties and seventies by a totally 
different approach to the concept of power - indeed, 
to the whole field of international relations. This 
approach, centred in the United States, and
variously referred to as 'behaviouralist' or
'scientific', explicitly claimed to be seeking the 
creation of a 'science' of international relations, 
and received a considerable stimulus from the 
traumas of the late sixties and early seventies - 
specifically, America's failure in Vietnam, and the 
Arab oil embargo of 1973.
This 'scientific' school sought, so its members
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claimed, "clarity and precision" (50) with regard to 
concepts of power. Basically, they were concerned 
with what they saw as "the paradox of unrealised 
power", i.e. the inability of apparently stronger 
states to force apparently weaker ones to submit to 
their demands (typified by America's failure in 
Vietnam and by the Arabs ability to massively 
increase their oil prices). D.A. Baldwin argues 
that there are two forms of explanation for this 
"paradox". Firstly, there is the traditional 
argument focussing on "malfunctioning conversion 
processes", in other words, lack of skill or will on 
the part of the would-be wielder of power (52). 
Then there is the answer provided by what can be 
called 'policy contingency framework analysis'. 
This approach argues that scope, weight and domain 
must always be taken into consideration in power 
analysis; that power resources have limited 
liquidity (or fungibilifcy)? that sources of power in 
one policy contingency may be counter-productive in 
other; that it is possible to determine whether 
something is a power resource or not only by placing 
it in the context of a real or hypothetical policy 
contingency framework; that power is relational -
i.e. it does not reside in the qualities of a state, 
but in the would-be wielder's qualities and the 
intended target's value-system; that the effective­
ness of military powee is exaggerated; and that, as
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a result, power is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, 
not a continuum - there is no such thing as an 
' u l t i m a t e o r  'basic' or 'dominant' form of power 
(53). In the words of two of the founders of this 
approach:
"Failure to recognise that power may rest 
on various bases, each with a varying 
scope, has confused and distorted the 
conception of power itself, and retarded 
inquiry into the conditions and 
consequences of its exercise in various 
ways ...,
"In particular, it is of crucial 
importance to recognise that power may 
rest on various bases, differing not only 
from culture to culture, but also within a 
culture from one power structure to 
another ....
"What is common to all power and influence 
relations is only effect on policy. What 
is affected and on what basis are 
variables whose specific content in a 
given situation can be determined only by 
inquiry into the actual practices of the 
actors in that situation ....
"Political analysis must be contextual, 
and take account of the power practices 
actually manifested in the concrete 
political situation" (54).
The argument that the focus on policy contingency
frameworks would involve so many combinations and
permutations as to impose an impossible burden on
any analyst is rejected by H and M Sprout:
"Estimates of capabilities covering all 
members of the society of nations in all 
imaginable contingencies would run to 
millions of combinations and permutations.
No government, even more emphatically no 
university or private individual, could 
conceivably carry out so massive a 
research and analysis. Nor is any such
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undertaking contemplated or needed by 
anyone. A great many contingencies - for 
example, Canadian-US military confront­
ation - are too remote to justify any 
consideration. By a process of 
elimination, one comes eventually to a 
hard core of contingencies that seem more 
or less likely to set the major patterns 
of international politics in the years to 
come, and with regard to which the 
relative capabilities of interacting 
nations are not self-evident* (55).
Baldwin argues that policy contingency framework 
analysis (alKO called the 'relative infungibility 
explanation') is superior to traditional power 
analysis for two reasons. Firstly, he argues that 
focussing on 'skill and will' with regard to an
actor's attempt to wield power encourages sloppy 
analysis - because it can always be employed as a 
cover behind which an incompetent or inept analyst 
car, hido his failure to correctly analyse the power 
relationship, should matters not proceed as he
predicted. in fact, Baldwin further argues, the 
olor.er.te o£ skill (that is, the likelihood that the 
state can convert its power resources into a 
g u c c/j o gSu I outcome) and will (the likelihood that 
the ot'-dti} will have sufficient determination to 
reach a auucesoful outcome) should be included in 
any estimate of a state's power resources.
Secondly, the policy contingency framework approach
focusses attention on power's contextual nature. 
For this approach, skill is merely another power 
resource.
Because of the nature of this 'relative
infungibility' approach, listing of elements of
power becomes a meaningless exercise, because:
"such data acquire political relevance 
only when viewed in some frame of 
assumptions as to what is to be attempted, 
by whom, when and where, vis-a-vis what 
adversaries, allies and unaligned on­
lookers" (56).
The eonteyt is everything, power has no independent 
existence beyond or outside it.
But the 'scientific' approach also threw up another, 
radically different, approach to power analysis - 
the mathematical model, This is exemplified by the 
work of Ray Cline. Quite simply, Cline constructed 
a mathematical formula encompassing all the elements 
he believed essential to a state's power? this 
formula is intended to provide a means of measuring 
the power of the various state actors in the 
international system. The formula, as a formula, is 
quite straightforward:
Pp = (C+B+M) x (S+W) 
whore:
Pp o Perceived power
C e Critical mass = population + territory 
E = Economic capability 
M = Military capability 
S = Strategic purpose
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W = Will to pursue national strategy (57).
Cline applied this formula to forty nations, giving 
numerical value to each element in the formula in 
each case; thus, for the variable 'strategic 
purpose' he gave the numerical value 0.3 to the US, 
and 0.8 to the USSR, because the latter possessed 
"clear-cut strategic plans for international 
aggrandizement" while the former did not. Quanti­
fication of the formula for each country produced a 
number which represented the "total weighted units 
of perceived power" for that state; in the case of 
the US the result was 35; for the USSR, 67.5 (58).
Cline's approach, in sharp contrast to that of the 
policy contingency framework analysts, is thus 
highly abstract, sees power as a phenomenon 
independent of contests, and regards it as both 
monolithic and homogeneous. Both, however, are very 
different from the traditional approaches of Carr, 
tiorgonthau, ktcn, and Knorr (though the last has 
adopted some of the style of the 'scientific' 
approach, though none of the content).
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CHAPTER 2; THEORIES OF WAR
When a State employs its Military Power as an 
instrument of its foreign policy, and encounters 
opposing Military Power, War often results. But 
vhat, in fact, is War? What are its purposes? 
These questions have concerned strategists from 
ancient timos - the earliest known surviving 
Strategic Treatise being Sun Tzu's The Art of War, 
written in the period 320-400 BC. In this Chapter, 
an attempt to answer these questions will be made by 
means of an examination of the analyses of some of 
the great Strategists - S”n Tzu, Niccolo Machia- 
velli, Karl von Clausewitz and Ardanb au Picq.
The very first thing that Sun Tzu writes on war is
the following:
"War is a matter of vital importance to 
the State; the province of life or death; 
the road to survival or ruin. It is 
mandatory that it be thoroughly studied"
(1).
Expanding on this verse, the classical Chinese
commentator, Li Ch'uan, wrote:
"'Weapons are tools of ill omen'. War is 
a grave matter; one is apprehensive lest 
•;ien embark upon it without due reflection”
(2 ).
In his concise and elegant manner Sun Tzu outlines 
the political significance of war: it is the most
important matter in which a state can be involved r a
%matter that can have awesome consequences to the
state involved. This point Sun Tzu reinforces in
Ch. XII, vs. 17 and 18;
"17. If not in the interests of the
state, do not act. If you cannot succeed,
do not use troops. If you are not in 
danger, do not fight.
"18. A sovereign cannot raise an army
because he is enraged, nor can a general
fight beca..se he is resentful. For while 
an angeret: man may again be happy, and a 
resentful ; an again be pleased, a state 
that has per.shed cannot be restored, nor 
can the deaV’ be brought back to life" (3).
Yet the use of military force is essential with
regard to some foreign policies:
"He who intimidates his neighbours does so 
by inflicting injury upon them" (4).
Centuries later, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)
took up the study of war, not only in his The Art of
War, but also in The Prince and The Discourses■ He
regarded war as being of such overwhelming
importance, that he wrote:
"A Prince, therefore, should have no other 
object or thought, nor acquire skill in 
anything, axcept war, its organisation, 
and itc: discipline .... The first way to 
lose your state is to neglect the art of 
war” (5).
This stemmed ftom his belief that political life was 
a constant struggle for survival between organisms, 
that is States, that were continually growing and 
expandin': (6). One does not have to aooept
Machiavelli's entire philosophy in order to
recognise the validity of his views on the political 
significance of war.
But of course the most famous of the great
strategists, and one who, more than any other,
firmly linked war to politics, was General Karl von
Clausewitz (1780-1631), In the first chapter of
Or. War, he writes:
"It is clear, consequently, that war is 
not a mere act of policy but a true 
political instrument., a continuation of 
political activity by other means. What 
remains peculiar tc war is oinply the 
peculiar nature of its means .... The 
political objective is the goal, war is 
the means of reaching it, and means can 
never be considered in isolation from 
their purpose" (7).
Unlike the other, aforementioned strategists, 
Clausewitz expliei-ly derives this definition.
Influenced by the leading German phi'osophers of the
day, Hegel and especially Kant, Clausewitz commenced
with an ideal definition of war:
"War is thus an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will" (8).
As war is an act of force, logically nothing must be 
allowed to interfere with the application of the
"Kind-nearted people might of course think 
there was come ingenious way to disarm or 
defeat an enemy without too much 
bloodshed, and might imagine this is the 
true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as 
it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be
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exposed; war is such a dangerous business 
that the mistakes which come from kindness 
are the very worst" (9).
and again:
"To introduce the principle of moderation 
into the theory of war itself would always 
lead to logical absurdity" (10).
"If we were to think purely in absolute 
terms, we could ... proclaim with
inflexible logic that, since the extreme 
must alway be the goal, the greatest 
effort must always be exerted" (11).
These ruthless statements, to reiterate, concern 
Ideal or Perfect War, that is the type of war that 
would exist if the world was perfect. Of course,
the world is not perfect. But Clausewitz, as
previously mentioned, was influenced by German 
philosophy, and i:om this source he gained a
determination to locate the essence of each 
phenomenon - in this case, war. Thus, this Ideal or 
Perfect War is an intellectual model designed to 
illuminate the essential, timeless elements of war. 
Failure to realise that this is Clausewitz's method 
has led to many totally failing to understand or 
comprehend his arguments (12).
But such Perfect War could only, by definition, take 
place in a world where perfect isolation of the war 
from all intervening factors »'as possible. No such 
world exists:
"Man and his affairs, however, are always 
something short of perfect and will never 
quite achieve the absolute best. Such 
shortcomings affect both sides alike and 
therefore constitute a moderating force" 
(13).
Real War, therefore, excludes the perfect require­
ment that utmost force be used. This is of key 
importance: if the absolute is not to be feared, and 
cannot bo aimed at, it thus becomes a matter of 
judgement as to what level of violence to employ in 
w ar. And this judgement depends, among other 
things, on the object of war? and this object, in 
turn, is politically defined:
"When whole communities go to war ... the 
reason always lies in some political 
situation, and the occasion is always due 
tn some political object. War, therefore, 
is an act of policy .... That, however, 
does not imply that the politicalaim is a 
tyrant. It must adapt it .elf to its 
chosen moans, a process which can 
radically change it? yet the polical aim 
remains the first consideration. Policy, 
then, will permeate all military 
operations, and, in so 'far as their 
violent nature will admit, it will have a 
continuous influence on them" (14).
The rider is very important. Clausewitz, contrary 
to myth, recognised that there could be different 
types of Real War, distinguished by different levels 
of violence, and the differing effects those levels 
of violence have or. the political objective. These 
different types of war can bo designated, to use 
modern jargon, L imited War and Total War.
1
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For clausewitz, the less extreme the tensions
proceeding the war, the more obviously political the
"The loss intense the motives, the less 
will the military element 'a natural 
tendency to violence coincide with 
political directives. As a result, war 
will be driven further from its natural 
course, the political object will be more 
and more at variance with the aim of ideal 
war, and the conflict will seem 
increasingly political in character" (15).
When political objectives are limited, the level of 
violence will be limited to serve that political
end. The five-day Peruvian-Ecuadorian Border war in 
early 1981 is an outstanding example of a Limited 
War. The boundary between the two countries has, in 
many places, been a source of dispute for years. 
Ecuador suddenly seized three unmanned Peruvian 
border posts, claiming they were on Ecuadorian
territory. The Peruvian Army counter-attacked and 
re-took the posts. Fighting occurred only around 
the three disputed posts, and nowhere else. The 
issues at stake were 'imited, and thus the fighting 
was limited. The success of the Peruvian counter­
attacks ended the war.
By contrast, there is Total War. This must not be 
confused with Ideal or Perfect War, which is, to re­
emphasise , an abstraction. But Total War is the
form of Real war which comes closest to this
abstraction. Total War occurs when the reasons for
war are of the greatest, most powerful, most
dangerous to the State:
"The more powerful and inspiring the 
motives for war, the more they affect the 
belligerent nations and the fiercer the 
tensions that preclude the outbreak, the 
closer will war approach its abstract 
concept, the more important wil be the 
destruction of the enemy, the more closely 
will the military aims and the political 
objects of war coincide, and the more 
military and less political will war 
appear to be8 .16).
The second Woi the classical example of
this: the militas., . political objectives became
identical: the total destruction of the enemy. But
note, though the political object becomes hidden by 
the military aim, it does not cease to exist? Total 
War is still political? it is simply no longer 
obviously political.
It must be otresued that Clausewitz did not regard 
the distinction between Limited War and Total War as 
a historical distinction, as a contrast between the 
relatively restrained wars of the 18th Century and 
the unrestrained nationalistic conflict of the 
Napoleonic era. Though he believed that Total War 
would become more common - a f..recast confirmed by 
history - he also believed that Limited conflicts 
would continue to occur - another forecast amply 
confirmed by history.
The objective of war is thus political? the means of
war is violence:
"That cannot be called war where men do 
not kill each other, cities are not 
sacked, nor territories laid waste"
wrote Machiavelli (17). Even Sun Tzu, who urged his
readers to try and defeat their enemies with the
minimum expenditure of time, economic resources and
men, by means of the maximum use of subversion (18),
recognised the need for - and gave great attention
to - battle. Though if the subversion were well
carried out, battle might only be required to
formalise a victory already won:
"Thus a victorious army wins its victories 
before seeking battle? an army destined to 
defeat fights in the hope of winning"
(19)-
Thifi might appear to be a statement of the obvious, 
but much of human knowledge stems from examining 
what is apparently obvious. It is no surprise that 
Clausewitz devotes clnuo attention to the issue of 
violence. Me have already discovered that 
Clausewitz regarded violence as the essence of war. 
Wo shall now examine clausewitz' treatment of 
violence in more detail.
All the other elements of wot are not unique to war: 
it is a competitive activity - so is business (and 
much else); it requires discipline, both externally 
and self-imposed - so does education? it is a social
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activity - so is choir-singing; it takes place at a 
national and international level - so does sport; it 
involves national passions - again, so does sport. 
And so on.
What is unique to war is its focus on violence - 
violence as a central theme, not as a side effect. 
In Clausewitz' words:
"Essentially war is fighting" (20).
and
"it is inherent in the very concept of war 
that everything that occurs must
originally derive from combat ... whenever 
armoeTforcea, that "is, armed individuals, 
are used, the idea of combat must be 
present .... The end for which a soldier
is recruited, clothed, armed and trained,
the whole object of his sleeping, eating, 
drinking and marching is simply that he
should fight at the rigFt^iace and the
right t i m e ^ u X K
Lot us return to Clausewitz' abstract model of Ideal 
War. in such an ideal War, the violence should take 
the form of one, massive, decisive battle -
Armageddon, in other words. This of course, does 
not happen. in the real world, a series of battles
are required - thus, in the Second World War, the
decisive battles (El Alamein, Stalingrad, Midway) 
took place during 19-12 and early 1943, yet the war 
did not end until late 19451 Moreover, in some,
Limited Wars, the actual violence might be restrict­
ed to mief'c battles or oven skirmishes. But, for 
Clausewitz, the ideal, the idea that informs and
inspires military action, even if it does not 
actually take place, is the battle. His own 
comparison - which had a great impact on Marx and 
Engels (22) - was with the cash settlement in trade. 
It may occur only rarely, but it was the ideal 
towards which everything was aimed. And if it did 
occur, it would decide everything (23).
But the combat is not merely a physical activity 
with physical results; it is also a psychological 
activity with psychological results. it should be 
noted here that, as the strategists we are 
considering all pro-date the formal invention of 
psychology, the term they frequently employed, 
instead of the not-yet-existing 'psychological', was 
'moral'. Those terms will be henceforth used 
synonymously. The moral, or psychological, elements 
operate simultaneously at many different levels, in 
many different ways, with many different effects, in 
a war situation. Basically, the issue can be 
approached ah thr^e lov"lst tactical - fear and the 
overcoming of fear, troop morale, etc.; strategical
- the will and determination of the leadership, both 
political and military; and finally, psychological 
warfare. The great theorists of the moral aspects 
of war are Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Ardant du Picg.
Sun Tzu sets out his statements as straightforward
facts: the reader or commentator muat flesh them out 
with his own experience and knowledge; it is like a 
book of mathematics which gives the equations and 
answers, but not the calculations needed to achieve 
these answers. Any experienced mathematician can 
derive the necessary calculations himself. Likewise 
for the student of strategy and Sun Tzu. By 
contrast, Clausewitz and du 3?icq derive and analyse 
their opinions, showing the reader clearly where the 
concepts come from.
Though sun Tzu was concerned that morale be in a
good condition in the army - ho argued that there
were five fundamental factors in war, and placed
"moral influence" as the first of those (24),
further stating:
"By moral influence I mean that which 
causes the people to be in harmony with 
their loaders, so that they will accompany 
them in life and into death without fear 
of mortal peril" (25),
and:
"He whose ranks arc united in purpose will 
be victorious" (26).
- he is primarily important for his stress on
psychological warfare and subversion to which we
will later return.
Clausewitz' consideration of the psychological/moral 
asp, u-s of war was one of his greatest achievements.
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They are encompassed in his conceptions of friction 
and genius. As these concepts are linked, they will 
be dealt with together,
For Clausewitz, the chaos of the battlefield was
dominated by the free play of human intelligence,
will and emotions. It was to deal with these
factors that 1 . clausewitz to invent of the concept
of genius. clausewitz' concept of genius did not
merely mean the highest possible level of
original5 ty and creativity; rather, it also referred
to "gifts of mind and temperament in general", to
quote Paret (27), and applied to ordinary men as
much as to extraordinary ones, and to all levels of
command, not just the highest. For, as clausewitz
points out:
"War is the realm of chance. No other 
humfn activity gives it greater scope: no
other has such incessant ana varied
dealings with this intruder. Chance makes 
everything more uncertain and interferes 
with the whole course of events" (28).
It requires the right temperament, the right gifts
of mind, to remain unsettled by chance, for:
"all j.nformation and assumptions are open 
to doubt, and with chance at work every­
where, the commander continually finds 
that things are not as he expected" (29)*
And not only to remain unsettled by chance, but also 
to seize and exploit the opportunities provided by 
chance. For Clausewitz, the strong mind is the one
that remains calm no matter what is occurring around 
it, and so retains its perception and judgement, and 
so its freedom of action. Additionally intelligence 
is vital in war; as is courage, audacity, decisive­
ness and determination. True military genius 
consists of a harmonious combination of these and 
other elements.
All these elements are required for military genius
because war is a very difficult thing to wage. Not
because it is difficult to draw up plans of
operations, but because it is very difficult to
carry out such plans. The difficulty is the result
of friction:
"The conduct of war resembles the workings 
of an intricate machine with tremendous 
friction, so that combinations which are 
easily planned on paper can be executed 
only with great effort. Consequently the 
commander's free will and intelligence 
find themselves hampered at every turn, 
and remarkable strength of mind and spirit 
are needed to overcome this resistance.
Even then many good ideas are destroyed by 
friction, and we must carry out more 
simply, and modestly what in more 
complicated form would have given greater 
results" (305.
It was just such frictio;, - the refusal of the 
British Armoured Divisions to obey orders and 
advance to screen the Infantry, due to their 
inferiority complex vis-a-vis the German Panzer 
units and fear of the dreaded *88" guns - that 
forced General Montgomery to change the plan for the
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Bafctle of El Alamein after it had begun {31}. And,
unlike in mechanics, from which Clausewitz borrowed
the term, lubrication cannot be used to reduce
friction, nor can improved planning reduce the
number of points vulnerable to it:
"A battalion is made up of individuals, 
the least important of whom may chance to 
delay things or somehow make them go 
wrong" (32).
Friction can be physical - rain, snow, mud, fog, 
blown bridges, mined roads, unexpectedly strong 
resistance by enemy defenders, etc.. But it is also 
psychological - uncertainty, ignorance, confusion, 
fear, mistrust, fatigue (both a physical and psycho­
logical phenomenon), wariness, all can inhibit the 
implementation of a General's plans.
Overcoming friction requires a strong will, and
tact. But it has its cost:
"Iron willpower can overcome this 
friction? it pulverizes every obstacle, 
but of course it wears down the machine as 
well" (23).
In the First World war. Generals Joffre and Nivelle 
(Joffre's successor) had "Iron willpower" but no 
tact, no feeling for the troops under their command. 
Time and again this willpower threw French troops 
against German defences with little or no effect; 
finally the "machine" was worn down - in May 1917 
the Army mutinied. it was only restored after
months of effort by Petain (5•)
It is this friction, more than anything else, which 
distinguishes real war from war on paper.
While clausewitz paid great attention to moral/ 
psychological factors, Ardant du Picq (1831-1670) 
focussed almost exclusively on them. A French Army 
officer, who served in the Crimea, Syria and Algeria 
before being killed near Metz in the early days of 
the Franco-Prussian War, his starting point was the 
dynamics of battle: What really happened in a combat 
situation? He rapidly discovered that this was one 
aspect of war that was almost totally neglected.
To try and discover the truth, du Picq turned to the 
wars of antiquity - partially because ancient 
writers were more outspoken on the fundamentals of 
military activities than du Picq's contemporaries, 
and partially because ancient wars displayed 
intriguing paradoxes: the most brave combatants, as
individuals, such as the Germanic and Gallic tribes, 
were the least successful in battle; and secondly, 
the casualties of the defeated were always vastly 
greater than those of the victorious. Why?
It is still a common opinion that, in ancient times, 
opposing armies clashed head-on, the leading
soldiers fighting each other until one side, through 
heavier losses, began to give way. But as du Picq 
point out, if this had been the case, victory would 
have gone to the bravest - or most fanatical - of 
the combatants. Yet the unfanatical Romans 
vanquished many fanatical enemies. And there 
remained the great discrepancy in casualties.
This led du Picq to conclude that not merely was
there a physical force in battle, there was also,
more importantly, a moral force:
BIn battle, two moral forces, even more 
than two material forces, are in conflict.
The stronger conquers. The victor has 
often lost ... more men than the 
vanquished .... With equal or even 
inferior power of destruction, he will win 
who is determined to advance, who ... has 
the moral ascendancy. Moral effect 
inspires fear. Fear must be changed into 
terror in order to conquer .... The moral 
impulse lies in the perception by the 
enemy of the resolution which animates you 
....Manoeuvres ... are threats. Be who 
appears most threatening wins" (35).
Victory, in other words, went to the Army that 
retained its moral cohesion; defeat to the Army that 
lost its moral cohesion. The highly disciplined 
Roman Army, because of that discipline and its 
constant training, retained its moral cohesion. 
Most of its enemies, while individually displaying 
fanatical bravery, had no collective moral cohesion. 
Hence, they were defeated:
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"Never do two equal resolutions meet each 
other in battle .... The abordage is never 
reciprocal .... The enemy never holds his 
position, because, if he is holding, you 
flee" (36).
This also explained the great difference in looses - 
the majority of the vanquished army's casualties 
occurred not in the actual battle, but during the 
flight from the battlefield. The fighting in the 
Far East after 1942 was so unusually savage and 
bitter precisely because the opposing armies kept 
their moral cohesion, making the abordage reciprocal 
and requiring the physical extermination of the 
enemy for the achievement of victory - for example, 
the capture of Iwo Jima, an island only four miles 
long, by the US Marines in 1945, required five weeks 
of bitter fighting, over two months of mopping up, 
cost the Marines 26,000 casualties (30% of the 
entire landing force) and left only a thousand of 
the approximately :;6,000 strong Japanese garrison 
alive, as prisoners (37). This is what happens on 
those rare occasions when combatants have an equal 
moral cohesion.
These psychological/moral factors do not merely 
operate at the level of strategic and political 
leadership. Clausewitz defines the object of war as 
"to compel our enemy to do our will" (38). That is, 
the enemy must accept our will for them. This can, 
at the military level, have a physical meaning - by
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clever use of defences force an enemy to strike in a 
certain direction - but it more usually has 
psychological/moral meaning, especially at a 
political level. Like an Army, a country's leader­
ship and people concede defeat when they believe 
they have been defeated, when they believe they 
cannot resist further. An outstanding military 
example is General Percival's surrender of Singapore 
to an Army half the site of his own, which had 
furthermore outrun its supply lines and so would 
have had to retreat had the British put in a 
counter-attack they were, theoretically, quite 
capable of (39). But they had no moral cohesion, so 
they surrendered. By contrast, Britain herself, 
despite a monotonous run of military defeats from 
1940-1942, was not defeated because the people and 
leadership did not believe they had, as a country, 
been defeated. As with armies, it is the nation 
with the greater moral cohesion that gains the 
victory. And Britain's moral cohesion was never 
higher than in the period 1940-1942.
It must, however, be pointed out that du Picq's 
conceptions were not based on the idea that high 
morale alone was enough to win battles - that was a 
caricature of his theories that was spread by 
Colonel Grandmaison, to disastrous effect on the 
French Army in 1914. For du Picq, training and
discipline were the foundations of moral cohesion.
He did argue that a badly armed, morally cohesive,
Army would defeat a well armed, morally weak Army; 
but he did not despise superior armaments - in fact, 
superior arms in the hands of a morally cohesive
Army made that Army even more formidable and 
effective. And superior arms have their own moral
It is this importance which adheres tr. an Army's and 
nation's moral cohesion, and to their leadership's 
will, which simultaneously makes psychological 
warfare both possible and important. Of all the 
abovementioned strategists, the one who really makes 
subversion (for that is what psychological warfare 
is, for it aims to subvert the enemy's will to
fight, by destroying his moral cohesion) his own is 
Sun Tzu.
As previously mentioned, Sun Tzu is, so to speak, 
for advanced students? many of his aphorisms uc... be 
interpreted simultaneously on several different 
levels - strategic and tactical; military and 
political? and physical and psychological, it must 
also be pointed out that psychological warfare is 
not merely waged against the enemy's troops 
(frequently the most resistant target groups) but 
also against the enemy's leadership and people. it
is towards these ends that Sun Tzu exhorts:
"Anger his {the enemy's] general and 
confuse him" (40).
"Keep him under strain and wear him down"
(41).
- a classical example of the multi-applicability of
Sun Tzu's statements, this one being equally
applicable militarily, politically, tactically,
strategically, economically, physically and
psychologically -
"Now an army may be robbed of its spirit 
and its commander deprived of his courage"
(42) .
And to what intention, to what result, is all this
activity directed?
'Thus, those skilled in war subdue the 
enemy's army without battle► They capture 
his cities without assaulting them and 
overthrow his state without protracted 
operations" (43).
"Thus a victorious army wins its victories 
before seeking battle; an a. ny destined to 
defeat fights in the hope of winning" 
(44).
Properly conducted, psychological warfare is one of 
the most devastating weapons in a country's armoury. 
Its use has become extremely common in the world.
To conclude, we see that war is of violence,
in order to generate a psychological effect on the 
target army, nation, and political leadership, in 
order to achieve a given political end.
- 59 -
*
NOTES
1. Sun Tzu, The Act of War, Oxford Oniversity 1 
Press, London, 1963, cE7 I, v. 1, p. 63.
(Translated and edited by Samuel B. Griffith.)
Sun Tzu's work is organised into chapters, each
subdivided into verses - like the books of the "
Bible. /
2. Ibid. f
3. Ibid., pp. 142-143.
4. Ibid., Ch. VII, v. 14, p. 113.
5. Machiavelli, N., The Prince, Penguin, Translated 
by George Bull, i S f s T p T "HI.
6. Gilbert, P., "Machiavelli : The Renaissance of 
the Art of War*, _in E. Meade Earl (ed. ), Makers 
of Modern Strategy, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1943, p . 22.
7. von Clausewitz, k . , On War, Translated and
edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, p.
67.
8. Ibid., p. 75.
5. Ibid. - 0 I
10. Ibid., p. 76.
11. Ibid., p. 78.
12. Even such a distinguished figure as Sir Basil 
Liddell Hart totally misunderstood Clausewitz - 
as a study of his Histoxy of the First World 
World war will rapidly r e v a "
13. Clausewitz, op.cit,, p. 78.
14. Ibid., pp. 86-87, emphasis added.
15. Ibid., p. 88, Clausewitz' emphasis. >
16. Ibid.
17. Quoted by Gilbert, op.cit., pp. 13-14.
18. See sun Tzu, op.cit., Ch. I, v. 25; Ch. Ill, vs.
4, 5, 10, 11; Ch. IV, v. 10; Ch. XI, V. 53.
19. Ibid., Ch. IV, v. 14, p. 87.
4
1
20. Clausewitz, op.cit., p. 127.
21. Ibid., p. 95, Clausewitzz emphasis.
22. On this, see Sigmund Neumann : * Engels and
Marx: Military Concepts of the Social
Revolutionaries", in E. Mead Earle (ed.). The 
Makers of Modern strategy, Princeton Oniversity 
Press, Princeton, 1943, especially p. 158. 
Another leading student of Clausewitz was Lenin.
23. Rothfels, Hans, "Clausewitz", in E, Meade Earle, 
The Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton 
University press, Prin«to^n, 1943, p . 104.
24. Sun TZU, op.cit., Ch. I, vs, 2, 3,, p.63.
25. Ibid., Ch. I, v. 4, p. 64.
26. Ibid,, Ch. Ill, v. 27, p. 83.
27. Paret, P., "The Genesis of On War" in Clause­
witz, op.cit., p. 11.
28. Clausewitz, ibid., p. 101.
29. Ibid., p. 102,
30. Clausewitz, quoted by Paret, op.cit., p. 17.
31. See H :iton, N., Monty: The Making of a 
Genere 1887-1942, Hamish Hami 1 ton”, London, 
1981, t . 755-848.
32. Clausewitz, op.cit., p. 119,
33. Ibid.
34. See Liddell Hart, Sir Bas;', History of the 
First World War, Pan Bc '-.s, "London, 1970, 
especially pp. 298-J02,
35. du Picq, quoted by Possony : Prtssony, S.T. and 
Mantoux, E., "du Picq an-.1 ^ch: The French
School", irs E. Meade Earle • ^  i i, The Makers of 
Modern Strategy, Princetc ',„iversity Press, 
Princeton, 1943, p. 210.
36. Ibid., p. 211. Abordage - hen-i-on clash.
37. See Liddeli Hart, sir Basil, History of the 
Second World War, Pan Books, London, 1970, pp. 
860-661.
38. Clausewitz, op.cit., p.75, Clausewitz' emphasis .
Calvocorressi, P. and Wink, G., Total War: 
Causes and Courses of the Second World WarT 
Pelican, London, 1972, pp. 719-,29.
, Ch. I, v. 22, p. 67.
24, p. 68.
v. 20, p. 108.
43, Ibid., Ch. Ill, v, 10, p. 79.
44. Ibid. , Ch. IV, v. 14, p. 87.
40. Sun Tau, op.cit
41. Ibid,, Ch. I, v
42. Ibid., Ch. CII,
- 62
CHAPTER 3: SEA POWER
The contemporary world has been moulded more by Sea
Power than by any other single factor. North, South
America, Australasia, Africa, Asit all exist in 
their current political forms as a direct result of 
the successful exercise of Sea Power by various
European powers at various times - Portugal
initi^'ly,: Britain ultimately and most success­
fully. Without the European discovery of Global Sea 
Power (as distinct from Regional Sea Power), the 
world would be an unimaginably different place.
Today, the United States of America is, basically, a 
maritime power (1), while Imperial Russia - and, 
later, the Soviet Union - have aspired to this 
status since the reign of Peter the Great (2). The 
sea provides the mobility and protection fo*. the 
most potent arm of modern nuclear strategy - the 
nuclear powered Ballistic Missile Suo,aarine (SSBN). 
Sea Power has also played a critically important, if 
often unnoticed supportive, role in the vast 
majority of foreign intervention operations under­
taken by major powers (3).
No understanding of the contemporary use of armed 
forces is possible without an understanding of what 
Sea Power involves. As in the proceeding chapters,
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this understanding will be achieved through an 
examination of the ideas of :he leading theorists of 
Sea Power.
The first and most famous of these was American 
Rear-Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan was the 
first to realise that the phenomenon of control of 
the seas was an historical factor which had never 
been expounded systematically. This gap he set out 
to remedy, doing so in three monumental studies: The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783; The 
Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution 
and Empire 1793-1612? and Sea Power in its Relation 
to the War of 1812. In these, his great works, 
Mahan made three significant contributions:
1. he developed a philosophy of sea power, a 
philosophy which gained wide acceptance at the 
highest naval -md political levels;
2. he formulated a new naval strategy
3. he was a leading commentator on naval tactics.
Additionally, he, like clausewitz, recognised that 
naval war, like land war, was essentially a 
political act intended to achieve a political end.
Experience shows that technological advances have 
little impact on strategy, but they nearly always
have a great impact on tactics. Naval technological 
advances since Mahan have thus rendered many of his 
tactical, though none of his strategical, 
observations, obsolete, and they will not be 
considered here (4).
For Mahan, Power was an absolute necessity for 
national survival, and the most important form of 
Power was Sea Power. He pointed out rhe immense 
importance of trade to national economics - and that 
the cheapest, yet most rapid, form of transport for 
such commerce was by water - whether ocean, sea, 
lake, river or canal. And, for most goods, this 
still holds: harbours are still full of ships? the
great inland waterways, such as the Great Lakes and 
Mississipi in North America, the Rhine and Danube in 
Europe, the Yangtze in Asia, and many more, still 
bustle with trade.
For, as Mahan pointed out, but is often forgotten, 
the sea covers 71% of the Earth's surface, and that 
the obstacles in it - islands, rocks, reefs, etc. 
are only a small fraction of the total? in a real 
sense, ships can go anywhere on the Oceans, and, 
thanks to the great river and lake networks, can 
also penetrate deep into every inhabited continent 
except Africa.
Trade, of course, makes countries rich, and the more 
trade -one has, the richer one is. Naturally, 
countries with their own merchant fleets are better 
off than those who must use foreign ships; and best 
off of all are those countries who have capacity to 
spare to carry o .ter nations' trade as well as their
Buc what of the requirements of war? Mahan believed 
that wars were inevitable; and that Sea Power was 
the critical issue in any war. States with powerful 
navies could protect their merchant fleets, and 
therefore their trade, and therefore their 
economies, and, ultimately, their ability to wage 
war. Conversely, countries with weak navies would 
see their trade destroyed, leading to economic 
distress which would increase over time, resulting 
in the undermining of their war efforts.
Nor was this all; any state that was Mistress of the 
Seas would possess complete freedom of action to 
strike her enemies wherever and whenever she 
desired.
As is well known, Mahan's model for Sea power was 
the Royal Navy of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. 
The British always had one objective: command of the 
sea; to this end they always set out to bring to
action and destroy the only possible threat to this 
command: the enemy fleets. By contrast, the model
of what not to do was the French Navy of the same 
period; the French sought always to use the sea, 
never to control it; they sought to avoid fleet 
action, never to encourage iz. The result was that 
while British ships, both naval and merchant, had 
total freedom of the seas (despite the attempts of 
privateers - commerce raiders - to harass the 
latter), French ships, naval and merchant, rotted in 
harbour. The French economy suffered terribly as a 
result. In the 17th and 18th centuries, each war 
left Britain economically stronger - even th . ->f 
Independence, which was a major military d< 
while simultaneously leaving France even more
exhausted.
The wars against the French Revolution and Napoleon 
were possible only because of British Sea Power. 
Not only did the Royal Navy keep Britain physically 
inviolate, but by protecting British commerce it 
allowed Britain to support not only her own war
effort, but also those of her allies. Without
British gold, the great armies of Russia, Prussia, 
Austria and the lesser states could not have been
nursed, trained, equipped and deployed in battle
against the French. These large, proud forces were, 
like the much smaller British Army nothing more than
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an extension of the Royal Navy. And Napoleon's 
downfall - the invasion of Spain and Russia - was 
the uirect result of his desperate attempts to 
negate Britain's sea control by use of land power.
But what are the sources of Sea Power (5)? Mahan 
lists six fundamental factors:
1. Geographical Position: the most obvious 
illustrations of this are Britain and Japan? 
islands well placed vis a vis their respective 
continents to dominate the extraterritorial 
trade routes z.nd, of course, able to devote 
most of their miliary effort to sea power 
(and, later, air power which is analogous to 
sea power). By contrast, huge Russia has to 
maintain widely separated and unsupporting 
fleets, while simultaneously requiring a huge 
army to guard her massive and geographically 
open land frontiers. Thus Britain ana Japan 
are 'natural' sea powers, Russia is not.
2. Physical Conformation: this refers to the 
character of the coastline and condition of 
the country. A coastline indented with many 
good harbous is a potential source of great 
naval strength; poor soil could drive people 
to take to the sea, for example, Norway; rich
lands could encourage them to ignore the sea, 
for example, France.
3. Extent of territory: this can be a source of
strength or weakness? a .large territory with a 
large population would be a source of strength 
(for example, the United States of America); 
but a large territory with a small population 
would be a source of weakness, especially if 
it possessed many bays and rivers: these
waterways could be easily exploited by hostile 
naval powers. This is precisely what happened 
to the confederacy during the American Civil 
War, greatly aiding the North's victory.
4. Population: this refers not the the total
population of a country, but to the sea- 
connected element: seamen, shipyard workers,
chandlers, etc.: a large sea-connected element 
of the population is an essential base for sea 
power - such a population base allows for 
rapid naval expansion in wartime. Britain 
remains a classic example.
5. National Character: a trading mentality and a
manufacturing capability are required? if 
these attitudes and abilities exist, and are 
coupled with a good sea coast, it is unlikely
that a people will be deterred from taking to 
the sea.
6. Character of Government: this element is
absolutely vital; Governments should encourage 
national interest in the sea, encoutage 
maritime commerce and maintain a strong Navy 
and the infrastructure needed to make that 
Navy effective - such as. overseas bases. 
Without such bases, the radius of action of 
the fleet is greatly curtailed. Britain's 
global Empire was made possible, and 
maintained, by her assiduous collection of 
strategically important overseas bases 
Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Aden, Cape of Good 
Hope, Singapore, to mention a few.
If all six factors were favourable to the 
development of sea Power, then the country would 
inevitably achieve sea power.
But, of course, Sea Power is not an end in itself. 
It is, as with all forms of power, a means to 
political ends. Strangely enough, perhaps because 
it lacked the glamour accorded to the other themes 
in Mahan's writings, this element has largely been 
ignored by his admirers.
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Mahan termed this overriding political purpose the 
Object of the war. This Object, in turn, embraced 
one or more specific Objectives, the achievement of 
which fulfilled the Object (6). For Mahan, the 
Objective was a tactical concept, and was concerned 
with the correct employment of Sea Power to achieve 
the object. An analysis of the Object was thus the 
essential first step of any war. Next, it was 
necessary to determine bhe military Objectives to be 
gained by the employment of armed forces. Finally, 
once these Objectives had been achieved, their 
impact on the general politico-military situation 
must be studied: have r.h^ y, I: fact, accomplished
the Object?
This dual concept of Object/Objective provided Mahan 
with a framework for the analysis and understanding 
of past wars. And it was from these historical 
studies that Mahan concluded that the Objective in 
naval war was Command of the Sea (also known as Sea 
Control).
Mahan's analytical framework was composed of three 
elements. Firstly, the identification of the 
principal and secondary belligerents - a quite 
straightforward but nevertheless essential step. 
Secondly, the Object of the war, from the viewpoints 
of the various belligerents, must; be ascertained;
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Why have they -.cne to war? The answer to this 
question inevi.-bly involves consideration of 
National interest and Rational Policy; as a result, 
the Object of the war must be stated in terms of the 
uJ ‘-.imate political effects the various belligerents 
wish to achieve, The Object, to reiterate, must be 
political, because war is political. Thirdly, each 
of the belligerents must select the military 
objectives whose achievement will create the 
political effect that is the Object of the war. If 
the belligerent is revisionist, seeking to modify or 
destroy the status quo, then it is necessary for it 
to go on to the strategic offensive. Should the 
belligerent seek to uphold the status quo then it is 
inevitably on the strategic defensive - after all, 
he is defending against a challenge. However, the 
campaigner for the status quo has the choice of 
adopting the tactical defensive - awaiting the
challenger's attack - or the tactical offensive - 
pre-empting the challenger.
Whatever the posture of the belligerent
revisionist or status quo - it is imperative that a 
hierarchy of objectives be established. This
hierarchy should be both programmatic (laying down
immediate, middle-range and long-range objectives) 
and geographic (designating the geographic areas for 
primary and secondary effort, the latter being areas
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that can be weakened, with reasonable safety, in 
order to strengthen the former).
This analytical framework provided Mahan with a tool 
that was simultaneously simple, yet also 
comprehensive and flexible - and, note, one that was 
not restricted it. application to naval conflicts.
Britain's leading maritime strategist was Sir Julian 
Corbett, a near contemporary of Mahan, and, un­
usually for a British strategist, a civilian (a 
lawyer by training, he later became a civil servant 
and an eminent historian) (7).
Corbett wrote at a time of great technological 
change - and a time when officers had not yet become 
used to the concept of such changes. As a result, 
many believed that these changes - steam replacing 
sail; rifled guns replacing smooth bores; turrets 
replacing broadsides; massive increases in gunnery 
ranges and ships displacements; the development of 
wireless; and so on - had rendered obsolete the 
accumulated strategic experience of the previous 
centuries. Corbett totally disagreed, in his book, 
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, he developed a 
threefold approach to the & -ject. First, he 
presented a theory of war, heavily based on the 
concepts developed by Clausewitz; second, and based
on his theory of war, he developed a theory of naval 
war; finally, he examinee he specific requirements 
for the conduct of naval war.
Corbett, unsurprisingly, regarded war as the use of 
violence to achieve a desired political end. As a 
Clauswitzian, Corbett placed this at the centre of 
his theory of war. Military force is employed to 
fulfill the ends of policy; but policy is, in turn, 
a conclusion, or decision, or evaluation, derived 
from a process that is very definitely political, In 
which key political interests such as National 
Security (among others) are weighed, balanced, 
appraised. Corbett recognised that this process was 
further affected by national, group, and individual 
perceptions. Thus, when required to plan for a war, 
the naval and military Commanders must, Corbett 
argues, ask three fundamental questions. What is 
the war about? How much value is to be attached to 
the political objects of the war? And how much 
value does the enemy attach to his political object 
of the war? Without a meaningful understanding of 
the answers to these questions, the armed forces 
chiefs will be unable to deploy their forces for 
maximum effectiveness, and so much of the war effort 
will be wasted and irrelevant - if not disastrous.
Having established his theory of war, which acts as
the overall unifying element, establishing as it 
does the relationship between the use of naval and 
ground forces and the political goals sought by 
their use, Corbett moves on to a discussion of 
maritime strategy.
Corbett viewed maritime strategy as a series of 
principles - but not prescriptive ('how to') 
principles, rather analytical principles, describing 
the subject matter and, if mastered, allowing a 
greater understanding af naval war. These 
principles are intended to educate the Fleet 
Commander, not guide him. To reiterate: they are
rP'iUired for elucidation, analysis and understand­
ing, and most definitely not for prescription.
Corbett states his first principle of naval strategy
"The object of naval warfare must always 
be directly or indirectly either to secure 
the command of the sea or to prevent the 
enemy from securing it" (8).
With the achievement ef this command of the Sea, 
purely naval strategy is concluded. With command of 
the Sea, the successful fleet - and country - can 
exercie.e control of the use of the sea. Subsequent 
naval operations are thus concerned with using the 
sea to achieve other objects - such as invading 
enemy territory.
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But what does Command of the Sea involve? It is an
often forgotten fact that the sea cannot be occupied
or possessed; nor can fleets live off it like armies
can live off the land. Essentially, the Sea is a
means of communication. For Corbett:
"Command of the sea is essentially control 
of maritime communications for a specific 
purpose" (9).
In other words Sea Control is the ability to move 
forces or supplies or whatever across the sea 
without encountering significant opposition, plus 
the ability to prevent the enemy from so doing. The 
purpose of this Command of the Sea is, of course, 
dependent on the political perceptions and decisions 
which originally led to the imposition or achieve­
ment of this Control.
It must be stressed that, for Corbett, Sea Control 
was not, could not, be a Zero-Sum Game. in other 
words, denying the enemy Command of the Sea does not 
automatically confer such Command on ourselves, and 
vice versa. This is precisely the characteristic of 
maritime conflict that makes possible - and requires
- the constant conflicts over Command of the Seas. 
Another effect of this is the creation of several 
grades of Control of the Sea. Corbett lists five 
such grades (10):
1. Absolute Control - in other words. Command of 
the Sea: here, one side possesses total 
freedom of action without interference? the 
other cannot funcion at all.
2. Working Control - here, the dominant state can 
function with a considerable amount of freedom 
while only encountering a minimum of risk? the 
subordinate state can only operate with 
considerable risk.
3. Control in dispute - in this case, both 
combatants operate with high levels of risk, 
and each finds itself required to establish 
Working Control in certain areas of the sea 
for limited times, in order to conduct 
specific operations. In historical terms, 
this condition has prevailed more frequently 
than the alternatives.
4. Enemy working Control - the inverse of 2.
5. Enemy Absolute Control - the opposite of 1.
The point is, command of the Sea involves control of 
an opponent. As Corbett emphasises, naval warfare 
is concerned with communications, not 'holding 
ground'. The above categories - which are only 
meant to be rough classifications, not precise 
statements - indicate that Sea Control is always a 
relative situation, heavily dependent on geography, 
time, and the relative fighting capacity of both
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sides, =md that it always involves a degree of risk.
One means of establishing Sea Control is by battle; 
but the Sea Battle is solely a means to the end of
Sea Control. Once the b&ttle has been won, then the
real business of "deadening the national activities 
at sea" (II) begins. It is this secondary action, 
this use of Sea Control after it has been gained,
that is the instrument for compelling the enemy to
make peace.
Thus, one is able to categorise naval operations in 
war by their relationship to either the Primary 
action - disputing and/or obtaining Command of the 
Sea - or the Secondary (but, ultimately, more 
importa.it) action - exercising Command of the sea.
In turn, these two forms of action give rise to no 
less than three general categories of naval 
operations (12): methods of obtaining Command;
methods of disputing Command; methods of exercising 
Command.
For the stronger power, the best method of obtaining 
Command of the Sea is to seek out and destroy the 
enemy battlefleet, in order to terminate as rapidly 
as possible the condition of disputed Control; 
failing this, the enemy fleet should be blockaded in
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harbour. This is the traditional Anglo-American 
approach.
When the relative strengths of both combatants are 
not adequate for either to achieve Sea Control, the 
condition of disputed Control prevails. This 
condition can be maitained by the weaker combatant 
provided it skillfully utilises its maritime assets 
and the unique characteristics of maritime warfare - 
for example, evading the enemy battlefield, in order 
to achieve a 'fleet in being' strategy.
Exercising Command of the Sea is a different matter 
altogether: it is predicated upon prior achievement
of Command of the Sea, and is concerned with using 
the sea to achieve specific purposes. Examples of 
the exercise of Command of the Sea would be defence 
against invasion (requiring the destruction of 
transports, as the primary target); or attacking
enemy trade, or defending one's own trade?
amphibious landings and the support thereof; and so 
on. In these cases, the specific operation in
progress, and the requirements for its success, must 
take priority over all other possible objectives. 
"The hierarchy of objectives must be observed" (13).
Together, Mahan and Corbett have distilled the 
experiences of, and become the strategic orthodoxies
for, the Anglo-American maritime tradition. Though 
the Anglo-Americans are inarguably the greatest 
practitioners of naval warfare and maritime strategy 
in history, theirs were not the only experiences and 
strategies that have existed. And no survey of 
maritime strategy would be complete without a brief 
survey o£ some of the alternative views of sea power 
held and practised by other Great Powers, albeit 
with far less success. We shall examine the case of 
Germany.
Germany, as a state, only came into being in 1871. 
True, the core of the new Empire, Prussia, had a 
long and proud history wi'ih a superb record of 
military achievement. This record acted as the firm 
foundation on which the German Army was established. 
But Prussia had always neglected the sea. There was 
thus little basis of naval tradition for the new 
German Navy. Indeed, from 1872 to 1883 the imperial 
Navy was commanded by Army Officers (14) I Thus, 
from 1872 on, the Navy had to build almost every­
thing from scratch - including the strategies that 
the new fleet was intended to serve.
In the initial period (1872-1888), while there was a 
steady development of both equipment and infra­
structure, the Navy remained firmly bound to a Coast 
Defence strategy, which, in the event of war, sought
to prevent any amphibious invasions or naval 
bombardments of German territories (15). This was 
the change dramatically following Wilhelm II's 
accession to the throne (15 June 1688) and his 
appointment of then Rear-Admiral von Tirpitz as 
State Secretaqry of the Navy Office (18 June 1897). 
In the years between Wilhelm's accession and 
Tirpitz1 appointment, the Emperor had overseen a 
considerable expansion of the Imperial fleet. How­
ever, no strategic doctrine existed for the growing 
fleet (which now included a sea-going battle
squadron), nor was there any consistent or organised 
naval construction programme. This all changed
under Tirpitz (16).
The details of Tirpitz' enormous fleet build-up,
which transformed the Imperial German Navy from a 
minor force to the world's second most powerful
fleet, is of no direct concern to this discussion. 
What is of importance is the strategy it was
designed to fulfil (17).
Admiral von Tirpitz not only oversaw the material
and personnel build-up of the fleet, but provided 
its raison d'etre. For Tirpitz, * Britain was 
Germany's ultimate enemy, and the new fleet was to 
be the instrument par excellence for employment
against Britain. Tirpitz' obsession with Britain as
a foe was shared by virtually non-one else in the 
Imperial government.
Tirpitz had read, but misunderstood, Mahan (19). In 
his Service Memorandum No. IX, Tirpitz recognised 
that a successful war at sea was predicated upon 
Command of the Sea; that this Command could be had 
only at the expense of the enemy? that the only 
means to achieve this Command was by a Strategic 
Offensive? and that such an offensive would require 
at least a one-third superiority (20). Yet Tirpitz
realised that such superiority could never be 
achieved against the target country - Britain. His 
response was to develop an ingenious, but highly
flawed, theory - that of Risikoflotte (Risk fleet),
which became German strategy with the First Naval 
Law of 1898.
In essence, the Risikoqedanke accepted that the 
German Navy could never be strong enough to defeat 
the Royal Navy (RN), but sought to achieve a
situation whereby, should the two fleets ever clash, 
the German could inflict enough damage on the RN to 
endanger the letter's supremacy vis-a-vis third 
fleets (for example, Russia), this potentiality 
acting (it was hoped) as a deterrent against
Britain. In other words, unable to defeat- Britain 
at sea, the Navy would detor Britain from going to
war with Germany (21). But if Britain should go to 
war, Tirpitz believed that the requirements of 
Command of the Sea would necessitate an attack on 
the German fleet, which could thus plan for battle 
on its own terms - specifically, in the Heligoland 
Bight, where mines, submarines, torpedo-boats, shore 
batteries, etc. would equalise the odds between the 
two sides (22).
And this was where the misunderstanding of Mahan 
entered the picture. Tirpitz, and the Imperial Navy 
in general, saw command as simply military 
supremacy, and not as Control of communications, 
which is actually what it is all about. In short, 
as long as the Imperial fleet did not threaten 
British communications, there was no need for the RN 
to attack it (23). So Tirpitz' strategy had 
actually no military basis! it had a purely 
psychological base - and a very questionable and 
unstable one at that. Should the British refuse to 
be intimidated by Tirpitz' fleet, or should they 
react to the threat: in a manner other than that 
expected by Tirpitz, the German fleet would be left, 
so to speak, high and dry - trapped in numerical 
inferiority, and lacking any workable strategy.
This is precisely what happened: Britain's
rapprochements with France and Russia, plus her
9earlier alliance with Japan, combined to 
'diplomatically eliminate' all significant third 
fleets. The whole basis of the Risikoqedanke was 
demolished (24). Moreover, as Command of the Sea 
involved Control of communications, and as the RN 
could guard Britain's communications most 
effectively from its remote base at Scapa Flow, far 
beyond the reach of the short-ranged German fleet, 
there was no need for the British to enter the 
Heligoland Bight and do battle there. The British 
refusal to follow Tirpitz' script totally demolished 
the German Navy's strategical posture, and left a 
bewildered High Command seeking palliatives. None 
were effective (25).
paradoxically, the Imperial fleet's greatest 
contribution to Germany was its post-war suicide by 
scuttling at Scapa Flow on 21 June 1919, giving:
"War-weary and humiliated Germany ... an
opportunity to celebrate and rejoice"
(25).
Fleets, however, do not exist to scuttle themselves. 
But a post-war evaluation of what, strategically 
speaking 'went wrong', was delayed by a desperate, 
and highly effective, rearguard action by Admiral 
von Tirpitz, seeking to obscure his responsibility 
for the disaster (27). Not until 1926 was a serious 
criticism of the Risikoflotte propounded within
Germany - by retired Vice-Admiral Wolfgang Wegener.
Wegener damned Tirpitz' strategy by virtue of its 
defensive orientation and by the fact that it failed 
to realise that the North Sea - Tirpitz" arena for 
decision - was 'strategically dead': i.e. contained
no key British Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). 
in other words, Wegener exposed Tirpitz' total 
failure to appreciate that Command of the Sea 
involved Command of Sea Lines of communication. For 
Wegener, German naval strategy should have involved 
the seizure of Denmark and perhaps South-West 
Norway, so providing the imperial fleet with 
advanced bases vis-a-vis the British, cutting the 
SLOC with Scandinavia, and threatening that with 
Russia. This would have forced the British fleet to 
do battle with the imperial fleet (27). in the 
tremendous excitement generated by Wegener's 
perception of the importance of SLOC's, and by his 
proposals for circumventing Germany's poor geo­
strategic position vis-a-vis Britain, many German 
commentators failed to observe that he had totally 
forgotten to consider the German fleet's gross 
numerical inferiority as against the Royal Navy, 
which would, in fact, have rendered suicidal any 
such challenge as proposed by Wegener (29).
This weakness of Wegener's led him and his
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successors into a view of sea power as distorted, in 
its own way, as that of Tirpitz. While Command of 
the Sea involves control of SLOCs, it is not 
restricted to such Control, nor is it achieved by 
attempting to limit oneself to such control. This 
Wegener failed to state clearly, and his successors 
failed to understand. Rather, they developed an 
almost exclusive focus upon SLOCs, which resulted J.a 
a conception of naval warfare being' primarily an 
instrument for undermining trade by means of a 
'tonnage warfare' waged by submarines and surface 
raiders (30).
This misinterpretation reached its peak with Admiral 
Assmann, writ' ig before and during the first half of 
the Second World War. Assmann focused almost 
exclusively upon SLOCs and thus upon 'economic 
warfare', claiming that this was a new form of naval 
warfare, introduced by the British with their
adoption of the remote blockade in 1914 (31). This 
was a fundamental misreading of British policy. In 
1914 the British already had Command of the Sea - 
they had possessed it since 1805 and the Battle of 
Trafalgar; of the other major fleets, Russia, Japan 
and France were allies; the United States neutral;
and the German fleet, thanks to Tirpitz and
geography, was unable to contest this British 
Command. Britain's blockade was simply one aspect
of exercising her Command of the Sea; the fact it 
was remote and not close was simply a tactial 
adaptation to neutralise the threat of the submarine 
and torpedo boat. „
decause of this profound error, Assmann was led 
astray from -he crux of true naval strategy -
achieve Command first, and Control of SLOCs will
automatically follow - to focus on na"al warfare as 
purely a trade conflict; to, finally, an acceptance 
of enemy (British) Command, to the extent of 
avoiding action with enemy naval units in favour cff 
an exclusive concentration upon attacks on merchant 
shipping (32) .
Though the German Wavy achieved much more in the
Second World War than in the First, and though the
U-boat force was a major threat So Britain until 
inid-1542, distorted thinking such as Assmann's 
prevented the German Navy from achieving its full 
threat potential vic-a-vis Britain and led to a 
total misuse of its major surface combatants, which 
were employed in isolation as surface raiders and 
not collectively as a Battlefleet, and so were 
tracked down and destroyed in detail. It also led 
to the abandonment of work on the aircraft carrier 
Graf Zeppelin in favour of more U-boats. Unbeknown 
to Berlin, the British feared a Battlefleet centred
•'S ^-jac
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on the Graf Zeppelin far more than the extra U-Boats 
produced in her stead (33).
The experience of Germany in the pe:_od J.898-1945 
clearly illustrates the continuing validity of the 
Mahan-Corbett strategic approach; the inadequacy of 
a l t e r . - - * - h n  ' 'rr- -ach,- and the grave 
difficultier facing a country with, in naval terms, 
a poor geostrategic position and inadequate 
resources, which .seeks to dispute command of the
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CHAPTER 4: AIR POWER
Of all the contemporary forms of military power, air 
power is the youngest (1), least formulated, most 
controversial (2), and yet, in some ways, the most 
important. The story of the great theories of air 
power - propounded by General Guilio Douhet in 
Italy, General William Mitchell in the United States 
of America, and Marshal of the RAF (as he became) 
Lord Trenchard in Britain - and their fate is itself 
interesting.
Whereas all theories of land and sea warfare - of 
war in general, in fact - were preceded by centuries 
of practice, the complete opposite applies to air 
war. Douhet first wrote on air power in 1909, 
before any aerial conflict had occurred, while his 
first serious writings on the topic date from 1921? 
'Billy' Mitchell's zealous advocacy of air power 
also began - at least as far as public notice was 
concerned - in 1921? while Trenchard's view of 
aerial warfare dated from at least his experiences 
in Command of the 'independent Air Force' carrying 
out strategic raids against Germany during 1918 (3). 
In other words, their theories were bold projections 
into the future based on a weak foundation of 
experience - a mere four years' worth at the most. 
Compare this with the centuries that Mahan and
wCorbett could draw on when constructing their 
theories 1 And many of the aerial activities of the 
First World War had been embryonic, tentative, 
uncertain. Strategic bombing was one of the most 
tentative elements in applied air power during the 
War. Yet, as we shall see, it was precisely on this 
far from proven aspect of warfare that the three 
theorists of military aviation focussed their 
attention, and upon which they constructed their 
intellectual edifices. In other words, for the 
first time in history, military men, to play upon 
the old cliche, planned for the next war and not the 
last one. How successful they were shall be shown 
in due course.
But what were their theories?
Douhet's arguments (4) proceded from two basic 
assumptions: firstly, that aircraft were offensive
weapons of immense capability against which no 
effective defence was likely; and secondly, that 
civilian morale would be destroyed by the bombing of 
population centres. it was upon these foundations 
that he constructed his theory, which contained five 
main elements. The first of these was to the effect
"in order to assure an adequate national 
defence, it is necessary - and sufficient
- to be in a position in case of war to 
conquer the command of the air" (5).
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Assuming one is, at the outbreak of a war, in such a 
position, the primary objectives for attack, 
according to Douhet, should not be the enemy's 
military installations, but rather his industrial 
and population centres - invariably targets remote 
from the actual combat zone between the contending 
ground forces. It is in this element of his theory 
that Douhet's assumptions on civilian morale are 
most obvious, as in this graphic account of the 
(supposed) impact of attacks upon population 
centres:
"At this point I want to stress one aspect 
of the problem - namely, that the effect 
of such aerial offensives upon morale may 
well have more influence upon the conduct 
of war than their material effects. For 
example, take the center of a large city 
and imagine what would happen among the 
civilian population during a single attack 
by a single bombing unit. For my part, I 
have no doubt that its impact upon the 
people would be terrible ....
"What could happen to a single city in a 
single day could also happen to ten, 
twenty, fifty cities. And, since news
travels fast, even without telegraph, 
telephone, or radio, what, I ask you,
would be the effect upon civilians of 
other cities, not yet stricken but equally 
subject to bombing? What civil or 
military authority could keep order, 
public services functioning, and 
production going under such a threat? And 
even if a semblance of order was 
maintained and some work done, would not 
the sight of a single enemy plane be 
enough to stampede the population into 
panic? in short, normal life would be 
impossible in this constant nightmare of 
imminent death and destruction. And if on 
the second day another ten, twenty, or
fifty cities were bombed, who could keep 
all those lost, panic-stricken people from 
fleeing to the open countryside to escape
pthis terror from the air?
"A complete breakdown of the social 
structure cannot but take place in a 
country subjected to this kind of 
merciless pounding from the air. The time 
would soon come when, to put an end to 
horror and suffering, the people them­
selves, driven by the instinct of self- 
presevation, would rise up and demand an 
end to the war - this before their army 
and navy had time to mobilise at all I" 
(6) .
It is clear from this that Douhet was a firm
believer in what has become known as Total War, a
belief he stated explicitly:
"The prevailing forms of social 
organisation have given war a character of 
national totality - that is, the entire 
population and all the resources of a 
nation are sucked into the maw of war.
And, since society is now definitely 
evolving along this line, it is within the 
power of human foresight to see now that 
future wars will be total in character and 
scope" (7).
Douhet devoted much attention to the mathematical 
details of aerial destruction - the number of tons 
of bombs required to totally destroy a given area of 
territory, for example - but these are of no 
importance to this discussion (8).
The third element of Douhet1s theory was that the 
enemy air force should be destroyed not in air-to- 
air combat, but by the bombing of its ground 
installations and of the factories on which its 
existence depends.
95 -
Unsurprisingly, the 'conventional' services - the 
army and the navy - were assigned secondary roles in 
Douhet's schemes. Basically, their role was purely 
defensive, restricted to holding a front in order to 
prevent enemy ground forces from advancing and over­
running one's air bases and aviation infrastructure 
before one's air force had paralysed the enemy's 
ability to maintain ground and naval forces, and 
destroyed their will to resist. Actually, Douhet 
appears to have believed that a well planned, well 
prepared aerial bombardment would cause such a rapid 
enemy collapse that only minor ground forces would 
be needed to hold the frontiers - in his book, 
Command of the Air, Douhet pictured France, in a 
scenario for a future war, capitulating within 36 
hours after four of her cities had been devastated 
by one hour's bombing each: (9).
Finally, Douhet argued, for reasons of efficiency 
and economy, that specialised types of aircraft such 
as bombers or fignters should be disposed of; 
rather, the backbone of the air force should be 
composed of so-called 'Battle Planes'. Such Battle 
Planes would be primarily employed for bombarding 
enemy targets, would be totally self-defending but 
could, if required, be used for aerial combat. 
Douhet saw the airplane as a relatively simple and 
cheap weapon, capable of changes in function merely
Vby changing onboard equipment. So, in Douhet's
opinion, bombs and/or fuel could easily be
substituted for offensive or defensive armament.
Furthermore, Douhet believed that it was possible to
directly convert civil aircraft into military combat
aircraft and vice versa:
"If we examine carefully the functional 
characteristics of bombing and combat
planes as I have tried to define them, we
can readily see that they are in general
almost identical with the functional 
characteristics of civil aviation. When 
all is said and done, the bombing plane is 
essentially a transport plane of medium 
speed and sufficient radius of action, 
especially equipped to carry bombs ..."
(10).
Note the phrase "medium speed" - Douhet regarded 
speed in aircraft as an issue on which "no emphasis 
need be placed ... it is of little importance" in 
comparison to the other elements of aircraft 
performance (11).
Nor did Douhet believe in the retention of reserves
- for him, the proposed aerial onslaught was an all- 
or-nothing affair from the word go, into which every 
available aircraft should be thrown, in order to 
guarantee victory.
Finally, it should be pointed out that, for Douhet,
air power was cheap power:
"An air force adequate to gain the mastery
of the air, especially in the first period
of the conflict, only requires limited
weapons, limited personnel, and small 
financial resources'’ (12).
Here Douhet was claiming discovery of the 
philosipher's stone of strategy: assured victory -
cheaply, tittle wonder his views were popular (13).
What of Trenchard? Paradoxically, Trenchard, by
virtue of his position as Chief of Air Staff (CAS)
for ten years following the First World War, was
simultaneously the aerial strategist who made the
greatest practical impact and the least articulate
contribution to the body of theory I According to
Sir John Slessor, Trenchard was:
"very inarticulate - his mind always 
worked quicker than his tongue? he was 
almost physically incapable of expressing 
his thoughts on paper ... his instructions 
were often a cause of puzzlement (and 
sometimes amusement) to his staff 
officers. His closest friends (or worst 
enemies), could hardly accuse him of being 
an intellectual type of officer. But he 
had a flair, an inwtinct for getting at 
the really essential core of a problem"
(14).
As a result, it is not possible to present, in 
Trenchard's case, an outline of a detailed and 
coherent strategy of air power. But he did succeed 
in infusing the RAF with a very definite conception 
of air power, and, perhaps more importantly, in 
preserving the Force's independence from Army and/or
The theoretical background to Trenchard's own 
opinions, and to the creation of the RAF, were 
undoubtedly the second Smuts Report on Air Power 
(issued 17 August 1917) and a memo by air power 
enthus • t Admiral Mark Kerr (October 1917) (15).
The Smuts Commission on Air Power had been 
establish as a result of popular pressure caused 
by German air raids on London (using conventional 
aircraft rather than airships) which had commenced 
in June 1917. The British public demanded defence 
and reprisals. The first Smuts Report concerned 
defence; the second examined Air Power in general 
(16).
The central theme of the Second Report was
aviation's capability for operations independent of
those of naval or ground forces, and that as a
result of this, aviation forces should be
independent of naval and ground forces. These
independent air operations, unsurprisingly, took the
form of strategic air attacks on enemy industrial
and population centres - in Smuts’ words;
"the day may not be far off when aerial 
operations with their devastation of enemy 
lands an,, destruction of industrial and 
populous centres on a vast scale may 
become the principal operations of war to 
which the older forms of military and 
naval operations become secondary and 
subordinate" (17) .
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While Smuts recognised that air power aia3 had a 
tactical aspect, this was more a token gesture than 
anything else - the primary thrust was on strategic 
bombing:
"It is important for the winning of the 
war that we should not only have secure 
air predominance, but secure it on a very 
large scale; and having secured it in this 
war we should make every effort and 
sacrifice to maintain it for tne future.
Air supremacy may in the long run become 
as Important a factor in the defence of 
the Empire as sea supremacy” (18).
The thrust of the Smuts Report was reinforced by the 
Kerr Memorandum, written for the then President of 
the Air B-'ard, Lord Cowdray, who had complained of 
Cabinet prevarication 111 the establishment of a new, 
independent, Air Ministry to oversee British aerial 
operations (19).
Kerr's arguments can be most succinctly related in
his own words:
"This memo is to point out, shortly, the 
extraordinary danger of delay in forming 
the Air Ministry and commencing on a 
proper Air Policy.
"In strategy it is necessary to put 
oneself in the enemy's place, and to 
decide what he will do. Information which 
confirms this is valuable.
"Germany will reason thus:
" 'Armies and Navies depend for existence 
on supplies and communications; destroy 
these and the enemy is beaten. Formerly 
we worked to outflank an enemy on land, in 
order to cut his communications; he then 
had to retire, or be surrounded and 
surrender. This principle remains, but
modern warfare renders it impossible to 
carry it out round the flanks of the
Allied Armies? the battle-line is too
long, and there is no room for a flanking
army of sufficient size on the map,, 
Therefore we must go over the Allied line 
and stop them from coming over us. It is 
thus necessary to reduce output in the
Army and Navy and make a huge bombing
squadron to destroy the British and French 
aerodromes and machines, before they come 
and destroy ours, and also to bomb their 
factories out of existence. When we have 
done this, the Allies' supplies will be 
reduc'd and cut off, and their Armies must 
eithei retire or surrender.
"'The .submarines will continue the same 
work a1- sea. Our German policy is there­
fore, to cut down output in everything 
except submarines and aircraft, and to 
increase our squadrons of underwater and 
air craft. We must strain every nerve to 
make our attack before the Allies make 
theirs. If we succeeded in this, their 
attacking machines will be destroyed 
before they leave their own aerodromes, 
and we shall win the war ...'" (20).
It was essential for Britain to obliviate this
danger; in Kerr's opinion;
"It is a race between them and us; every 
day lost is a vital danger. If the 
Germans get at us first, with several 
hundred machines every night, each one 
carrying several tons of explosives, 
Woolwich, Chatham, and all the factories 
in the London district will be laid flat, 
part of London wiped out, and workshops in 
the south-east of England will be 
destroyed, and consequently our offensive 
on land, sea and air will come to an end.
"There is no exaggeration in this, and if 
we are going to stop it, we must start at 
once with our preparations to lay their 
factories flat and to destroy their 
aerodromes ...
"In short, it means the country who first, 
strikes with its big bombing squadrons of 
hundreds of machines at the enemy's vital 
spots, will win the war ...” (21).
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In order to ensure that Britain achieved the 
necessary strategic air force first, Kerr, like 
Smuts, argued for the creation of a separate Air 
Ministry. On 16 October 1917, it was announced in 
parliament that just such a Ministry and air service 
would be created; the bill received Royal Assent on
29 November 1917, the Air Council established on 3 
January 1918; and the Royal Air Force became an 
operational entity on 1 April 1918 (22).
The Smuts-Kerr view of aerial warfare can be 
regarded as the 'official' British approach to the 
subject. It was this view that was adopted, 
vigorously promoted, and indoctrinated into the RAF 
by Trenchard. Though Trenchard did not produce a 
coherent memorandum on aerial strategy until 1928, 
his agreement with Smuts and Kerr is obvious from 
other statements, parts uf memoranda, arguments with 
the other service chiefs, and proposals to the 
Cabinet. Thus, in January 1919 he stated that only 
the lack of means (i.e. heavy bombers, which only 
became operational after the signing of the 
armistice) had prevented the RAF from devastating 
many of Germany's industrial centres (though he did 
admit that this might have required up to five years 
of effort) (23). Similarly, Trenchard's concept of 
air power is discernable in his peacetime 'master 
plan' for the RAF, submitted to the Cabinet in
T^- -
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November 1919, specifically in the following
paragraphs:
"The principle to be kept in mind in 
forming the framework of the Air Service 
is that in future the main portion of it 
will consist of an Independent Force, 
together with Service personnel required 
in carrying out Aeronautical Research.
"In addition, there will be a small part 
of it specially trained for work with the 
Navy, and a small part specially trained 
for work with the Army, these two small 
portions probably becoming in the future, 
an arm of the older service.
"It may be that the main portion, the 
Independent Air Force, will grow larger 
and larger, and become more and more the 
predominant factor in all types of 
warfare” (24).
The focus, clearly, is on strategic air power 
('independent Air Force' being the contemporary 
description for what would now be referred to as a 
Strategic Air Force).
A further formulation of Trenchard's views came with 
an RAF policy paper to the Committee of Imperial 
Defence in March 1921, wherein he claimed that the 
major menace to Britain was strategic air attack, 
and that only the RAF could provide adquate defence 
against it. But, it must be noted, the basis of 
this defence would be the RAF'a counterstrike 
potential, not fighter aircraft (25). Trenchard had 
a very low opinion of the value of fighter aircraft, 
regarding their prime function as being a political 
necessity - a sop to the prejudices of an ignorant
citizenry. In fact, for the Home Defence air 
command, Trenchard prescribed a ratio of two bomber 
squadrons to every fighter squadron! This imbalance
in favour of bombers was justified in the following
manner:
"Although it is necessary to have some 
defence to keep up the morale of your own
people, it is infinitely more necessary to
lower the morale of the people against you 
by attacking them wherever they may be*
(26).
As late as March 1939 Trenchard (who had retired ten 
years previously) was still protesting at the 
expenditure of resources on defence measures, 
including fighters (27)!
Trenchard's overall views on aerial strategy can
best be summed up by quoting one vf his last major
memos as CAS:
"In my view the object of all three 
services is the same, to defeat the enemy 
nation, not merely its army, navy or air
"For an army to do this, it is almost
always necessary as a preliminary step to 
defeat the enemy's army, which imposes
itself as a barrier that must be broken
"It is not, however, necessary for an air 
force, in order to defeat the enemy 
nation, to defeat its armed forces first.
Air power can dispense with that 
intermediate step, can pass over the enemy 
navies and armies, and penetrate the air 
defences and attack direct the centres of 
production, transportation and commun­
ication from which the enemy war effort is 
maintained .... The stronger side, by
developing the mote powerful offensive, 
will provoke in his weaker enemy 
increasingly insistent calls for the 
protective employment of aircraft. In 
this way he will throw the enemy on to the 
defensive and it will be in this manner 
that air superiority will be obtained, and 
not by direct destruction of air defences"
(28).
In short, for Trenchard, the strategic bomber
offensive was everything (29).
Brigadier-General William Mitchell, Assistant Chief 
of Air Service 1921-25, is undoubtedly the tragic 
figure in the story of air power. His zealous 
advocacy for the new branch of the United States 
Army vis-a-vis the older branches and the United 
States Navy led to his court-martial in the autumn 
of 1925, and his subsequent resignation in February 
1926. In civilian life he remained a zealous 
advocate of aviation (30).
Many of Mitchell's arguments and beliefs concerning
air power were virtually identical to those of
Trenchard and Uouh-it, and this can be best
illustrated by reference to Mitchell's writings:
"In future the mere threat of bombing a 
town by an air force will cause it to be 
evacuated, and all work in factories to be 
stopped. To gain a lasting victory in 
war, the hostile nation's power to make 
war must be destroyed - this means the 
factories, the means of communication, the 
food producers, even the farms, the fuel 
and oil supplies, and the places where 
people live and carry on their daily 
lives. Aircraft operating in the heart of 
an enemy's country will accomplish this
object in an incredibly short space of 
time" (31).
and again:
"The advent of air power, which can go 
straight to the vital centres and either 
neutralise or destroy them, has put a 
completely new complexion on the old 
system of making war. It is now realised 
that the hostile main army in the field is 
a false objective, and the real objectives 
are the vital centres .... The result of 
warfare by air will be to bring about 
quick decisions. Superior air power will 
cause such havoc or the threat of such 
havoc in the opposing country that a long- 
drawn- out campaign will be impossible” 
(32).
and a fina;
"It is .essary that ... cities be
destroyed, m  the sense that every house 
be levelled to the ground. It will be 
sufficient have the civilian population 
driven out so that they cannot carry on 
their usual vocations. A few gas bombs 
will do that" (33).
Again the standard belief in strategic air power's 
uniqueness, decisiveness, speed and destructive 
capability. But, on several important issues, 
Mitchell's conception of air power diverged 
considerably from those of Douhet and Trenchard.
Unlike them, Mitchell did not ignore the tactical 
aspect of air power - though he rated this as 
secondary to the strategic aspect, he still de'-oted 
considerable attention to it. Indeed, ■ his famous 
controversy with the United States Navy was an 
outgrowth of his interest in the uses of air power 
in support of the older services, for, unlike his
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contemporaries, Mitchell firmly believed that the 
destruction of the enemy's ground and naval forces 
was an essential prerequisite to victory (34) 
"whatever the future might hold, war is still a
matter of defeating the enemy's armed forces" (35).
One of the consequences of this belief was his 
advocation of paratroop forces as early as 1918
(36); the other was his rejection of the (implicit) 
belief of Douhet and Trenchard that rival air forces 
would by-pass each other in the air, or at least
that air-to-air combat would be of only minimal 
importance. This was coupled to a rejection of the 
belief in the impotence of the fighter: "the only
effective defence against aerial attack is to whip 
the enemy's air forces in air battles" (37). In 
fact, for Mitchell, the fighter was very important - 
for without escort fighters to protect them, the 
strategic bombers would never reach their objectives 
(38). In sharp contrast to Douhet, who rejected 
fighters in favc’t of his self-defending 'Battle­
planes', and to Trenchard, with his ratio of two 
bombers to every (begrudged) fighter, Mitchell urged 
a ratio of four fighters to every bomber, and 
regarded them as the prime means of defeating the 
enemy's air forces, only following which could the 
bombers destroy the enemy surface forces and 
strategic centres (39).
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As previously mentioned, these theories were 
projections into the future based on limited 
experiences, in contradistinction to all previous 
strategic theories. Thus no account would be 
complete without a brief examination of their 
success - or failure - in practice. This will be 
done by studying the classic aerial offensive: the
Anglo-American strategic bombing offensive against 
Germany during the Second World War. This 
offensive, of two parallel yet largely independent 
campaigns, with which we will deal in turn, was a 
conscious attempt to prove the concepts of Trenchard 
and Douhet.
It is well known that the British bombing campaign 
was an overwhelmingly nocturnal one. This was the 
result of Bomber Command's rapid and painful 
discovery that technological advances - especially 
radar - had totally demolished Trenchard's belief 
(an exaggerated one even before radar) in the 
impotence of fighters? Britain's lightly armed 
bombers were unable to defend themselves against 
German fighters (40).
The nocturnal British offensive against Germany, 
which commenced on 15 May 1940, can be divided into 
several phases. The first, from May 1940 to the end 
of 194:, was a period of trial and error, of
enormous navigational difficulties (errors of up to 
100 miles were not uncommon) and inadequate aircraft
- but al'io of weak German defences. In this period, 
RAF Bomber command flew 43,774 sorties, for the loss 
of 1,019 aircraft - an average loss rate of 2.8%. 
It had been estimated that the maximum sustainable 
loss-rate the Command could accept was 5%. The
achievements were minimal - a contemporary survey 
estimated that only one-third of all aircraft 
dropped their bombs within five miles of the
designated aiming-point - i.e. in an area of 
seventy-five square miles around the target! More­
over, improving German defences began to exact a 
higher toll, culminating in a 9% loss-rate on the 
night of 7-8 November 1941.
The second phase of the offensive can, for 
convenience, be dated from the appointment of Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris as Air Officer
Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, on 22 February
1942. Harris called this the 'Preliminary Phase'
and dated its conclusion as February 1943 (42).
This phase was marked by qualitative improvements in 
aircraft and navigational aids, by the development 
of the concept of the 'Bomber Stream' (all the 
attacking aircraft flew the : ame route to and from 
the target) in order to swamp the German defences 
{the airspace over Europe had been divided, by the
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Luftwaffe, into radar-controlled 'boxes', each 
containing one night-fighter? - , the 'Bomber Stream' 
concentrated all the bombers into relatively few 
■boxes', the defending night-fighters were either 
totally avoided or completely swamped), by the 
formal adoption of Area Bombing - previously Bomber 
Command had pretended only to bomb industrial 
targets? now it accepted this was impossible and 
simply set out to devastate German cities - and by 
the creation of the 'Pathfinder Force' of elite 
crews to increase nocturnal bombing accuracy (43).
Two important events during this phase were the 
attack on Lubeck (28 March 1942) when the first fire 
bomb attack was made - 191 bombers, three quarters 
of them carrying only incendiary bombs, the 
remainder carrying the then new 4000 lb bomb, in an 
attack of 140 minutes, devastated 200 acres of the 
town, killing 302 people - and the first 'Thousand 
Bomber Raid' against the heavily defended city of 
Cologne, two months after Lubeck, in which 1,046 
bombers, in a ninety minute attack, devastated 600 
acres of the city for a loss rate of only 3.8% (40
bombers) (44). Lubeck and Cologne set the pattern 
for the future.
In March 1943 Harris began his 'Main Offensive’: 
further technological advances and tactical innov-
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ations vastly increased the bombers ability to find 
their target cities, while greatly increased numbers 
of aircraft considerably enhanced Bomber Command's 
capacity for devastation (45). Retrospectively, the 
'Main Offensive1 has been subdivided into three 
'Battles' - the Battle of the Ruhr, the Battle of 
Hamburg, and the Battle of Berlin, each named after 
the prime target areas involved (though there were 
always ov.or targets attacked, both as a result of 
weather limitations and in an attempt to disperse 
the German defences).
The Battle of the Ruhr raged from 5 March 1943 to 14 
July 1943, involving no less than 43 separate raids
- two-thirds of them against the Ruhr itself 
causing considerable destruction (for example, in 
the very first raid of the Battle, against Essen, 
over 600 acres of the city were destroyed or badly 
damaged) but exacting a coat of 872 aircraft - a 
loss rate of 4.7%, dangerously near the 5% limit 
(46) .
The Battle of Hamburg (24 July to 3 August 1943), 
comprising four massive British nocturnal and two 
American daylight raids, was marked by the British 
introduction, on a large scale, of Electronic 
Counter Measures (ECM) - using strips of silvered 
paper (code-named 'Window') to jam German radar.
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Use of 'Window' reduced British losses to only 12 on 
the first raid, though total British lossess in this 
battle finally amounted to 89 aircraft; nevertheless 
this represented a loss rate of only 2.8%. The 
devastation caused in Hamburg was enormous, over
50,000 people being killed and over 40,000 injured. 
It was Bomber command's greatest success (47).
The Battle of Berlin began, initially, in August
1943, but was temporarily suspended after the first 
three raids had achieved little for a loss rate of 
7.2% (48). German defences had recovered amazingly 
rapidly from 'window' „ The most important of these 
defences were the radar-equipped nightfighters, 
which caused 66% of Bomber Command's losses during 
the Battle of Berlin. This resulted in a dramatic 
escalation of the 'electronic war' (49). The Battle 
was resumed on 18 November 1943 and continued until
30 March 1944, and comprised 16 major attacks, 
totalling 9,111 sorties, on Berlin, while another
11,113 sorties were flown against other major 
targets, including Brunswick, Frankfurt, Leipzig, 
Mannheim, Nuremburg, Schveinfurt and Stuttgart. 
Damage inflicted was severe, but the cost was high - 
1,047 aircraft lost, 5.1% of the total. Worse, 
while this was the average loss rate (and was itself 
on the wrong side of the acceptable limit), loss 
rates on individual missions, showed a tendency to
rise far above acceptable levels - despite un­
precedented British ECM and ECCM (Electronic 
Counter-Counter Measures) campaigns to aid the 
Bombers. Thus, January 1944 saw raids to Berlin 
lose 6.1%, and to Brunswick, Magdeburg and Stettin 
7.2%, of their aircraft; a February raid on Leipzig 
lost 9.5%; a March raid on Berlin, 9.1%. These 
alarming losses culminated in the disastrous attack 
on Nuremburg on 30 March 1944, which experienced an 
overall loss-rate of 11.8% (in terms of the heavy 
bomber force, excluding the Mosquito light bombers, 
which flew so high and so fast as to be virtually 
immune to German defences, the loss rate was 
actually 13.6%) (50). With Nuremburg, the Battle of 
Berlin collapsed. Bomber Command was saved from 
having to face up to its defeat by its compulsory 
transfer to operations in preparation for, and 
support of, the allied invasion of France.
The last phase of *-ho Bomber Offensive ran from 
September 1944 to May -'5, and was by far the most 
successful - nearly 100,000 sorties were flown for a 
loss rate of less than 1%. This, however, was 
largely due, among other factors, to the advances of 
the allied armies, which had overrun key elements of 
the German defence system - radars, airfields, etc.. 
Yet, even at the end, German civilian morale did not 
collapse, nor did war production - indeed, as the
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British assault had intensified, so had Germi.n
production accelerated! The cost to Germany had 
been high - but Britain's losses had not been light: 
55,573 bomber aircrew were killed during the 
offensive (51).
What of the American experience? The Americans 
began operations in 1942, with a doctrine of
precision bombing against industrial, and not 
population, targets (as it turned out, poor weather 
conditions often resulted in American 'precision' 
raids being as indiscriminate as British 'area'
attacks.) The 1942 attacks, as the strength of VIII 
Bomber Command of the 8th Army 'Air Force steadily 
increased, were directed against short-range
targets, largely in France. Thus, on 5 Septsmber
1942, the Americans attacked railway marshalling 
yards at Rouen and Sotteville. As a result, the
Americans often enjoyed strong fighter escorts from 
the RAF and, increasingly, v m  Fighter Command, 8th 
AAF. Moreover, in the German air defence system
France was rated as a low priority area for 
fighters, so the Americans encountered no 
significant fighter opposition. As a result, the 27 
operations carried out by v m  Bomber Command betwen 
August and December 1942 sustained a los rate of 
less than 2% (52)!
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The American command was determined, in 1943, to 
extend the offensive to Germany itself, confident in 
the ability of their bombers, flying in large, tight 
formations, to defend themselves. They had 
forgotten Mitchell's warnings on the need for escort 
fighters to protect the bombers, and believed that 
the painful lessons learned by the British and 
Germans earlier in the war could be disregarded 
because of the American aircraft having considerably 
greater defensive armament. Wedded to the c^niept 
of precision daylight bombing, v m  Bomber Command 
set out to fulfil the objectives laid down by the 
Casablanca Directive on bombing (53).
Between 27 January and 14 October 1943 approximately 
65 targets in Europe were attacked, involving no 
less than 16,210 sorties; 10,740 aircraft succeeded 
in reaching their targets. The overall loss rate 
was just under 5%, though more ominously the loss 
rate among aircraft that actually attacked the
target was a little over 7%. The damage rate
sustained was staggering - on any given raid deep 
into Germany, between 25% and 50% of the attacking 
bombers could expect to suffer some kind of
battledamage (54). Worse, as the German defenders
gain ;d experience, they inflicted yet heavier
casualties on the Americans. Thus, while the attack 
on Kiel (14 May 1943) suffered light casualties, the
17 August attack on Schweinfurt- and Regensburg cost 
60 bombers destroyed out of a total committed of 
376. This increasingly unacceptable attrition 
climaxed in 'Black Week' (8-14 October) in which the 
Americans lost a total of 148 aircraft - including 
60 out of 291 despatched on the second Schweinfurt 
raid (55). Finally the realisation came: even with 
all their heavy defensive armament and tight 
formations, the United States bombers could not 
defend themselves against fighter attacks. The 8th 
Air Force abandoned its long-range operations until 
suitable escort fighters became available.
The third and final phase of American bomber 
operations began when these escorts had become 
available in quantity - which was by the Spring of
1944. Henceforth, the bomber formations would be 
accompanied by large numbers of the superb p-51 
Mustang fighter. The bombers were still to suffer 
heavy losses, but they were bearable losses - while 
the Luftwaffe's casualties rose alarmingly. Thus, 
in January 1944 total Luftwaffe aircraft losses, 
from all causes, amounted to 1,311; in February, 
2,121; and in March, 2,115 (56). With these German 
losses came an American realisation that the real 
damage to Germany was not being inflicted by the 
bombers on the industrial infrastructure, but by the 
escorting fighters on the Luftwaffe. And so began a
conscious policy of attacking targets that would 
force the German fighters to react (57). It was not 
the German losses in aircraft that were important - 
they were easily replaced (despite the fierce aerial 
onslaught, German production of single-seat fighters 
rose from 851 a month in. the second half of 1943 to
1,561 per month in the first half of 1944} - but the 
losses of irreplaceable aircrew, killed in the 
enormous air battles over Germany (58).
From April 1944 the American bombers, like their 
British counterparts, were primarily employed in 
preparing for, and later supporting, the invasion of 
France. However, strategic raids continued. And
the Americans finally discovered a weak spot in the 
German industrial infrastructure that could be
effectively attacked by bombers - the synthetic oil 
plants. These, in 1943, had produced 6.2 million 
tons of petroleum, as against the 2 million tons 
imported from Rumania and Hungary; and there were 
only 80 of them - of which 27 were especially
important. And virtually all were within range of 
the bombers of the United States 15th Army Air Force 
in Italy (59).
This offensive began on 12 May 1944, and though only 
a small minority of the American bombing effocc was 
devoted to them (11.6% in June, 17% in July, 16.4%
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ir. August) the results were immediate and dramatic. 
Germany'a petroleum stocks fell from 927,000 tons in 
March, to 717,000 tons in May? to 472,000 tons in 
June. The Luftwaffe suffered even more dramatic­
ally, its aviation fuel stocks declining from
180.000 tons in April, to 50,000 tons in June, to
10.000 tons in August (60). Amazingly, this 
campaign was allot* *d to slacken off, and was never 
pursued with the necessary vigour (especially by the 
British, who were roped into the 'Oil Plan' against 
Harris' will) (61). As with the British, the 
American bomber offensive continued to the very end 
of the war, ultimately devastating Germany.
How well had the theories of Douhet, Trenchard and 
Mitchell stood up to reality? Their belief in the 
fragility of civilian morale was exposed as totally 
false - under aerial bombardment the people had not 
panicked nor forced their governments to make peace. 
Nor had the target's industrial infrastructure been 
destroyed - rather, its efficiency had incr-'as-*^ 
considerably. Air power had not rendered the ciu-.r 
services obsolete, as Douhet and Trenchard had 
claimed - despite being devastated by bombing, 
Germany still had to be defeated on the ground and 
physically occupied by allied armies before her 
resistance ceased. Indeed, the bombers benefitted 
enormously from this land campaign, for it swept
m.
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away much of the essential infrastructure of the 
German air defence system: at from strategic
bombing paving the way for the armies, the armies 
had paved the way for the bombers. On the other 
hand, Mitchell's belief in the value of air power in 
direct support of other services was clearly 
vindicated - one need only think of the great 
contributions made by tactical air power to the 
conflict on land and at sea. Douhet's faith in the 
bomber's ability to defend itself and Trenchard's 
opinion on the impotence of the fighter were clearly 
shown to be false, as was their idea that air-to-air 
combat would be of little importance. In contrast, 
Mitchell's stress on the need for fighters to 
protect the bombers, and the necessity of defeating 
the enemy air force in combat were vindicated. 
Finally, strategic air power was not cheap to its 
employers, not in terms of money, aircraft, or lives 
lost. it was not the 'philosopher's stone' of 
strategy.
To sum up, the theories of Douhet and Trenchard were 
effectively demolished by the test of experience, 
however, important elements (though- course, by 
no means all) of 1-fitchell's tho-" indicated.
But the debate on air power in certain
respects, moved on to a new phase. On August 6,
1945, Colonel Paul Tibbets' B-29 'Enola Gay' dropped
%an atomic bomb on 
nuclear strategy.
Hiroshima, ushering in the age of
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CHAPTER 5: UNITED STATES NUCLEAR STRATEGY 1945-84
The development and employment of the atomic bomb at
the end of the Second World War saved the Air Force
Marshals and Generals from having to face the truth
about their Bomber offensives of the preceding
years. Scientific genius had - belatedly - provided
tnem with an instrument capable of achieving urban
destruction approximating that hoped for by Douhet,
Trenchard and Mitchell. Unsurprisingly, then, uhe
first phase of post-war United States air strategy
was a straightforward continuation of the wartime
approach, only with the new atomic weapons
supplementing the older, conventional, bombs. That
this was so is clear from the writings and speeches
of air power advocates at the time. Thus in
November 1945, General H.H. Arnold, one of America's
leading airmen, wrote that:
"While this country must employ all of its 
physical and moral force in the course of 
peace, it must recognise that real
security against atomic weapons in the 
visible future will rest on our ability to 
take immediate offensive action with over­
whelming force. It must be apparent to a 
potential aggressor fctrr. an attack on the 
United States would be immediately 
followed by an immensely devastating air 
atomic attack on him. The atomic weapon 
thus makes offensive and defensive 
airpower in a state of immediate readiness 
a primary requisite of national survival"
(1).
That same month, Arnold had also addressed the 
Senate Military Affairs Committee:
"The next war will be preponderantly an 
air war ... attacks can now come across 
the Arctic Regions, as well as across 
oceans, and strike deep ... into the heart 
of the country. No section will be 
immune. The Pearl Harbor of a future war 
might well be in Chicago, or Detroit, or 
Pittsburgh, or even Washington" (2).
Unsurprisingly, British air pundits agreed with this 
position; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder 
asserted at the University of Cambridge in 1947,
"I am utterly convinced that the out­
standing and vital lesson of the last war 
is that airpower is the dominant factor in 
this modern world and that, though the 
methods of exercising it will change, it 
will remain the dominant factor as long as 
power determines the fate of nations* (3).
While no less a personage than Winston Churchill
himself, addressing the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in 1949, stated that:
"For good or ill, air mastery is today the 
supreme expression of military power. And 
fleets and armies, however necessary and 
important, must accept subordinate rank.
This is a memorable milestone in the march 
of man” (4).
Or, as General Arnold summed it up:
"The influence of atomic energy on air 
power can be stated very simply. It has 
made air power all important .... [The] 
only known effective means of delivering 
atomic bombs in their present state of 
development is the very heavy bomber ...."
(5) .
But for the references to atomic bombs, it would be 
impossible to distinguish these statements from
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those made in the era of air power superenthusiaam 
before the War.
There were good technical reasons - in addition to 
psychological and bureaucratic ones - why the 
development of nuclear weapons did not immediately 
transform United States air strategy: the acute
shortage of both nuclear weapons and correctly 
configured delivery systems. In 1946, when the new 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) was created, it 
possessed only 148 B-29 Superfortress bombers, of 
which only about thirty had been modified to carry 
atomic weapons. And only a few atomic bomb- "tst-qd
(6). Moreover, only twenty crews were . to 
drop nuclear weapons, and training was yered 
because the Air Force had then extremely limited 
access to the real thing: dummy bombs were employed
for loading and bombing practice (7).
The situation had not improved dramatically by 1948, 
the time of the Berlin blockade. The SAC possessed 
only thirty-two B-29s capable of carrying nuclear 
weapons, all concentrated in the 509th Bomb Group. 
Not one of the ninety or so B-29s sent to Europe 
during 1948 in response to the blockade could carry 
atomic bombs. Only in the summer of 1949 did the 
first nuclear-capable bombers of the 509th arrive in 
Britain (8). And while the stockpile of nuclear
N - ^
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weapons had improved somewhat, it probably contained 
no more than 200 bombs - most of them disassembled 
(9).
By 1950, when the outbreak of the Korean War showed 
that conventional forces were most definitely not 
obsolete, there had been an all-round improvement in 
the United states' nuclear capacity - to some 300 
nuclear-capable aircraft (B-29s, b -50s and B-36s)
and around 400 bombs (10). Nevertheless, atom bombs 
were still a scarce resource, this being one of the 
reasons why McArthur's request that they be used in 
Korea was turned down (11).
in contrast to the late forties, the decade of the 
fifties was to see a dramatic expansion in America's 
nuclear capability, with the acquisition of overseas 
bases for SAC (initially in 1951 in Britain and 
French Morocco), the deployment of air-to-air 
refuelling tankers, modern new jet bombers (B-47s 
and a-52s), accelerated production of nuclear 
weapons {to counter the soviet acquisition of the 
bomb), and the achievement of a nuclear capability 
by the United States Navy's aircraft carriess. By 
1955 the SAC possessed approximately 200 B-36s and
1,000 b-47s - all nuclear-capable - while by 1959 it 
reached its peak with 1,366 B-47s, <iB B-52s (all 
nuclear-capable), 174 RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft.
and over 1,000 KC-97 and KC-135 tanker aircraft
(12). This impressive military build-up had been 
accompanied by the development of a new nuclear 
strategic doctrine - popularly called 'Massive 
Retaliation'.
This, a result of the election of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower to the Presidency in 1952, represented 
the first significant development in American 
thinking on nuclear strategy. This 'New Look', as 
it was also originally termed, was based on studies 
undertaken by the National Security Council, which 
were issued in two documents: NSC-162 and NSC-162/2. 
These studies, in turn, originated from three main 
sources: firstly, discontent over the apparently
inconclusive, protracted and expensive (in lives, 
property and money) conventional Korean war; 
secondly, the need to ensure strong defence against 
the Soviet Union; and thirdly, the need to keep 
defence spending to low and stable levels, so as not 
to strain the United States economy. As the then 
United states Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
put it: "We want, for ourselves and the other free
nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost" 
(13). Traditionally, the second and third 
objectives underlying the 'New Look' had b«en 
mutually incompatible. But this was no longer the 
case: nuclear weapons provided the answer, because
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nuclear defence, contrary to popular imagination, is 
cheap defence. For a country like the United States 
of America, it was - and is - the conventional 
component which absorbs the bulk of defence 
spending. Thus, under Eisenhower's new strategy, 
conventional forces were cut while nuclear forces 
were emphasised. All United States military 
planning was ordered to be based on the assumption 
that the use of nuclear weapons would be permitted 
whenever the military situation warranted, should 
the United States find itself in a general or major 
war. There was no way, no intention, that America 
would wage a general war without use of nuclear 
weapons. Unsurprisingly, at the end of 1953, this 
also became official NATO policy (14).
Secretary Dulles himself outlined the intentions of
the new strategy:
"If an enemy could pick his time and place 
and method of warfare - and if our policy 
was to remain the traditional one of 
meeting aggression by direct and local 
opposition - then we needed to be ready to 
fight in the Arctic and in the tropics; in 
Asia, the Near East, and in Europe; by 
sea, by land and by air .... The total 
cost of our security efforts ... could not 
be continued for long without grave 
budgetary, economic and social 
consequences ... the President and his 
advisers, as represented by the National 
Security council, had to take some basic 
policy decisions. This has been done ....
Now the Department of Defence and the 
Joint chiefs of Staff can shape our 
military establishment to fit ... our 
policy, instead of having to try to be 
ready to meet the enemy's choices. That
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permits a ... selection of military means. 
As a result, it is now possible to get,
and share, more basic security at less
cost" (15).
Furthermore:
"The way to deter aggression is for the
free community to be willing and able to
respond vigorously at places and with 
means of its own choosing" (16).
To this end,
"Local defence will always be important. 
But there is no local defence which alone 
will contain the mighty landpower of the 
Communist world. Local defences must be 
reinforced by the further deterrent of 
massive retaliatory power. A potential 
aggressor must know that he cannot always 
prescribe battle conditions that suit him" 
(17).
superficial examination of d lies' speech almost
immediately gave rise to the idea that the United •
States was threatening to respond to any Communist
aggression, of any magnitude, anywhere in the world,
by means of an all-out nuclear attack (18). Nothing
could have been further from the truth. Careful
reading reveals the stress is actually on
selectivity of response:
"Now [we] ... can shape our military 
establishment to fit ... our policy ....
That permits a ... selection of military
means . ..".
and, again:
"... the free community [must] ... be 
willing and able to respond vigorously at 
places and with means of its own choosing"
(19).
The aim of the 'New Look' was to give the United
States a r ;ategy that had the flexibility to 
handle, and ^  --.ve appropriate responses to, Soviet 
expansionism WM^ever, whenever and however it might 
occur. The 'Massive Retaliation' element of the 
strategy was intended to cover only a certain part 
of the threat spectrum - a direct attack on the 
United States, or Western Europe, for examples. The 
United States ran down its conventional forces, but 
by no means dismantled them: a limited war capacity
was retained, while sufficient conventional forces 
were deployed to require significant attack to 
overwhelm them. Nor was it necessarily so that if 
nuclear weapons were employed they would have been 
unleashed in a cataclysmic 'armageddon' style 
onslaught. And even if the 'worst possible case' 
came about, and the United States had engaged in a 
large-scale nuclear attack on the USSR, it would not 
have takers the form of an indiscriminate 'spasm' of 
popular imagination (and fiction)•
For American war plans, under 'Massive Retaliation', 
were based upon wartime and post-war objectives that 
were both specific and explicit. Around 1957, 
American objectives, in event of full-scale war with 
the USSR, were:
1. to reduce the Soviet Union's influence and 
power to a level at which it could no longer 
threaten global peace and security;
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2. to liberate the satellite states from Soviet
domination?
3. to ensure that any post-war regime or regimes
on traditional Russian territory would be
incapable of waging aggressive war;
4. to destroy the authority structure of the 
Soviet communist Party; and
5. if a Communist regime did survive in ths USSR, 
to ensure that its military-industrial 
potential was inadequate for it to wage war on 
comparable terms with America (20).
In short, the strategy was intended to reduce the 
USSR's post-war power and influence; thus, the 
targeting emphasis was on military and other
strategic targets, and not on the indiscriminate 
destruction of cities, 'Massive Retaliation' was 
aimed at specific political and military targets, 
not the obliteration of Russia, even though the 
United States did not really have, at that time, the 
technical capacity to carry out such pinpoint
attacks.
Nevertheless, despite the flexibility and select­
ivity inherent in the 'New Look', the feeling arose 
that it was not flexible enough, especially with 
regard to the requirements i limited war. so,
perhaps, it was not surprising when John F. Kennedy
9 V
became President in 1961 he, in keeping with his 
image as vigorous, young • forward-looking, should 
have ordered the development of a new strategy to 
supercede the misunderstood 'Massive Retaliation'.
The result was 'Flexible Response', first publicly 
proclaimed in 1962, However, it is essential to 
realise that the title 'Flexible Response' was used 
to cover no less than four different nuclear 
strategies adopted under the tenure of Defence 
Secretary Robert McNamara (1961-68) in the Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations.
The first of these 'Flexible Response' strategies 
really was flexible: it sought and provided an in­
creased variety of capabilities and options, an 
ability to react to enemy threats at any level of 
the threat spectrum. This flexibility comprised both 
strategic nuclear and conventional forces (which 
were boosted in strength) and, at the nuclear level, 
sought to avoid the situation arising in which use 
of nuclear weapons automatically meant armageddon. 
As McNamara himself said at Ann Arbor in 1962:
"The United States has come to the
conclusion that to the extent feasible 
basic military strategy in a general
nuclear war should be approached in the 
same way that conventional military
operations have been regarded in the past.
That is to say, principal military
objectives should be the destruction of 
the enemy's military forces, not of his 
civilian population" (21).
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The following year, he made the pjint more clearly:
"We should never think of ourselves as 
forced by limitations of resources to rely 
upon strategies of desperation and mutual 
destruction. The relative numbers and 
survivability of the United States 
strategic forces should always permit us 
to retaliate against all the urgent Soviet 
military targets subject to attack, thus 
contributing to the limitation of damage 
to ourselves and our allies. The damage- 
limiting capability of the superior 
strategic forces is, I believe, well worth 
its incremental costs® (22).
And again:
"By building into our forces the flexible 
capability, we least eliminate the
prospect that we could strike back in only 
one way, namely against the entire Soviet 
target system, including the cities. Such 
a prospect would give the Soviet Union no 
incentive to withhold attack against our 
cities in the first strike. We want to 
give them a better alternative. Whether 
they would accept it, no one could say. 
Considering what is at stake we believe it 
is worth the additional effort on our 
part, however, to have these options"
(23).
Thus, in the period 1962-63, United States strategy 
contained, as its basic elements at the strategic 
nuclear level, the concepts of city avoidance, 
selective targeting, counterforce attacks (i.e. 
attacks on enemy nuclear/milttary/strategic 
• targets), damage-limitation in event of war, and 
that attacks on urban centres (countervalue attacks) 
were only the ultimate threat of a reserve force. 
This reserve force - which had to be secure from 
enemy attack to be effective - coupled with the 
United Stakes intention to engage in city avoidance
- 135 -
or counterforce strikes was the basis of America's 
plans for damage-1 imitation. City avoidance would 
deprive the Soviets of a rationale for attacking 
United States cities, while the reserve force prom­
ised avesome retaliation should they try anyway
(24).
To achieve these ends, the Kennedy Administration 
greatly accelerated projects initiated by Eisenhower 
and initiated some new ones. Because of the 
successful Soviet deployment of Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) which, unlike bombers, 
were apparently unstoppable, the focus was on 
missiles. America's first operational ICBM, the 
Atlas-B, had been deployed in I960; the Atlas-F and 
Titan-l followed in 1962, to be rapidly superceded 
by the second-generation Minuteman-I and Titan-II, 
of which it was originally intended to deploy 1,200 
and 120 respectively (the Kinwteman was, and is, a 
'light' ICBM, the Titan-ll a "‘heavy' one - it was 
five times heavier than the Minuteman), However, by 
the mid-1960s (by which time United States Strategy 
had begun to change) the force level was stabilised 
at 1,000 Minuteman-I and -IIS, and 54 Titan-IIs. 
The United States Navy Polaris programme - the first 
unit of which, the USS George Washington, had been 
commissioned in December 1959 - was considerably
accelerated, though McNamara reduced the planned
fleet from 45 to 41 submarines. Long-range air-to- 
ground missiles were delivered to equip the SAC's B- 
52 bomber force (25).
As against this, production of the B-52 was ended in 
1962, and its intended successor, the XB-70, was 
cancelled. Moreover, systems now considered 
obsolete or inappropriate to the new strategy were 
very swiftly phased out of service - B-47 bombers, 
Snark, Mace and Matador cruise missiles, Thor and 
Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles 
(IRBMs) and Atlas and Titan-I ICBMs. By 1966, SAC 
could muster only 591 B-52s, 83 B-58s (a short-range 
supersonic bomber produced in small numbers in the 
late fifties and early sixties) and 16 RB-47s, in
addition to the force of KC-135 tankers (26).
Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara's strategic thinking 
had begun to change, with the introduction of the 
concept of 'assured destruction'. Originally, 
'assured destruction' had been intended as a 
measuring concept - as a means of deciding 'how much 
is enough' in terms of nuclear hardware, by 
providing a standard based on population destruction 
and industrial damage - i.e. the very kind of 
targets that 'Flexible Response' originally sought 
to avoid. This means of analysis eventually itself 
became the conceptual framework, dominating (instead
4
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of serving) strategic thinking. However, in the new
sttategy of the mid-sixties (actually 1964/65) the
concept of damage-limitation was retained as the
partner for 'assured destruction'. Thus, in his
1964 annual statement to congress, Mcttamara argued
against a concept of deterrence based solely on city
destruction, arguing that "City destruction is not a
new concept. It has been debated for many years.
But I know of no responsible official who would
support it today" (27). He further argued that
American strategic nuclear forces:
"must be visibly capable of destroying the 
Soviet society under all conditions of 
retaliation. In addition, in the event 
that such a war is forced upon us, they 
should have the power to limit the 
destruction of our own cities and popul­
ation to the maximum extent practicable.
Such a damage-limiting strategy is the 
most effective course to follow, in every 
case we have studied, we have found that 
forces in excess of those needed to 
.similarly destroy Soviet industry would 
significantly reduce damage to the United 
States and Western Europe" (28).
The emphasis on damage-limitation, and thus on a 
flexible approach to targeting, was retained, but 
already the roots of what Van Cleave has described 
as a "bizarre detour" (29) in American strategic 
thinking under McNamara were becoming visible. The 
next, 1966/67, phase of McNamara's strategy was to 
take the United States firmly down this detour.
This involved an almost exclusive emphasis on
'assured destruction'; not only was the concept of
damage-limitation abandoned, it was actively
disparaged:
"Our forces must be sufficiently large to 
possess an assured destruction capability.
By this I mean an ability to inflict at 
all times and under all conditions an 
unacceptable degree of damage upon any 
aggressor or combination of attackers, 
even after absorbing a surprise attack.
It is this clear and present ability and 
not the ability partially to limit damage 
that provides the deterrent* (30).
While McNamara admitted that damage-1imitation might
be of some benefit to deterrence, he now argued that
for this to be of any significance, it:
"would have to be extremely effective, 
that is, capable of reducing damage to 
truly nominal levels and we now have no 
way of accomplishing this" (31).
On top of all this, McNamara rejected the concept of
city avoidance and firmly indicated that the
American intention was now city destruction
(countervalue targeting):
"If we were to strike after [an enemy 
attack ] the question is what would we 
launch against? I think all would agree 
that we would launch against their cities 
since they have already launched all their 
forces against us" (32).
The adoption of this 'strategy' was based on the 
assumption that the United states was faced by a 
requirement to deter an all-out, one-salvo, Soviet 
attack on the United States, and that as a result, 
the problem facing the United States was simply one
* k * 4k
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of having enough surviving capability to inflict 
unacceptable damage on the USSR (apparently 
estimated at 25% of the population and 50% of the 
industry (33)). But the United States nuclear 
forces were not merely intended to protect the 
United States of America, they were further meant to 
provide a protective 'umbrella' to key Dnited States 
allies, specifically Western Europe, Canada and 
Japan. McNamara's new 'strategy', by locking the 
United States nuclear forces into a predominantly 
countervalue targeting plan, totally destroyed, in 
principle, the credibility of this umbrella. It was 
simply unbelievable that the United States would 
risk total destruction to try and protect her 
allies. Only the fact that the United States 
retained a clear superiority over the USSR in 
nuclear firepower propped up the umbrella. But like 
an edifice deprived of its foundations, all that was 
required was a shock and the nuclear umbrella would 
fall apart, McNamara himself provided it, with his 
concept of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' adopted by 
1968/69.
'Mutual Assured Destruction' inevitably acronymed - 
and deservedly so - into MAD, was a unilateral 
attempt to work out the rules of deterrence for both 
sides, and was quite different from 'assured 
destruction'. The latter said that the United
States had to have an assured destruction 
capability, irrelevant of what the Soviets had, or 
what strategy they espoused. But MAD said something 
very different: that, if the United States had an
assured destruction capability, the USSR also should 
have it, and would have every right to use it. The 
ideas underlying MAD were as follow: _if both sides
had deterrence as their objective? if, this 
deterrence was based, by both, on a retaliatory 
strike? if this retaliatory strike was based on 
countervalue destruction, then the result would be 
that both sides would find themselves in a mutual 
deterrence relationship which would be stable so 
long as neither side tried to reduce the assured 
destruction capability of the other, such reduction 
could only be possible through the deployment of 
Counterforce systems threatening the survivability 
of the opponent's retaliatory forces, or of Anti- 
Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems threatening his 
ability to reach his targets. In short, McNamara 
came to see defence against nuclear attack, not as 
impractical, but as undesirable - because, under 
MAD, it would be destabilising. Any attempt by one 
side to achieve counterforce capability would force 
the other to do likewise, triggering an arms race. 
Thus, MAD produced a strong rationale for arms 
control; for arms control would preserve the mutual 
deterrence relationship. But effective arms
control, under MAD, had a pre-requisite - nuclear 
parity between the united States and the USSR (34).
With this conceptual background to United States 
nuclear defence policy it is unsurprising that, in 
the late sixties, only minor augmentations occurred 
to United States strategic nuclear forces - balanced 
by reduction in SAC's bomber force, in the field of 
Research and Development (S&D) no new ICBM was 
developed under McNamara, though a new submarine-
launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) - Poseidon - was, 
and work commenced on Multiple independently 
Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). However,
Poseidon, with its combination of relatively low
accuracy and very high survivability, was useless as 
a Counterforce but ideal as a Countervalue weapon? 
while MIRVs, by allowing one missile to attack 
several separate targets, acted as a guarantee of 
America's 'assured destruction' capability. In
short, both fitted neatly into McNamara's concepts 
in the second half of the sixties.
McNamara's acceptance of parity between the United 
States and USSR as good and desirable totally 
destroyed, in practice, the credibility of the 
United States umbrella. While the United States had 
retained superiority, there had always been the 
chance that the United States would run grave risks
- 142 -
for her allies; now, with parity proclaimed as an 
American objective, no such chance remained. MAD 
completed the damage initiated by the 'assured 
destruction' concept of 1966/67. Moreover, MAD did 
not possess a secure foundation; rather, as has been 
made clear above, it rested on a series of major 
'ifs'. Should only one be wrong, MAD would be 
seriously compromised. Should all be wrong, the 
United States would be in severe trouble. And there 
were indications that the USSR did not agree with 
American conceptions of the nuclear balance - for 
example, the deployment of the huge SS-9 ICBM, 
starting in 1967, and for which no conceivable role 
existed under either 'assured destruction' or MAD. 
This strongly suggested that Moscow accepted neither 
of these policies. McNamara's approach to nuclear 
defence from 1966 deprived America of flexibility, 
selectivity and, short of an all-out onslaught on 
the Continental united States itself, all 
credibility in the face of any major international 
crisis. Liddell-Hart had defined strategy as "the 
art of distributing and applying military means to 
fulfil ends of policy" (35). Not only did 
McNamara's 'assured destruction' and MAD policies 
not do this, they actually prevented the United 
States from fulfilling the ends of its policy. They 
were not strategies, not even non-strategies, but, 
in reality, anti-strategies.
<6 ml** jH? mMriSk.
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Little wonder, then, that the new Nixon 
administration of 1969, inheriting an anti-strategy 
and faced by a Soviet nuclear build-up more rapid 
than anticipated - from 1962 to 1969 the number of 
Soviet iCBMs increased from 200 to more than 1,000 - 
initiated a review of American requirements for 
strategic nuclear forces. it was against this 
background - and against the background of the
extremely expensive and increasingly unpopular 
Vietnam war - that the concept of 'sufficiency', as 
against superiority or parity, was adopted as the 
basis of United States nuclear strategy. There were 
four elements to sufficiency:
1. Assured destruction -'though not based on
simple calculations of population casualties; 
it was left open as to what form of
measurement would be used;
2. crisis stability - United states nuclear
forces must not develop any vulnerabilities
that would tempt the DSSR to launch a
Counterforce strike in times of crisis, thus, 
the ICBM force would not be allowed to become 
vulnerable;
3. 'essential equivalence' - the United States
must have equal destructive capacity to that 
of the USSR; if it did not, the resulting
imbalance could not only havw military 
implications, but also strong political
implications; this element was especially 
important to President Nixon, who felt it was 
an essential prerequisite to any effective 
United States foreign policy? and
4. damage limitations against at least light 
attacks by deployment of the Safeguard ABM 
system (36).
This, however, was only the beginning of a series of
studies on United States nuclear strategy,
stimulated by the continuing Soviet build-up and by
the unsatisfactory nature of the first strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) agreement. On
January 10, 1974, Defence Secretary James
Schlesinger announced:
"a change in the strategies of the United 
States with regard to the employement of 
central strategic forces has taken place.
A change in targeting strategy as it
were" (37).
He added that:
"To a large extent the American doctrinal 
position has been wrapped around something 
called 'assured destruction' which implies 
a tendency to target Soviet cities 
initially and massively and that this 
would be the principal option the United 
States would have. it is our intention 
now that this not be the only option and 
not the principal option" (38).
This was, Schlesinger argued:
"Because of the growth of Soviet 
capabilities, the range of circumstances 
in which an all-out strike against Soviet 
cities can be contemplated has narrowed 
considerably, and we must have alternat­
ives for the employment of stretegic
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forces other than what would be a suicidal 
strike against the cities of the other 
sides" (39) .
In short,
"The point that is different about the 
targeting doctrine that I am outlining is 
the emphasis on selectivity and 
flexibility" (40).
The fact that McNamara's 'anti-strategy' was totally 
non-credible had been clearly recognised - indeed, 
was openly stated by Schlesinger himself (41) - and 
a 'new' genuine, strategy adopted. This 'new' 
strategy, in may respects, hailed back to those that 
had existed before McNamara's "bizarre detour", and 
was composed of three main elements. Firstly, pre­
planned options for limited attacks were created, 
both in case of war with the USSR and for extended 
deterrenc... Secondly, the capacity for 'assured 
destruction' would be regarded as a secure reserve 
and not as America's principal means of retaliation 
even in the event of a full-scale war; thus ensuring 
that even if deterrence failed, it would not all 
fail at once. To this end, the United States had to 
devote more attention to forces that could survive 
even protracted nuclear conflict. Thirdly, 'assured 
destruction' was no longer to be viewed simply in 
terms of damage to citiea and deaths of civilians; 
rather, it was ~ as in the 1950s - viewed with 
regard to reducing post-war Soviet influence and 
power (42). Under Schlesinger and Nixon, America
-- 146 -
again had a strategy - a means "of distributing and 
applying military means to fulfil ends of policy" 
(43). This 'Schlesinger strategy' was formally 
embodied in Presidential order NSDM-242.
This period of strategic re-examination was 
accompanied by the deployment of a new SLBM - the 
aforementioned Poseidon, which was deployed on 31 
submarines which had previously carried Polaris; 
again, each submarine carried 16 missiles - and an 
improved version of the Minuteman ICBM, the Minute- 
man III, each of which carried three Re-entry 
Vehicles (RVs); 550 were deployed, but they replaced 
the same number of earlier Minuteman versions. Work 
also began on a new, long-range bomber, to be 
designated the B-l (44).
The new course was endangered by the arrival of the 
Carter Administration in .1977 - both Carter and his 
Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, supported much of 
the MAD doctrine. Indeed, Brown had been one of 
McNamara's subordinates. However, the developments 
of Soviet nuclear forces - now clearly far in excess 
of those required for MAD - could not be ignored. 
Nor could the advice of the Joint chiefs of Staff, 
who supported NSDM-242, while the secret report of 
the famous 'B-team' of president Ford also had an 
impact (45). The result was that, though the Carter
Administration conducted its own strategic study, 
the result, embodied in the document PD-59, really 
marked the acceptance of the basic elements of NSDM- 
242, and included a re-affirmation of the require­
ment fcr 'essential equivalent'-'. Again, there was 
the stress on flexibility and selectivity in 
targeting, in avoiding Countervalue attacks except
= oorv  , to control escalation (if
poss'^-le), and to ensure that if there was a failure 
o: deterrence, it would not be a total failure.
Unfortunately, a new problem had arisen - did the 
United States possess the necessary forces to carry 
cut this strategy? For advances in Soviet missile 
technology had begun to reach the level where the 
survivability of uhe United States ICBM force was 
endangered - the USSR had, or would soon have, 
enouo’ missiles with enough accurate warheads to 
destroy virtually all America's ICBMs, and have 
considerable numbers of missiles left over. In 1978 
Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval 
Operations, estimated that the USSR would "soon" 
have the ability to destroy 90% of United States 
ICBMs with only 20% of their MIRVed ICBM force (46). 
This would leave the United States with only its 
Countervalue SLBM force and present the American 
President with the dilemma o£ annihilation or 
acquiescence in Soviet expansion.
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Modernisation of United States strategic nuclear 
forces was thus a matter of urgency. To this end, 
President Carter - reluctantly - authorised develop­
ment of the M-X ICBM, long-range Cruise Missiles, 
and continued the already initiated programme for 
the development of the Trident:-I SLBM. Yet, as 
against this, development of the longer-range
Trident-Il was postponed indefinitely, and the new 
B-l bomber cancelled - in favour, so the Admin­
istration argued, of a revolutionary new 'stealth' 
bomber, even though this was clearly years away from 
production, let alone service. Nor was this all;
problems in the shipyard bulding the new Ohio class 
ballistic missile submarines for the Trident 
missiles, and in the Navy management of the project, 
caused long delays and incredible cost overruns: OSS 
Ohio herself, funded by Congress in 1974, due for 
completion in 1979, was not actually completed until 
1982. As a result, the size of the United States 
SLBM force began to decline from 1980 on (47). 
Moreover, the M-X was bedevilled by arguments over 
whether or not it should be deployed, and if so, 
how. The problem of reconciling a secure basing 
system with the needs of verification for arms 
control purposes within reasonabe cost was not 
solved by the end of the Carter Administration.
Thus, when the Reagan Administration was inaugurated
in 1981 it was not so much nuclear strategy that 
needed attention as the forces necessary to 
implement it. Indeed, it had been one of President 
Reagan's campaign promises that he would close the 
gap between America's strategy and her capability 
for carrying it out (48). This, however, proved 
easier said than done. The bitter disputes over how 
the M-x should be based continued, the Reagan 
Administration deciding, in late 1981, to deploy 100 
missiles as rapidly as possible in existing silos, 
while research continued into long-term basing 
systems. As this decision did nothin^ reduce, 
let alone solve, the vulnerabiliv/ problem, 
trenchant criticism was directed against it. Less 
controversially, the Reags,. Administration re­
activated the B-l programme, ordering 100 of the 
improved B-lB variant, to be armed with Air-Launched 
Cruise Missiles (ALCKs), as well as continuing the 
Stealth project, and reversed1 the Carter decision 
not to develop the Trident-Il.
The continuing controversy among nuclear strategists 
over especially the M-X basing issue finally led the 
President to appoint a Commission on Strategic 
Forces, better known as the scowcroft Commission, 
primarily to survey the alternatives for a secure 
land based ICBM force, and to indicate the best 
solution. After four months of deliberation, it
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delivered its report in April 1983, covering 
virtually all elements of the United States 
strategic forces. in effect, it confirmed the 
previous decisions of the Reagan Administration. 
Alternative proposals, most of which were unsound 
strategically, politically or economically, were 
largely dismissed. However, an extremely sound 
alternative to M-X - the production and deployment 
of 1,000 single warhead, highly accurate, mobile 
ICBMs - was also downplayed, being seen, by the 
Commission, as a long term development; by contrast, 
the supporters of the 'Midgetman' (as the missile 
has been dubbed) saw - and see - it as a real 
alternative to the M-x (now dubbed "Peacemaker''). 
At this stage, with the Peacemaker heavily funded 
and the Midgetman receiving some development 
funding, and with the future possibilities for laser 
and particle-beam weapons, the outcome of the 
current strategic debate cannot be foreseen.
Thus, at the end of the Reagan Administration's 
first term in office, the United States has a 
viable, flexible strategy, which can be, and is, 
constantly updated and refined to deal with altering 
situations, yet is sadly deficient in the nuclear 
forces need to implement it - a deficiency which is 
still years away from being eliminated, it is not a 
good position to be in.
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CHAPTER 6: SOVIET MILITARY DOCTklNE, 
MILITARY SCIENCE AND STRATEGY 1345-84
"Soviet military thought possesses an 
idiom and a hierarchy {of structure) which 
are characterised by a certain degree of 
precision in usage and application ... it 
does not easily 'fit' Western strategic 
concepts .... Whatever difficulties it may 
pose .... Western analysts must approach 
it on Soviet terms and refrain either from 
substituting trendy Western strategic and 
arms control jargon, or dismissing the 
Soviet military idiom as propaganda or the 
untutored flummery of an archaic military 
caste" (1).
It is for these reasons that it is necessary to 
devote a separate chapter to the structure, content 
and evolution of Soviet military thought, in order 
to comprehend the Soviet approach to nuclear 
weapons.
Soviet military thought is divided into the 
following precisely defined concepts: Military
Doctrine, Military Science, Strategy, Operational 
Art, and Tactics. Each will be considered in turn.
A Soviet military dictionary defines military
doctrine as:
"a nation's officially accepted system of 
scientifically founded views on the nature 
of modern wars and the use of the armed 
forces in them, and also on the require­
ments arising from these views regarding 
the country and its armed forces being 
made ready for war.
"Military doctrine has two aspects: 
political and military-technical. The 
basic tenets of a military doctrine are 
determined by a nation's political and 
military leadership according to the 
socio-political order, the country's level 
of economics, scientific and technological 
development, and the armed forces' combat 
material, with due regard to the 
conclusions of military science and the 
views of the probable enemy" (2).
In 1975, Marshal A.A, Grechko, then Soviet Defence
Minister, described military doctrine as
"a system of views on the nature of war 
and methods of waging it, and on the
preparation of the country and army for
war, officially adopted in a given state
and in its armed forces" (3).
According to Grechko, doctrine would serve to answer
these basic questions:
"What enemy will have to be faced in a 
possible war?
"What is the character of the war in which 
the state and its armed forces will have 
to take part; what goals and missions 
might they be faced with in this war?
"What armed forces are needed to execute 
the assigned missions, and in what 
direction must military development be 
carried out?
"How are preparations for war to be 
implemented?
"What methods must be used to wage war?"
(4)
While, in the view of General-Major S.N. Kozlov,
"present day military doctrine is the 
poj tical policy of the Party ... an 
expression of state military policy, a 
directive of political strategy ..." (5).
In abort, military cloctrine serves as the Soviet 
Communist Party's guide to the purpose, structure 
and future of the armed forces, while simultaneously 
governing the Soviet military leadership's actions 
with regard to meeting the military requirements of 
the Party. It forms the intellectual and policy 
framework directing both war planning and the 
acquisition of forces, Emanating from the highest 
circles of the Party leadership, doctrine is both 
extremely stable and authoritative: once pronounced, 
it provides the necessary stamp of approval for more 
precise planning, sets the armament production norms 
and guides the military's weapon acquisition 
policies. Though doctrine can be - and has been - 
modified to deal with the new military and 
scientific developments, it cannot be debated 
(unless decreed otherwise by the high Party 
leadership) once it has been pronounced. Pronounced 
doctrine possesses an aura of finality and an 
authority that is binding on all the Soviet armed 
forces and also on all the rest of the Warsaw Pact 
armed forces. There is no real Western equivalent 
to the Soviet concept of military doctrine.
Next in the hierarchy of soviet military thought we 
find military science, which is officially defined
"a system of knvwledge concerning the 
nature, essence and concent of armed 
conflict, and concerning the manpower, 
facilities and methods of conducting 
combat operations by means of armed forces 
rnd their comprehensive support.
"Military science investigates the 
objective laws governing armed conflict, 
and elaborates questions pertaining to the 
theory of military art, which is the basic 
component of military science, as well as 
questions pertaining to the organisation, 
training and supply of armed forces, and 
also deals with military historical 
experience" (6).
While Kozlov describes it as
"a unified system of knowledge of the 
preparation for and conduct of armed 
conflict in the interests of the defence 
of the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries against imperialist aggression" 
(7 ).
Military science, which is, of course, firmly rooted 
in the ideology (the soviets claim it is a science) 
of Marxism-Leninism, is composed of several major 
elements. These are: military-technical sciences?
military training and education; Party-political 
work; military economics (that is, military support, 
fiscal support and technological support); military 
history (history of wars and history of military 
art); force posture (i.e. organisation, material, 
personnel and mobilisation); the theory of military 
art; and the theory of military science (8). of all 
these components, the most important is the theory 
of military art.
The Soviets take great care to distinguish between 
military doctrinn and military science, and for good
"There are clear cut differences between 
itary science and military doctrine. 
M.'.tary science, in its development, 
relies on the analysis of objective laws, 
which are independent of human will, and 
on the practice of armed combat.
"Mi" :y science is the theory of 
mill, y affairs. Doctrine, on the other 
hand, is based on the theoretical data of 
military science and the political 
principles of the state ....
"The difference betveen military science 
and doctrine consists in the fact that 
doctrine, elaborated and adopted by the 
state, is a unified system of views and a 
guide to action, free of any kind of 
personal subjective opinions and evalu­
ations. Science, or. the other hand, is 
characterise by controversy. in the 
system of theones known as military 
science, there may be several different 
points of view, diverse scientific 
concepts, original hypotheses which are 
not selected as doctrine for practical 
application and thus do not acquire the 
character official state views on
military questions" (9T
In short, while doctrine, once pronounced, is 
unquestionable, military science can remain an area 
2; r heated debate. Howevar, any debate in the realm 
of military science (or military art) must not be 
confused with dissension, or interpreted as signs of 
dissatisfaction or discontent in the military. All 
military debate is controlled and approved by the 
Party, through its prime (but not sole) means of 
control over the armed forces, ths Main political
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Administration (MPA), which is directly responsible 
to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) itself. For the MPA 
controls, and is responsible for, all Soviet 
military publications, military propaganda, and the 
n.ilitary publishing house. Nor must military 
science be confused with the western concept of 
'Military Philosophy', which is damned in the USSR 
as a 'bourgeois concept' based on metaphysics and 
idealism.
Of all the components of military science, the one 
most relevant *-o this discussion - and which is 
rated as the most important by the Soviets them­
selves - is theory of military art. This is 
because it covers the study of actual methods and 
forms of combat. It, in turn, consists of three 
elements: Strategy, Operational Art, and Tactics.
Each is considered, in Soviet eyes, to be an 
integral field of scientific knowledge? all are 
viewed as being, at the same time, interrelated and 
interdependent. Kozlov defines strategy as being:
"the part of military art that studies the 
foundations of the preparation and conduct 
of war and its campaigns as a whole. In 
practice, it is policy's direct weapon.
With respect to strategy, policy plays the 
leading and directing role";
moreover, strategy is "general and common for all
the services of the armed forces of the country'’
(10). Marshal Sokolovskiy and General-Major
Cherednichenko give a more extensive definition:
■Military strategy as a science may be 
stated as: determination of the nature,
character, and condition of the outbreak 
of various types of wars; the theory of 
organisation of the armed forces, of their 
structure, and development of a system of 
military equipment and armament; the 
theory ot strategic planning; the theory 
of strategi- deployment, establishment of 
strategic g^^upings and the maintenance of 
combat read:ness of the armed forces; 
the theory cC preparation of the economy 
and the country as a whole for war in all 
respects, ""including preparation of the 
population in a moral sense; the creation 
of reserve supplies ol arms, combat 
equipment, and other material resources; 
the development of methods of conducting 
armed struggle, of types and forms of
strategic operations; determination of 
forms and methods of strategic leadership 
of the armed forces, the development of 
command systems; the study and evaluation
of a probable enemy; the theory of
strategic intelligence; and the theory of 
possible results of a war* (11).
Frorr. these sources it is clear that Soviet military 
strategy is both operationally oriented and heavily 
infused with politics, Cot it is a direct instrument 
of politico, and as such, reflects the Party's 
political strategy. The Party's input determines 
the political objective of the war, and this, in
turn, indicates the tasks the military must fulfil. 
Strategy is the instrument for the fulfillment of
these tasks. In short, military strategy is
intended "to devise the means for winning war" (12). 
Noteworthy is the insistence that strategy be
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"general and common" for all the armed forces, 
clearly reflecting the Soviet belief that wars are 
conducted by the combined services and branches of 
the armed forces, and that only within the framework 
o£ a single strategy can all their activities be co­
ordinated. Also interesting is the subordination of 
the economy and population to the requirements of 
military strategy.
Because political considerations are dominant in
both n l i t a r y  doctrine and military strategy, there
exiii'-o a possibility that the two nay be confuuvd.
Soviet sources seek to prevent this by elucidating
the relationship between them;
*A relationship does exist between 
r:litarv - csrine and strategy. Strategy, 
ao a seierjf, '•te theory, develops the basic 
resfcoUs and : :-r"n of armed conflict on a 
strategic scale at the same time,
carries out the m;--tary leadership c£ 
war. Theoretical positions if strategy 
influence rrilitary doctrine and its 
Gcienti£?.c development. At th^ i,?me time, 
ctratagy directly executes doctiine and 
itc instrument in working out plans for 
'war and preparation of the country for r, . 
During txwti of war military doctrine 
recedes sbtr7e~wHat into the background, 
aince"a~rme'd combat is guided primarily by 
milltary-polltical ana military-strategic 
ideas, conclusions an3 generalisations, 
which flow from actual conditions. Con­
sequently, war and armed combat are 
directed not by doctrine, but bv strategy"
(13) . ------------ -------- ----------
Naturally, when doctrine changes, so does strategy.
Subordinate to strategy ate operational art and
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tactics. The concern of operational act is with 
"the theory and practice of preparing for and 
conducting combined and independent operations by 
major field forces or major formations o£ services*
(14), and encompasses Front (Army Group, in Western 
parlance) and Army operations. Each of the Soviet 
armed forces - there are five of them: Strategic 
Rocket Forces, Troops of National Air Defence, 
Ground Forces, Air Forces and Navy - has its own 
operational art. Operational art is responsible for 
determining the means for preparing and conducting 
those operations intended to fulfil strategic goals.
At the bottor, of the soviet hierarchy of military 
thought we find e$cties - 'the part of military art 
directly studying the basis for preparation and 
combat actions of small units, units and large units 
of all combat arms and services of the armed forces*
(15). Slot only does each Soviet armed service 
develop its own tactics, but often each arm or 
branch of a particular service develops its own 
tactics - for example, within the Ground Forces you 
will encounter Tank tactics, infantry tactics, 
Artillery tactics, etc..
Having ascertained what the Soviets mean when they 
talk about doctrine, military science, strategy and 
so on, it is now necessary to examine the content
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and evolution of the most important of these 
concepts: military doctrine and strategy.
Soviet sources consider that there have been, to 
date, three stages in the development of post-war 
Soviet military doctrine: 1945 to 1953; 1953 to
I960; and 1960 to the present.
The first period, marked by the continued total 
dominance of the Soviet scene by Stalin, was 
characterised by an intriguing dichotomy between 
theory and practice. Under Stalin, no discussion 
was permitted in the area of doctrine, nor was it 
permitted to discuss the possible nature of future 
war, Soviet officers had to speak, act and write as 
if nuclear weapons did not exist, or at best 
denigrating their capabilities. Indeed, after only 
three articles in 1945 and 1946, not one single 
article devoted to either atomic weapons or nuclear 
energy ia known to have appeared anywhere in the 
Soviet military press until 19531 The proclaimed 
basis of Soviet doctrine in this period was Stalin's 
five 'Permanently Operating Factors', first 
announced in 1941. In order of priority, they were:
1. stability of the rear;
2 . morale of the army;
3. quantity and quality of divisions;
4. armament? and
5. organising ability of the command personnel
(16).
The ranking of stability of the rear as the first 
priority illustrated Stalin's all-consuming fear of 
being toppled in an internal revolt, triggered by 
defeat at the hands of the Germans - in the same 
manner that Tsarism had collapsed 25 years before. 
Even urgent frontline priorities were subordinated 
to it - for examples, Stalin massively increased, by 
perhaps as much as 100%, the number of NKVD internal 
security troops after the German invasion, when 
there was a desperate need to reinforce the 
crumbling Red Army? while, in the Battle of Lvov, 
the Soviet 4th Army was sacrificed simply to win 
time for the NKVD to liquidate thousands of 
Ukrainian political prisoners held in the town, so 
that the Germans could not free them and employ them 
against the Sovjet :sglme (17). Of course, no one 
could question these permanently operating factors. 
So, in the realm of military thought, this period 
was one of total stultification.
However, it was very different in the realm of 
action. Soviet nuclear research actually pro-dated
the outbreak of the war, while 1943 saw a central 
Committee (i.e. Stalin) decision directing atomic
*• 6-
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weapons research. A special organ was created to 
co-ordinate all nuclear research and development, 
and after the United states bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, Stalin laid down the policy abjective of 
eliminating the United States nuclear monopoly as 
quickly as possible ( M O . Moreover, in 1945, Stalin 
ordered that the American B-29 strategic bomber, 
several of which forcelanded in Siberia after raids 
over Japan, Lx and puc into production (19).
In 1946, ewo acyusha regiments were merged
to form the 'JSS? - iirst ballistic missile unit 
(20). And in 1947, -he Soviets initiated their ICBM 
programme - well before the Americans (21). 
Finally, m  194?, and far earlier than the West 
expected, Russia detonated he, first atomic bomb 
(22).
Why v/ac all this urgent activity not reflected in 
doctrine? p-.-ti.-iUy, it was a matter of necessity: 
despite the intensive development programme, nuclear 
weapons wc-ro a iony way from making a oignj.tieant 
contribution to Soviet military power. Primarily, 
it was for political and psychological reasons. 
With the Eastern European empire still in the 
process of being digested, Stalin is unlikely to 
have wished to draw attention to atomic weapons, 
given the United States monopoly (or, after 1949, 
considerable superiority) in such weapons and their
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delivery systems. Related to this was the desire to 
persuade the West that Moscow could not be 
intimidated, not even by nuclear weapons.
This period in the development o£ soviet doctrine 
came to an end with the death of Stalin on 5 March 
1953. There followed a period of transition, with 
the commencement of: a Party institgated and
controlled debate on doctrine, centred in the new 
U353) Military Science Directorate of the Soviet 
General St.i££. The Eirot known product of this 
process was General-Major N .A. Talenskiy's article 
'On the Question of the Laws of Military Science' in 
the September 1S53 edition of the General Staff's 
classified and restricted journal Military Thought. 
In fact, Tslenskiy implied that Stalin's 'permanent­
ly operating factors' were not basic principles of 
war, ar.d called for * ctiirique o£ the then accepted 
military concepts. Over the following year, the 
joucMl published many letters concerning 
Talenskiy's article, indicating Party approval for 
the debate. However, for reasons unknown, Talenskiy 
himself was relieved of his post as editor of 
Military Thought, ultimately joining the Institute 
of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
This limited debate occurred in the realm of a 
restricted publication; in the open press, t: «
Stalin Line was re-afficmed by Marshal A.M. 
vasilevskiy, former Minister of Defence, who did so 
in two articles published in the magazine Rdd Star 
in February and May 1954 ropeetively. Likewise, 
Colonel p.A. Sidorov's 1954 basic military text. On 
Soviet Military Science re-affirmed the importance 
of the permanently operating factors (23).
Only with the appointment of Marshal G.A. Zhukov as 
Minister of Defence, in February 1955, did the 
confidential debate intensify. He is reported to 
have given a secret address at this time in which he 
severely criticised Stalin's concepts and called for 
a 'new look' in military affairs. The very next 
month Marshal P.A. Rotmistrov openly questioned the 
validity of Stalin 'o permanently operating factors, 
specifically in the case of nuclear war initiated by 
means of a surprise attack. Within twelve months 
Stalin "s concepts had been consigned to the 
intellectual scrap-heap by most soviet military 
thinkers. And in the famous Twentieth Party 
Congress of 1955 , Khrushchev called for a re­
examination of questions of military science. This 
resulted, in May 1957, in the convening of a secret 
conference to re-consider Soviet military science. 
In turn this was followed in 1958, by a series of 
secret high-level seminars, which ultimately reached 
the conclusion that the development of nuclear
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weapons and guided missiles had radically altered 
all aspects of warfare, and that basic concepts 
needed to ba considerably revised as a result. All 
these discussions were carefully monitored by the 
Party Secretariat, Politburo and by Khrushchev 
himself.
in order to achieve the necessary revisions in basic 
concepts, senior officers, including the Minister of 
Defence, were instructed to prepare studies on the 
impact of nuclear armed missiles on military art. 
These were to emerge as the famed Special 
Collection, published in Military Thought from 
January 1960 onwards. Meanwhile the Party leader­
ship had concluded that the nuclear-tipped missile 
would be the decisive factor in any future war (24).
Also in this period, the Soviet Union's nuclear 
capacity incroaaod as projects initiated under 
Stalin came to fruition. In August 1953, the 
Soviets exploded theii first hydrogen bomb. By the 
end of 1954, no few«r than 1,500 TU-4s had been 
produced for the Soviet Air Force's 'Long-Range 
Aviation' - a force which hod been virtually non­
existent in 1945 - while 1954-5L saw the entry into 
service of the 3,800 mile range TU-16 (NATO code- 
name Badger) jet bomber, which could reach much of 
the United States on one-way missions. And in 1956-
57 deliveries began of the turboprop TU-20 (Bear) 
bomber, which had a combat radius of 3-4,000 miles. 
By the end of the fifties the soviets had well over 
1,000 Badgers and approximately 150 Bears in service 
(25). Moreover, on August 3, 1957, the USSR had
tested the world's first ICBM, the ss-6 (a NATO code 
designation). And on October 4, 1957, they used an 
ICBM booster to launch Sputnik 1, the world's first 
artificial satellite, following up rapidly with 
Sputnik 2 on November 3, 1957, and sputnik 3 in May
1958. Nor was the Soviet Navy inactive: September
1955 had seen the first experimental launch of a 
ballistic missile from a Soviet submarine. Between 
1555 and 1957 seven Zulu (NATO code-name) diesel- 
electric submarines were converted to carry two 
launch tubeo for the 300 nautical-mile range SS-N-4 
Sark surface launched missiles. They were followed 
by a programme initiated in 1958 (and concluded in 
1962) which produced 23 Golf diesel-electric and 8 
Hotel nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, 
each carrying three SS-N-4* (26). Couple all this 
with an efficient Soviet dis-information programme 
to exaggerate soviet nuclear power, and Khrushchev's 
nuclear bluster, and it is little wonder that the 
United States became afeaid of a 'missile gap'.
Al" this ordered and monitored intellectual ferment 
culminated with the proclamation, by Khrushchev, in
a speech before the supreme Soviet on 14 January
1960, of a new military doctrine for the USSR. With 
modifications, it remains Soviet doctrine to thi. 
day. There were six main elements in the new 
doctrine, aa outlined by Khrushchev. The ficst of 
these was that there was no longer any fatal 
inevitability of war between communism and 
c-pitalism; f  . position, first propounded at the 
twentieth party Congress of the CPSU in 1956, and 
re-affirmed at the Twenty-First Congress, was a 
reversal of one of the long-standing beliefs of the 
Party. This change was in reaction to the 
development of nuclear weapons. second, should war 
occui, it would not commence, as in the past, by 
cross-border invasions, but by mesns of nuclear 
misaiie strikes deep into the interior. In 
Khrushchev's own words: "Not a single capital, no
large industrial or administrative centre, and no 
strategic area will remain unattacked in the very 
first minutes, let alone cays, of the war" (27). 
Howiver, while the USSR must expect a surprise 
attack, such an attack will not, of itself, win the. 
w a r . This would be because duplicate launch sites 
had been constructed and because the surviving 
nuclear missiles, which would be fired from them, 
would be sufficient to successfully deal with the 
aggressc Fourth, because the USSR possessed both 
nuclear and thsrmonuclear weapons, and the rockets
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to carry them, the Soviets could "wipe [any 
attacker] off the face of the earth" (28). True, 
such a nuclear exchange would inflict huge losses on 
the Soviet Union, but it would survive, whereas 
Western capitalism would be destroyed. Fifth, 
Soviet missiles were superior to American ones, and 
the USSR would seek to maintain this lead until a 
disarmament agreement was reached. Finally, 
national defence in the modern era was dependent 
upon firepower, not manpower; because of this, and 
because of Moscow's possession of nuclear weapons, 
the manpower of the Soviet armed forces would be 
reduced.
Ever since, this speech has been identified by
Soviet sources as signalling the change in Soviet
doctrine - though Khrushchev himself has never been
mentioned by name since his ouster. The importance
of this speech was highlighted, along with the
details of the new doctrine, by the then Soviet
defence minister, Marshal Malinovskiy, in a speech
before the k-nrty's Twenty-fecond Congress in October
1961. This speech is worth quoting at length:
"In that speech (i.e. Khrushchev's 1960 
address], a thorough analysis was given of 
the nature of modern war, which lies at 
the base of Soviet military doctrine. One 
of the important positions of this 
doctrine is that a world war, if in spite 
of everything is -.ileashed by the 
imperialist aggressors, will inevitably 
take the form of nuclear rocket war.- that
is, the kind of war in which the main 
means of striking will be the nuclear 
weapon and the basic means of delivering 
it to the target will be rocket. In 
connection with this, war will also begin 
in a different way from before and will be 
conducted in a different way ....
"The use of atomic and thermonuclear 
weapons, with unlimited possibilities for 
their delivery to any target in calculated 
minutes with the aid of rockets, permits 
the achievement of decisive military 
results in the shortest period of time at 
any distance and over enormous territory. 
The objects of crushing nuclear strikes 
will be groupings of the enemy armed 
forces, industrial and vital centres, 
communications junctions - everything that 
feeds war.
'k future world war, if not prevented, 
will take on an unprecedentedly destruct­
ive character. It will lead to the death 
of hundreds of millions of people, and 
whole countries will be turned into 
lifeless deserts covered with ashes ....
"*ri spite of the fact that in a future war 
the decisive ?lace will belong to the 
nuclear rocket weapon, we nevertheless 
cc&e to the conlusion that final victory 
over the aggressor can be achieved only as 
a result of the joint actions of all the 
services of the Armed Forces. This is why 
we are giving the necessary attention to 
perfecting all kind of weapons, teaching 
the troops to use them skillfully and to 
achieve deci - victory over the 
aggressor.
"*« also consider that, in contemporary 
circumstances, a future world war will b& 
waged, in spite of enormous losses, by 
massive, multi-million armed forces.
"... The importance of the beginning 
period of a possible war is that in this 
period the first massive nuclear strikes 
can, to an enormous degree, predetermine 
the whole subsequent course of the war, 
and lead to such losses in the interior 
and in the troops that the people and the 
country might be placed in exceptionally 
serious circumstances.
"Evaluating circumstance; realistically, 
it must be taken into account that the 
imperialists are preparing a surprise
nuclear attack against the USSR and other 
socialist countries. Therefore, Soviet
military doctrine considers the most
important, the main and paramount task of 
the Armed Forces to be in constant 
readiness for the reliable repulse of a
surprise attack of the enemy and so
frustrate his criminal plans.
"The fact is that in contemporary circum­
stances, any armed conflict inevitaoly 
will escalate into general nuclear rocket 
war if the nuclear powers are involved in 
it. Thus, we must prepare our Armed 
Forces, the country and all the people for 
struggle with the aggressor, first of all 
and rainly, in conditions of nuclear war.
"Our country is big and wide. it is less 
vulnerable than capitalist countries. But 
we clearly recognise that this would be 
for us an exceptionally severe war. we 
are deeply convinced that in this war, if
the imperialists thrust it on us, the
socialist camp will' win and capitalism
will be destroyed forever" (29).
'ihis, then, is Soviet doctrine. Note the strong 
nuclear emphasis, and note again, the emphasis on 
preparing the whole country - and not just the armed 
forces - for nuclear war, and the belief that 
victory, though costly, is achievable in nuclear 
war. Malinovskiy's outline of Soviet doctrine has 
been repeated again and again since, sometimes in 
more detail, sometimes in less. Thus we find the 
same arguments made in the third (1962) edition of 
the authoritative Party-military work, Marxism- 
Leninism on War and the Army, in Malinovskiy's own 
pamphlet Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace, 
which appeared in December 1962, less than two
months after the end of the Cuban missile crisis; 
P.M. Derevyanko's Problems of the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (1965 - after the fall of
Khrushchev; the appearance of this book indicated
that there would be no change in Soviet doctrine
under the new leadership); the fourth (1965) edition 
of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army; The History 
of Military Art (1966 - a joint effort by staff 
members of the Frunze Military Academy and the Lenin 
Military-Political Academy); Marshal Zakhavov"s 
(editor) Fifty Years of the Armed Forces of the PSSR 
(1968); and S.N. Kozlov's Officer's Handbook (1971), 
among many others. Only two modifications have
since been made to the doctrine, which has been
communicated to, and popularised among, junior 
officers, tiCOs, soldiers as well as the civilian 
population, by means of the slogan "The Revolution
in Military Affairs'.
The first of these modifications occurred following 
NATO's adoption of the strategy of 'Flexible 
Response' in Europe during 1967 (precisely at the 
time when McNamara was moving away from Flexible 
Response in practice!). In Europe, Flexible 
Response held that an East-West war could initially 
be fought with only conventional weapons. That the 
Soviets had modified their doctrine to cope with 
this first became apparent in the fifth (1968)
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edition of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army,
which included the following;
"Our military doctrine gives the main role 
in defeating an aggressor to the nuclear 
rocket weapon. At the same time it does 
not deny the important significance oi 
other kinds of weapons and means of 
fighting and the possibility in certain 
circumstances "of conducting combat oper­
ations w ithout the use of nuclear weapons"
T5oT:
The emphasised section was totally nev,- it had not
appeared in any earlier edition. The revisions in
the fifth edition were credited to Lt-Col V.M.
Bondarenko who, in the December 1968 issue of the
highly authoritative journal Communist of the Armed
Forces, expanded on this modification and placed it
firmly in its context within 'the revolution in
military affaire/;
"In our times conditions may arise when in 
individual instances combat operations may 
be carried out using conventional weapons.
Under these conditions, the role of 
conventional means and the traditional 
services of the armed forces are greatly 
increased. It becomes necessary to train 
troops for various kinds of warfare. This 
circumstance is sometimes interpreted as a 
negation of the contemporary revolution in 
military affairs, as its conclusion.
"One cannot agree with this opinion. The 
point is that the new possibilities of 
waging armed struggle have arisen not in 
spite of, but because of the nuclear 
missile weapons. All this forces the 
conclusion that the present situation is 
one of the moments in the revolution in 
military affairs. It flows out of this 
revolution, continuing it, instead of 
contradicting it.
"On the basis of this, we are able to
T 5 ' ^  • F  ^  ^  eT-
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define the contemporary revolution in 
military affairs as a radical upheaval 
in its development, which is characterised 
by new capabllTties of attaining political 
goals in war, resulting from the avail- 
ability of nucXear weaponsto the troops"
The new acceptance of the possibility of purely 
conventional fighting is thus firmly rooted within 
the 'revolution in military affairs" and securely 
placed under the Soviet nuclear umbrella. It is 
thus an extension, not a contradiction, of the 
doctrine laid down at the beginning of the decade. 
Bondarenko's arguments were repeated subsequently by 
other Soviet sources - including the then Soviet 
Defence Minister, Marshal A.A. Grechko. Colonel 
Seleznev sucmed up the modified doctrine in March 
1970:
"The nain and decisive means of waging the 
conflict will be the nuclear rocket 
weapon. In it, classical types of 
arma.aents will also find use. In certain 
circumstances, the possibility is admitted 
of conducting combat operations by units 
and subunits with conventional weapons"
(32).
The Soviet Union had - and has - acknowledged the 
possibility that a conflict will initially involve 
conventional weapons only. But they remain firm in 
their belief that nuclear weapons would probably be 
used from the start, and that these weapons remain 
the decisive factor in any war.
The second modification to the doctrine occurred in
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the early seventies;. The first, cautious hint of
the new adaptation came right from the top - Party
Secretary L.I. Brezhnev himself, who in March 1971
addressed the Twenty-fourth Party Congress:
"The Soviet people can be sure that at any 
time in the day or night our glorious 
armed forces are ready to repel an enemy 
no matter from where it comes. Any 
possible aggressor is fully aware that in 
the event of an attempt of a nuclear 
missile strike on our country, he will 
receive a dev bating retaliatory strike"
(33).
At first observers saw this as a reference to China;
but that this was too narrow an interpretation began
to become clear the following year. For 1972 saw
the publication of a new book, edited by Colonel
Kulish, entitled Military Force and International
Relations. It was a new departure in Soviet
military writings, for its central theme was that
the USSR required the ability to project military
force abroad:
"Greater importance is being attached to 
Soviet military presence in various 
regions throughout the world, reinforced 
by an adequate level of strategic mobiii*- ■ 
of its armed forces.
"In connection with the task of preventing 
local ware and also in those cases wherein 
military support must be furnished to 
those nations fighting for their freedom 
and independence against the forces of 
international reaction and imperialist 
interventions, the Soviet Union may 
require mobile and well-trained and well- 
equipped forces ....
"Expanding the scale of Soviet military 
presence and military assistance furnished 
by other socialist states is being viewed
today as a very important factor in 
internat'cnal relations" (34).
Then, in .1974 , Defence Minister Marshal Grechko came
ouk with an unprecedented statement that most
authoritatively confirmed the new addition to Soviet 
doctrine:
"At the present stage the historic
function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not 
restricted to their function in defending 
our Motherland and the other socialist 
countries. In its foreign policy activity 
the Soviet state purposefully opposes the 
export of counterrevolution and the policy 
of oppression, supports the national
liberation struggle, and resolutely 
resists imperialists' aggression in 
whatever distant region of our planet it 
cay appearh (35).
Henceforth the Soviet armed forces would operate 
anywhere in the world where the Patty leadership 
deemed its interests were at stake. This was a 
logical extension of Soviet doctrine, and provided 
the doctrinal base for the writings of the Chief of 
the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gor ';kov, as well as 
signalling a new direction for the development of 
the Soviet Navy.
nevertheless, the core of Soviet doctrine remains 
unchanged: the nuclear missile r the decisive
factor in any world war; howi xclear parity
has largely neutralised America s. .aolear forces, 
the possibility of waging a conventional war, under 
the protection of the Soviet nuclear umbrella, is
f  % w ~
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recognised,- projection of military force abroad is 
the logical extension of this.
What is the strategy that has been developed to
implement this doctrine? In January 1960, the very
month Khrushchev first pronounced the new doctrine,
a highly classified edition of Military Thought
appeared, initiating what is known as the Special
Collection, which, according to Colonel Oleg
Penkovskiy, was a series of articles devoted to the
discussion of future wars and of the requirements of
the new doctrine. The first article, by General-
Lieutenant Gastilovich, set the theme for the whole
series. The emphasis was on nuclear warfare.
Whereas previously wars had begun on the borders of
the combatant countries, argued Gastilovich,
"If war starts now, mi ? itary action will 
evolve in a different way because 
countries have avai’ .i.. le means of 
delivering weapons ovi. thousands of 
kilometres ....
"About 100 nuclear charges, exploded in a 
brief period of time i:\ a highly 
industrialized country with a territory of 
about 300-50C thousand kilometres, will 
suffice to transform all of its industrial 
areas and administrative-political centres 
into a heap of ruins, and the territory 
into a lifeless desert contaminated with 
deadly radioactive substances" (36).
Penkovskiy summarised the contents of the whole 
Special collection as follows: any future war would
commence with a sudden, surprise r.uclear attack upon 
the enemy; there would be no declaration of war -
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indeed, the Soviets would do theic best to avoid 
such a declaration; local wars were envisaged, but 
only as preludes to a global nuclear exchange; and 
while the intention would, be to achieve a rapid 
victory, there was recognition of the possibility 
that even nuclear war could be protracted and that 
the USSR must be prepared for this (37).
The accuracy cf Penkovskiy's account was confirmed
with the publication of the unclassified book.
Military Strategy, editrd by Marshal V.D.
Sokolovskiy (former Chief of General Staff), in mid-
1962. The focus was unhesitatingly nuclear.
Indeed, this was the justification for the book, as
Sokolovskiy wrote in his introduction:
"the app .ance of weapons of mass 
destructio. in the armament of modern 
armies and *n particular the development 
and perfection of missiles with nuclear 
warheads have necessitated a fundamental 
review of many tenets of military 
strategy" (38).
Military Strategy reflects vhe doctr.-nsi propounded 
by Khrushchev and Malinovskiy, eclated into 
strategy. Thus, "a third world war ' : oe first of 
all a nuclear rocket war"; therefe ; The initial 
period of the wac will be of decisive importance for 
the outcome of the entire war"; as a result, the 
prime task facing Soviet strategy was the 
development of reliable metnods of "repelling a
surprise nuclear attack of an aggressor" (39). As 
in the Special Collection, the stress waa on a 
devastating initial (officially, 'retaliatory') 
nuclear strike upon the enemy; at short war if 
possible, but with the ability to fight a long one 
if required} on thorough preparation in peacetime 
for the eventuality of war; and on the need to 
prepare the population so that it would survive in 
nuclear war conditions.
June 1963 saw the publication of the second edition
of Military Strategy: though, in the interim, there
had been the Cuban missile crisis and the signing of
the Test Ban Treaty, there were no significant
differences from the first edition. Moreover, in
1964, the second edition of a work entitled On
Soviet Military Science appeared; the first (1960)
edition had briefly mentioned nuclear weapons, but
had focused on conventional onee Now, in 1964, the
focus was strongly nuclear. As in the realm of
doctrine, the fall of Khrushchev had no impact on
the new Soviet strategy. Soviet writings on
strategy continued to focus on nuclear weapons.
Thus, in 1966, Marshal Sokolovskiy and General-Major
Cherednichenko wrote that:
"The determination of the composition of 
the armed forces for peacetime and 
especially for time of war, the making of 
a reserve of arms, military equipment and 
primarily, nuclear rocket weapons as a 
means of war, as well as material
reserves, deploying strategic groups and 
organising the all-round security of the 
armed forces in time of war - this is the 
crucial ta^k of military strategy" (40).
And, 4S if this was not clear enough, the authors go
on to spell it out bluntly:
"The most acute problem of strategy in
contemporary citcumstances^ls thT" working 
out os metTTocfs of' waging "nuclear" "rocket 
wap- rTTTT"*
Nineteen sixty eight jaw the publication of the
third -‘dition o£ Military Strategy; this edition was
nominated for she prestigious Frunze Prize in 1969
and is listed in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia
(the first voluTr.e of which appeared in 1976) as a
basic reference book on strategy. The nuclear
emphasis was unadulterated, though, in accordance
with the modifications in doctrine. Military
Strategy now recognised that non-nuclear wars could
be fouyht/ and that the Soviet armed forces should
bs ready to fight such wars. As with doctrine,
Soviet strategy was rot in the least affected by the
signing of the SALT I Treaty. For example, in the
book Scionlific-Tcchnical Progress and the
Revolution in Military Affairs (1373), we find;
"The possibility of using nuclear missile 
weapons has required the development of
active and decisive forms and methods for 
strategic as well ao tactical operations 
without any delay from the very outsc-t of 
the war" (42).
Since then, the only modification to Soviet strategy 
has concerned the projection of Soviet forces into
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any and all part.? ox the world, reflecting the 
modification to doctrine in the early seventies. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental tenet of Soviet 
strategy remains unaltered - the armed forces must 
be prepared for the possibility of a nuclear war.
Having established their nuclear doctrine and 
strategy, the Soviet Onion has engaged in an on­
going process of providing itself with the forces 
necessary to implement them. organisationally, a 
completely new and separate armed force, the 
Strategic Rocket Forces, was established in May 1960 
to control all strategic land-based Ballistic 
Missiles, while in 1961 the Civil Defence organ­
isation was transferred from the control of the 
Ministry of the interior to the Ministry of Defence.
In terms of hardware, the last quarter-century has 
seen a most impressive build-up in the Soviet 
arsenal. in late 1962, the soviet nuclear forces 
had comprised some 100 TU-20 Bear and Myasishchev 
Mya-4 Bison heavy bombers, 1,350 medium jet bombers, 
and 35 SS-6 and SS-7 ICBMS (43) r ti,f products of 
projects launched under Stalin's regime. in 1963, 
the SS-8 ICBM became operational, and under the new 
doctrine, deployment of iCBMs was accelerated. By 
the end of 1964, the number of Soviet ICBMs had 
increased to approximately 200. Moreover, the
Soviets had begun to construct hardened silos fr
which to launch these missiles. In 1967, the SS-9,
then the world's biggest ICBM, entered service. 
Around the same time the smaller SS-11 became 
operational, followed in 1969 by the SS-12. By the 
end of 1970, the USSR had deployed 1,100 operational 
ICBMs, including 275 giant SS-9s, as against
America's total of 1,054, of which only 54 were 
heavy ICBMs (44). Between 1967 and 1972 the Soviets 
had deployed over 200 ICBMs every year, finally 
reaching a total of no less than 1,600. This level 
was institutionalised in the SALT I agreement, which 
allowed the USSR a total of 1,618 ICBMs (45).
Henceforth, the emphasis would be on upgrading the 
quality - i.e. the accuracy and reliability - 
without reducing the throw weight (i.e. the size of 
the warheads) of Soviet ICBMs. Thus the seventies 
saw the deployment of vastly more accurate, and 
MIRV-capable, ICBMs - the SS-17 and SS-19 medium 
missiles and the SS-18 heavy missile; while another 
medium ICBM, the SS-16 L-s not been operationally 
deployed (though an IRBM version, the fully-mobile 
SS-20, has been). By 1981 Soviet ICBM strength 
stood at 1,398, down in quantity but up in quality, 
with modernisation taking place at the rate of 
approximately 175 new missiles a year. Moreover, 
both the SS-17 and SS-18 employ 'cold-launch' 
techniques - i.e. the ICBM is fi-.-t ejected from the
Soviets had begun to construct hardened silos from
which to launch these missiles. In 1967, the SS-9,
then the world's biggest ICBM, entered service. 
Around the same time the smaller SS-11 became 
operation*!, followed in 1969 by the SS-13. By the 
end of 1970, the USSR had deployed 1,100 operational 
ICBMs, including 275 giant SS-9s, as against 
America's total of 1,054, of which only 54 were 
heavy ICBMs (44). Between 1967 and 1972 the Soviets 
had deployed over 200 ICBMs every year, finally 
reaching a total of no less than 1,600. This level 
was institutionalised in the SALT I agreement, which 
allowed the USSR a total of 1,618 ICBMs (45).
Henceforth, the emphasis would be on upgrading the 
quality - i.e. the accuracy and reliability -
without reducing the throw weight (i.e. the size of 
the warheads) of Soviet ICBMs. Thus the seventies 
saw the deployment of vastly more accurate, and 
MIRV-capable, ICBMs - the SS-17 and SS-19 medium 
missiles and the SS-18 heavy missile; while another 
medium ICBM, the SS-16 has not been operationally 
deployed (though an IRBM version, the fully-mobile 
SS-20, has been). By 1981 Soviet ICBM strength 
stood at 1,398, down in quantity but up in quality, 
with modernisation taking place at the rate of 
approximately 175 new missiles a year. Moreover, 
both the SS-17 and SS-18 employ 'cold-launch' 
techniques - i.e. the ICBM is first ejected from the
m, r &
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silo and then ignites its rocket motors - thus 
considerably reducing launch damage to the silo, 
making re-loading and re-use of the silo practical 
and raising the disturbing question: how many re­
load ICBMs does the soviet Union have? The threat 
these developments pose to the United States of 
America has already been discussed in the preceeding 
chapter.
With SLBMs the story is the same - massive increases 
in both quantity and quality. The Hotel class 
ballistic missile submarines were fol] n 1968
by the Yankee class, each carrying sixt merged
launched SS-N-6 SLBMs, possessing a range of 1,300 
nautical miles? by the end of 1970, 17 Yankees were 
operational. These were supplemented by cruise 
missile armed submarines - 57 of them (23 diesel- 
electric and 34 nuclear) - capable of attacking 
United states coastal cities with their 400 nautical 
miles range SS-N-3 missiles (47). The Yankee 
programme ended in 1974 after the construction of 34 
submarines, and was followed by the Delta class, 
which, in turn, is composed of three sub-classes. 
Ths Delta I sub-class carries twelve of the 4,200 
nautical mile range SS-N-6 SLBMs? the Delta II 
sixteen of the ss-N-18 SLBM. The latest Soviet 
programme, dating from approximately 1980, is the 
massive Typhoon submarine carrying no less than
%twenty SS-N-20 SLBMs (48).
By contrast, the Soviet strategic bomber force 
suffered from a long period of neglect, perhaps 
resulting from geographic factors (the USSR is 
poorly placed to act as a base for air attacks on 
the United States of America), This only began to 
be rectified in the mid-seventies, with the 
deployment of the TU-22M Backfire bomber in 1974. 
With air-to-air refuelling, the Backfire can achieve 
intercontinental ranges (49). More importantly, the 
early eighties has seen the development and testing 
of a new, truly intercontinental bomber, originally 
known as RAM-P but now codenamed Blackjack. 
Believed to possess an unrefuelled combat radius of
4.000 nautical miles, and reportetly capable of a 
maximum speed of twice the speed of sound (Mach 2), 
it will be a very formidable aircraft when 
deployment begins in 1987. On top of this, the USSR 
appears to be developing long-range cruise missiles
- the 1,500 nautical mile range AS-X-15 and the
2.000 nautical mile range supersonic 8L-10 - to arm 
the Backfire and Blackjack, a combination which 
would pose an enormous threat to the continental 
United States of America (50).
Similarly, doctrinal and strategic recognition of 
the value of conventional forces has been followed
by a considerable upgrading in the quality of all 
Soviet conventional systems - tanks are better 
armed; artillery has become self-propelled; aircraft 
have longer ranges and better payloads etc.. 
Likewise, doctrinal and strategic acceptance of the 
value of power projection has begun to have an 
impact on the type of ships built for the Soviet 
Navy. Hitherto a sea denial force intended to 
attack United states aircraft carriers, Polaris 
submarines and NATO convoys, it is in the process of 
becoming a sea control force with its own aircraft 
carrier?, modern replenishment ships', ocean-going 
amphibious vessels and longer endurance cruisers and 
destroyers. Moreover, the Soviet Union has 
practised power projection abroad in Angola (1975- 
76), Ethiopia (1977) and Afghanistan (1979) with 
considerable success.
Thus, 1984 finds the soviet Union with a logical, 
coherent and widely disseminated and understood 
military doctrine and strategy, which has, moreover, 
remained unaffected by the changes in the Soviet 
leadership over the past twenty years (Khrushchev to 
Brezhnev 1964, Brezhnev to Andropov 1982, Andropov 
to Chernenko 1984), and for the implementation of 
which the necessary forces (both in terms of 
quantity and quality) exist. As the Scotts point
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"... Soviet military doctrine and strategy 
has an integrity of its own ... even with 
the revolution in military affairs, soviet 
military doctrine is still 'classical' in 
that war remains an extension of politics 
and that deterrence is not an end in 
itself" (59).
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CHAPTER 7; WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY
At the opposite end of the spectrum from nuclear 
weaponry and strategy, and apparently bearing little 
relation to it, lies insurgency, or unconventional, 
or irregular warfare. But the two apparent extremes 
are far more closely linked than many realise - 
linked by the Soviet doctrines of Peaceful 
Coexistence and War' of National Liberation.
For, while, as has been seen, the Soviet view of 
nuclear weapons and strategy is very different from 
that of the united states, there was, for many 
years, the inescapable fact that the United States 
possessed a clear nuclear superiority which would, 
in event of a fullscale war, gravely endanger the 
survival of the USSR. Yet Moscow was, and is, 
ideologically bound to pursue the goal of world 
revolution (1). How to further this aim without 
provoking the United States of America to a nuclear 
response? The answer was a three pronged strategy:
Peaceful Coexistence, Wars of National Liberation, 
and a massive and relentless military build-up, all 
interlinked and interacting with each other.
While the Soviet concept of Peaceful Coexistence 
pre-dated the development or nuclear weapons, it had
been a mere tactic to help the USSR survive a period
of great weakness following the revolution and civil
war (2). Khrushchev, however, elevated it into a
strategy (3). This new development was first
outlined at a closed plenum of the soviet Communist
party (CPSU) Central Committee in July 1955 . The
whole purpose of PeacoSul coexistence was, and is, .. . —
to allow the USSR to expand its ideological empire
without triggering a massive Western response -
indeed, while actually lulling the West into a false
sense of security - by engaging in subversion,
ideological intrusion, diplomacy, etc. (4).
That this is so is clear from many Soviet statements
and writings made since the official pronouncement
of the policy at the 20th Party Congress in 1956.
Thus, in 1959, the 'statement of the 81 Communist
and Workers Parties' stated:
"The policy of peaceful coexistence is a 
policy of mobilising the masses and 
launching vigorous action against the
enemies of peace, Peaceful co-existence 
of states does not imply renunciation of 
the class struggle .... In conditions of 
peaceful coexistence favourable opportun­
ities are provided for the development of 
the class struggle in the capitalist
countries and the national liberation
movement of the peoples of the colonial 
and dependent countries. In their turn, 
the successes of the revolutionary class 
and national liberation struggle promote 
peaceful coexistence ... [Communists] will 
do their utmost for the people to weaken 
imperialism and limit its sphere of action 
by an active struggle for peace, democracy 
and national liberation" (5).
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Khrushchev himself, on 6 January 1961, stated that:
"the policy of peaceful coexistence as 
regards its social content, is a form of 
intense economic, political and ideologic­
al struggle of the proletariat against the 
aggressive forces of imperialism in the 
international arena* (6).
Ten years later, V.N. Egorov, an official Soviet
ideologist,- was to write
"... while political and ideological 
disputes between states should not lead to 
war, the concept of peaceful coexistence 
means intensification of the struggle of 
the working classes, of all the Communist 
parties, for the triumph of socialist 
ideas' (Y).
While the following year (1972), Leonid Brezhnev 
proclaimed
’While pressing for the assertion of the 
principles of peaceful coexistence, we 
realise that successes in this important 
matter in no way signify the possibility 
of weakening the ideological struggle",
"We should be prepared for an 
intensification of this struggle and for 
it becoming an increasingly more acute 
form of the struggle between the two 
social systems. We have no doubt as to 
the outcome of this struggle, because tbs 
truth of history and the objective laws of 
social development are on our side" (8).
In 1979, an even more candid statement, by Gen-Maj.
D.A. Volkogonov, appeared in the journal Communist
of the Armed Forces:
"Peaceful coexistence facilitates the 
weakening of the omnipotence of the 
military-industrial complex in the 
capitalist world while creating political, 
economic, and ideological struggle by the 
proletariat" (9).
The 'executive arm', so to speak, of this Grand
Strategy is the Strategy of Wars of National
Liberation. mhe intention was, and is, to harness
Third World anti-Western nationalism to the USSR's
revolutionary cause. As the authoritative journal,
Voprosy istorii KPSS stated;
"The fate oC hurnaa progress depends upon
whom seventy under-developed countries 
choose to follow. -This is a matter of
great historical significance" (10).
The Soviet Military Encyclopedia (1978) has defined
Wars of National Liberation as follows;
"National Liberation struggle is a form of 
war waged by peoples of colonial, in­
dependent, or formerly colonial countries 
... in which Socialist countries become 
the decisive factor when the peoples 
launch an armed struggle against internal 
reactionaries* (11).
To this end, in January 1966 the Soviet Union
organised a Tri-continental Conference in Havana,
Cuba. The mon:h before, Tass had stated;
"The Soviet Union, in taking part in the 
Havana conference ... will do everything 
it can to help consolidate the front of 
the struggle against imperialist aggress­
ion” (12),
At the conference itself, Brezhnev pledged that the 
USSR would
"strengthen the fraternal links of the 
CPSU with the communist parties and 
revolutionary democratic organisations in 
Asia, Africa and Latin American 
countries",
and, furthermore, stressed that the global success 
of communism was "bound up with the successes of the 
national liberation movement" (13). Sharaf R.
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Rashichov - head of the Soviet delegation to Havana,
First Secretary of the Party Central Committee of
Uzbekistan, and candidate member of the Presidium of
the Central Committee of the CPSU — declared:
"Our purpose is the formation of a united 
front against the common enemy ... [and] 
international imperialism, headed by the 
United States" (14).
The Conference, in the words of Cuban Communist
Party Central Committee member Lionel Soto, marked
"a new, higher stage in the liberation
movement ... [It] will be peaceful
catalyst, also strategically. It will 
spur on social revolution in the 
capitalist countries" (15).
A resolution at this Conference re-affirmed the link
between the concepts of Peaceful Coexistence and
national liberation:
"This doctrine [peaceful coexistence]
applies only to relations between states 
with different social and political
systems. It cannot apply to relations
between the social classes, between the 
exploited and the exploiters within 
separate countries, or between the
oppressed peoples and their oppressors"
(16).
A 'Committee of Assistance and Aid for the Peoples 
Fighting for Their Independence' was established to 
act as a central body for policy and strategy for 
Wars of national liberation. The 513 participants 
hailed from the then Portuguese colonies of Angola 
and Mozambique, from Zaire, the then Rhodesia, North 
and South Yemen, South Africa, South West Africa/ 
Namibia, ’Palestine1, Laos, Cambodia, South Korea,
OL ...
- 198 -
Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, 
Columbia, Cyprus, Panama, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei
(17).
This 1966 Conference was followed up by two more 
Soviet sponsored Conferences, both in 1969. First, 
there was the liberation conference at Khartoum, 
attended by representatives of subversive movements 
from South Africa (ANC), Rhodesia (ZAPU), South West 
Africa/Namibia (SWAPO), Angola (MPLA), Portuguese 
Guinea {PAIGO, and Mozambique (S?RELIMO). Then, in 
October, at Alma Ata (in Kazakhstan), the 
'symposium' on 'The Leninist Teaching of National 
Liberation Revolution and t M  Present Developing 
Countries', which delegates from fifty Third World 
countries attended (18).
Nor is Moscow's support for wars of national 
liberation merely rhetorical. As early as 1964 the 
Soviet: Politburo decided to increase its spending on 
Terrorism by 1000% (19). Within months of the
conclusion of the Tricontinental Conference a whole 
network of training camps for insurgents had been 
created in Cuba, supervised by KGB Colonel Vadim 
Kotchergine (20). Since then, this network of 
training camps has grown worldwide, embracing
countries such as Czechslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, North Korea, South Yemen,
Algeria, Libya, Angola, Mozambique as well as the 
USSR itself (21). The Soviet Union's training camps 
appear to be concentrated in and around Moscow, 
Odessa, Tashkent and Simferopol (where one camp 
alone can simultaneously train 400 recruits), and 
provide instruction in mine-laying, ambush 
techniques, fire co-ordination, revolutionary
tactics in general, driving, radio and television
techniques, political indoctrination and intell­
igence. These camps ate apparently run by Soviet 
Military Intelligence, the GRU (22). One terrorist, 
captured by the Israelis, reported that in 1976 she 
had been trained at Camp Khayat (South Yemen), at 
which time the trainees had included recruits from 
Holland, Germany, Ireland, Iran, Turkey, Latin
America, Eritrea and Japan; Cuban instructors had
been prominent (23).
How is this strategy of "National Liberation' 
organised and implemented at the level of the target 
state? When considering this 'operational' aspect 
of the strategy, one must always remember that 
military action and politics cannot be divorced from 
each other; rather, they are closely interlocking. 
And in no form of conflict is this interlocking more 
evident than in wars of national liberation, which 
are, of course, wars of insurgency. In this regard, 
it is necessary to return to Clausewitz:
"It is clear, consequently, that war is 
not a mere act of policy but a true 
political instrument; a continuation of 
political activity by other means. What 
remains peculiar to war is simply the 
peculiar nature of its means .... The 
political objective is the goal, war is 
the means of reaching it, and means can 
never be considered in isolation from 
their purpose" (24).
Nor should one forget his rider to this:
"War ... is an act of policy .... That ... 
does not imply that bhe political aim is a 
tyrant. It must adapt itself to its 
chosen means, a process which can 
radically change it ..." (25).
In practice, this interaction is illustrated and 
exemplified by the invariable dual structure of the 
various insurgent organisations: a political
structure with a parallel 'military' structure. 
This always applies, whether the movement is rural 
or urban or both. Though of course the political 
structure - the 'Party' - is always established 
first, each level in the political hierarchy comes 
to be matched by an equivalent level in the 
'military' hierarchy, while the geographical 
divisions of the party ore almost always congruent 
with the various zones of 'military' operation. 
This can be illustrated schematically as follows:
Political (Party) -----  Military (Insurgent)
Party Leader ------ 'Military* Leader
Party Headquarters ------ 'Military' Headquarters
Regional Organisation ------ Regional Headquarters
Local Branches  ------1 Front Line1 Units
Source: Paget, J., Counter-Insurgency Campaigning,
Faber and Faber, London, 19677 p. 182.
Real organisational structures tend to be somewhat 
more complex, but they nevertheless follow this 
basic pattern, as can be seen from the organisation­
al chart for the Viet Cong;
1
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Neither of these wings can effectively operate 
without the other.
The actual process of subversion, in its classical 
form, involves four stages. Firstly, there is the 
creation of the underground party organisation, by 
the party itself. This involves the infiltration, 
subversion and intimidation of the local population 
in the target area. The infiltrators will focus on 
real or imagined grievances felt by the inhabitants, 
in an attempt to win over the target population. 
But this approach is always accompanied by coercion 
in the form of terrorism. This is a slow process 
that can, and usually does, take years. As the 
underground organisation develops and spreads, it 
destroys the security of the people and disrupts the 
Slow of intelligence to the Security forces - who 
are usualy unaware of this process of subversion. 
Once in place, the party can provide logistic 
support and intelligence for the active insurgents 
of the military wing.
With the successful establishment of the party 
organisation in the target area, bhe second stage 
begins. The active insurgent or military forces 
begin to come into being with the creation of 
village insurgent squads. These units are often 
'part-time' formations, rendering detection
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difficult; their function is to reinforce the under­
ground organisation, and to physically eliminate the 
representatives of the central government resident 
in the villages, Such governmental representatives 
have often already had their power and status under­
mined by the activities ot the party. It must never 
be forgotten that this second stage of insurgency is 
totally dependent on the party underground for its 
survival and effectiveness.
The next, third stage is the creation of regional 
insurgent forces, composed of full-time insurgents. 
These, again, act in support of the elements of the 
above two stages, providing yet greater security for 
the under<_.ound organisation and virtually 
eliminating the danger: of Security Force strikes on 
the village squads, if only by becoming the primary 
targets for such strikes. But they also act 
offensively, placing greater pressure on the govern­
ment and forcing it into the defensive. In turn, 
these Regional Forcesi can only survive because of 
the activities of stages one and two, providing them 
with essential logistical support and intelligence 
(such as locations and strengths of Police posts, 
routes of government patrols, threats from major 
Security Force operations, etc,). The Police are an 
especial target for these Regional units.
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The final, and highest, stage of the classical 
insurgency pattern is the formation o£ regular 
uii.'.ts. Initially, these are small formations 
established in safe, remote, areas or in friendly 
foreign sanctuaries. Ultimately, they reach 
divisional strength; their function is to engagge 
and destroy the major units of the government's 
army. Yet, despite their size, and relative power, 
they are still interlinked with the other levels of 
insurgency who provide the critically needed flow of 
intelligence, logistics, replacements, and rear area 
security. Even at this late stage, all the elements 
are totally interdependant, with the underground 
party still the essential, irreplaceable foundation 
on which the whole complex structure is founded and 
without which th% other elements would rapidly be 
destroyed.
This process of insurgency can be schematically 
illustrates as follows:
INFILTRATION
POPULATION JUNGLE
LINE OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT
Adopted from R. Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam, 
Chatto and Hindus, London,"1969, pp. $2-33.
However, this classical model has rarely been 
achieved - virtually only in China and Indo-China. 
In most other cases, a hybrid model has come into 
being comprising two levels: the underground party
organisation, which functions in exactly the same 
manner as the underground organisation in the 
classical model; and the Regional insurgent units, 
which also have to fulfil some of the roles of the 
village squads in the classical model. The Regular, 
that is conventional, units never occur in these 
hybrid cases. It was this hybrid version of 
insurgency that was epparent in Malaya, Angola, 
Mozambique, Rhodesia, Nicaragua and which is 
currently being practised in South West Africa/ 
Namibia and El Salvador, to give only a few
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examples. It has also been adopted by nationalist 
insurgent groups, such as the IZL in mandated 
Palestine and EOKA in pre-independence Cyprus, which 
otherwise had no significant link-up with the Soviet 
strategy of National Liberation, In urban 
insurgency, this 'two level' model of underground 
organisation and insurgent force is the only 
applicable one. However, there is a considerable 
difference in scale between rural and urban 
insurgent forces - the former are almost invariably 
considerably larger than the latter.
But, whatever version of insurgency is experienced, 
all have one critically important print in common, 
which bears repeating: all are totally dependent for 
survival and ultimate success on the underground 
organisation. Without this organisation, there 
would be no food, no recruits, no secure bases, no 
intelligence; the insurgents would be blind, deaf, 
sick and starving - and thus, easy targets for the 
Security Forces.
Many historical examples can be given of the process 
of subversion; a recent case, involving the hybrid 
model, will be examined - Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) 
(28). All early insurgent infiltration attempts, 
carried out Dy the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary 
Army (ZIPRA) of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African
peoplezs Union (ZAPU) in the period 1967-68, had 
failed disastrously because ZAPU had totally 
neglected to create the necessary underground 
organisation without which the Terrorists of ZIPRA 
could not survive. And they did not survive. This 
strategic incompetence greatly aided the rival 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) of 
Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Onion 
(ZANU) in two ways. It illustrated how not to 
conduct insurgency, and it resulted in gross over­
confidence and complacency on the pert of the 
Rhodesians - Security Forces and goven rc-nt both. 
They simply assumed that all further infiltration 
attempts would be repeats of ZJ-'SA's inept efforts. 
No meaningful attempt was made to examine the 
lessons learnt - and publicised - by other countries 
fighting insurgency elsewhere in the world. Thus 
they failed to take any precautions against the 
construction of an underground organisation.
Yet the creation of precisely such an organisation 
was ZANU/ZANLA's top priority; and they commenced it 
under the worst possible conditions - from rear 
bases in distant Tanzania via war-torn and 
Portuguese ruled Mozambique. Had the Rhodesians 
been alert, ZANU would never have succeeded in 
establishing its organisation, ZANLA's operations 
would have been aborted before they began, and the
^ * 1
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history of Southern Africa would have been 
different. However, this was not to be, and ZANU 
successfully established itself within Rhodesia, 
ZANLA following.
The actual process of creating the underground was 
quite a simple and straightforward combination of 
carrots and sticks, it would begin with one or more 
ZANU political commissars, accompanied by a small 
escort group, moving through a tribal area. They 
would repeatedly call the local people to meetings, 
to explain who they were, what they were doing, and 
what their objectives were. At these meetings the 
commissars announced the commencement of the
Chimure^ga, the 'liberation w ar' to drive the white
conquerors out of the country, so ending their 
oppression (shown by their unpopular insistence on 
soil conservation schemes and veterinary regulations 
and restrictions) and exploitation (illustrated by 
their wealth, housing, cats, etc.) of 'the people'. 
On the successful conclusion of the Chimursnga, all 
the 'petty' regulations would be abolished, and 
European land and wealth distributed to the
tribesmen. In orfler to achieve this end, the
villagers had, of course, to support the 'freedom 
fighters'. Of such promises was the carrot formed,- 
promises of better, freer times to come.
•• - *  us***
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But there was also the stick. The commissars would 
warn their audiences of the fatal consequences of 
becoming 'sellouts' - agents of the government. To 
give emphasis to these warnings, the commissars 
would order the tribespeople to point out government 
supporters, or 'stooges and puppets' in the 
revolutionary jargon? invariably, several unfortun­
ates were identified as such. They were promptly, 
publicly and brutally killed by the escort group. 
The cost of opposing the Chinrnrenga was thus made 
graphically and terrifyingly clear. It proved most 
effective. These indoctrination sessions usually
concluded with a rousing address from the commissar 
and the singing of Chimurenga songs, the learning of 
which was compulsory.
Once this preliminary work of 'politicising the 
people', to employ the jargon, was successfully 
concluded, the commissars established the local 
underground organisation. In Rhodesia it took an
extremely simple, though nevertheless very
effective, form, with three main elements. Firstly, 
and most importantly, there were the Contactmen. 
Their role was vital; they collected all scraps of 
intelligence concerning Security Force movements 
{which the local tribespeople were duty-bound to
report, on pain of death); selected the base sites 
for the ZANLA groups when they arrived? organised
the necessary logistic support (primarily food) for 
them? were responsible foe all communications 
between the ZANLA unite (radios could not be 
employed because of the danger posed by Radio 
Direction Finding), and for arranging security for 
all meetings between such units. Secondly, there 
were the 'Policemen'', subordinate to the Contactmen 
and responsible for maintaining discipline among the 
tribespeople? any breaches of discipline were 
reported to the local ZANLA commander - the 
Policemen had no 'executive' powers themselves - who 
then decided upon, and carried out, the necessary 
punishment. Finally, there were the Mujibas, who 
ranged in age from the very young to the very old. 
They acted as intelligence gatherers and messengers, 
either under the control of the local Contactman, or 
directly under the local ZANLA group. The more 
flexible Mujiba structure came, in some measure, to 
supersede the more rigid Contactman-'Policeman 
system.
Only once this organisation was in place and 
operational would ZANLA units actually deploy in the 
area. The ZANU commissars would then move on to 
'politicise' another area, and then another, and so 
on, ZANLA always following behind. This process was 
still continuing when the war ended.
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Though the Rhodesian Special Branch, and its 
executive arm,, the Army 'Selous Scouts' Regiment, 
became familiar with this process - and were able, 
to a degree, to delay and disrupt it - during the 
course of the war, they were unable to convince the 
government and Security Forces establishment of its 
significance, with the result that the Rhodesians 
lost the war, though they won every battle.
What is the situation with regard to urban sub­
version? Here, whether the insurgency is purely 
urban cr merely the urban extension of a primarily 
rural insurgency (as in Vietnam), the underground is 
split into two branches. There is the branch that 
functions in exactly the same manner as the rurally 
based underground, providing the necessary support, 
communications and intelligence network for 
successful operations by the active insurgents who 
arrive later. However, thi urban party members 
adopt a lower profile than their rural equivalents: 
they seek employment in ordinary, useful jobs; they 
are strictly enjoined to lead a quiet, decent, 
respectable, very definitely (apparently) law- 
abiding life. In short, they do nothing in their 
everyday activities that will draw attention to 
themselves or generate suspicion about their 
activities. In fact, the ideal is that their 
neighbours will regard them as good people to have
■* .. <* .
next door (29). Only after having established their 
cover/ and rendered themselves above suspicion, will 
they begin to iunction.
The second branch of the party Infiltrates key 
institutions of society (invariably centred in major 
towns and cities), in order to undermine society 
from within. Such institutions, apart from the 
Security Forces themselves, are the media, churches, 
universities, political parties, etc.. The idea is 
to disseminate propaganda from positions that are 
usually accorded respect and credibility, in order 
to de-legitimise the government and Security Forces, 
confuse the people, to try and turn the young and 
future elites against their own socio-political and 
belief systems, and legitimise the insurgents and 
their cause. The importance of this branch of the 
underground cannot be overestimated.
What is the ultimate objective of all insurgent 
groups? Is it to destroy the Security Forces and so 
ride victoriously to power? Actually, while there 
have been a few cases where the insurgents have 
indeed become powerful enough to achieve military 
victory over their enemies (for example, the Chinese 
'People's Liberation Army'), these are very much the 
exceptions. The actual aim is more subtle, even 
more effective - to break the political will of the
Ifx.
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opposing government, to convince it that it cannot
win the war, that it must accede to the insurgents'
demands, that it must surrender. Or as the Cypriot
nationalist insurgent leader General Grivas put it:
"It should not be supposed that by these 
means [that is, Terrorism] we shall expect 
to impose a total defeat on the British 
forces in Cyprus. Our purpose is to win a 
moral victory through a process of 
attrition, by harassing, confusing and 
finally exasperating the enemy forces with 
the effect of achieving our main aim"
(30).
To this end, military victories are unnecessary:
insurgent forces, as in Aden, Algeria and Rhodesia,
have achieved this while losing virtually every 
battle they were involved in. Indeed, militarily 
absurd or irrelevant operations are launched 
because of their political and propaganda value (for 
example, the Viet Cong attack on the United States
Embassy at the commencement of the 1968 Tet
offensive). The party and the active insurgents 
both have key roles in this process of breaking the 
will of the target government.
A key function of the party in this process that 
must be examined more closely is that of generating 
propaganda both within and without the country. as 
already indicated, real or imagined local grievances 
are typical themes for party propagandists to adopt. 
Mao Tse Tung regarded this approach as being of key 
importance:
"In all practical work of our Party, 
correct leadership can only be developed 
on the principle of from the masses to the 
masses. This means summing up (that is, 
co-ordinating and systemising after care­
ful study) the views of the masses (that 
is, views scattered and unsystematic) and 
taking the resulting ideas back to the 
masses .... Then it is necessary once 
again to sum up the views of the masses 
and once again take the resulting ideas 
back to the masses so that the masses can 
give them their whole-hearted support. 
And so on, over and over again ..." (31).
Or, in other words, the party members must 
constantly seek for local grievances that can be 
exploited to further the party's objectives. These 
grievances allow the insurgents to pose as the means 
whereby the people's ambitions will be realised; 
yet, whenever victory is achieved in a war of 
National Liberation, the victorious insurgents 
invariably repudiate every promise made, and reverse 
key policies taken, during the war.
Thus, in both China and Vietnam, land-hunger was 
endemic among the peasantry; few peasants owned the 
lane they worked, rather, they rented it - at heavy 
rates - from local landlords. in both cases the 
insurgents exploited these grievances oy seising, in 
the areas they dominated, the landlord's ground, 
distributing it to the peasants, granting then the 
ownership of the land in the process. This was a 
most successful form of propaganda. However, on
r- 216 -
their previous policies on land - ownership was 
banned and the peasants forced into collectives and 
communes against their will. This betrayal provoked 
an uprising in North Vietnam centred in the province 
of Nghe An - which had hitherto been referred to in 
Viet Minh propaganda as 'the Mother of the 
Revolution' - which was fiercely suppressed by the 
.;ew revolutionary government of Bo Chi Minh. At 
least 50,000 peasants were killed and 150,000 
imprisoned in forced-labour camps,* some sources put 
the number of dead and imprisoned as high as 500,000
- out of a total population of 17 million (32).
Another key propaganda line is that attacking the 
Security Forces (and by association, the government 
that controls them). This uniformly takes the line 
of claims of atrocities - of massacres in the field; 
of torture and murder of prisoners under 
interrogation, or, if no credible evidence of 
physical ill-treatment is possible, of 'psycho­
logical' damage allegedly arising from interrogation 
and imprisonment techniques (33). If the target 
country possesses a modicum of freedom, such 
accusations are voiced from within respected and 
legitimate organisations such as the communications 
media, the churches, universities, legal profession, 
etc. by agents of the party previously infiltrated 
into these positions, by sympathisers ('fellow
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travellers'), and misguided moralists (Lenin's 
'useful idiots'). As a result, these accusations 
receive greater credibility and attention than they 
would c ’ ;rwise have enjoyed. The occasional - 
almost unavoidable - lapses of discipline on the 
part of the security Forces help this campaign, it 
often bei’. fnored that while such lapses were few 
and far between, systematic terror war a central 
instrument of the insurgents (34). This terror is 
itself a powerful propaganda weapon, already 
indicated in the example of Rhodesia. The more 
savage the act of Terror, the more effective it is - 
there were documented cases, during the Malayan 
Emergency, of pregnant women being disembowelled by 
Terrorists (35). By contrast, except when the 
Security Forces behave with systematic ruthlessness 
exceeding that of the insurgents, the processes of 
the government appear to be slow, cumbersome and 
less deadly than those of the insurgent - and 
therefore safer to disregard. Where the Security 
Forces also make systematic use of Terror, they 
inevitably destroy the insurgent forces and party.
The externally directed propaganda, though it may 
stress different themes to those of the internal 
propaganda, has the same general goals of de- 
legitimising the target state, its Security Forces, 
undermining its right to self-defence and external
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aid, and seeking to legitimise the insurgents as 
popular liberators of the oppressed masses and as 
the inevitable future government. Often this 
propaganda is generated and disseminated by foreign 
sympathisers {36}.
Ultimately, if the insurgents are successful, the 
target government, apparently unable to protect its 
supporters, or contain the spread of the insurgency, 
bitterly attacked from within and subject to 
pressures mobilised by the insurgents' propaganda 
from without, suffers a collapse of morale, loses 
the will co continue fighting, and surrenders. Thus 
it was in Cuba, Nicaragua, Rhodesia and every other 
case where th? 'War of National Liberation' proved 
successful.
Such success is, however, by no means inevitable. 
Wars of National Liberation have been defeated, in 
Greece (1944-49), Malaya (1948-60), and Dhofar 
(1965-75), amongst others. The basis for these 
victories will now be examined.
The British victory in the Malayan Emergency (1548- 
60) is widely regarded as the classic counter- 
insurgency (COIN) campaign. At first, the British 
tried to fight the Communists as they had fought the 
Japanese - that is, by conventional jungle warfare
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tactics. However, the numbers of the regular 
insurgents was relatively small (initially some 
4,500? at their peak 10,000), while the jungle in 
which they hid \;as large. Much energy was wasted in 
meaningless sweeps and patrols, while insurgents - 
organised as the 'Malayan Races Liberation Army' 
(MRLA) - seersd to be able to strike at will (37). 
The breakthrough came when the British realised that 
the MRLA wa;- the less important arm of the 
insurgency; the prime arm being, of course, the 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The British thus 
changed their strategy, and set out to destroy the 
MCP.
Detention without trial, already in force, w'ts 
stepped up, allowing the security Forces to pick up 
suspected members of che MCP. However, the most 
dramatic - and often totally misunderstood - element 
of the new strategy was the re-settlement of 500,000 
Chinese squatcers, living on the fringes of the 
jungle, into protected 'New Villages'. It has often 
been ssumed that this was a 'hearts and minds' 
strategy, to improve the squatters' standard of 
living. This did happen, but it w.:,s a valuable 
side-effect. The central objective of the strategy 
was tre double-pronged one of providing security for 
the villagers and destroying the MCP (these two 
being opposite sides of the same coin). To these
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ends, the first building constructed in each New 
Village was a Police Station. Searching for under­
ground operatives is directly analogous to searching 
for criminals? protecting people from party 
intimidation is directly analagous to protecting 
people from criminal gangs (especially those engaged 
in protection rackets!); these tasks are thus best 
undertaken by Policemen. To provide the necessary 
manpower, the police Force was expanded from 10,000 
to 40,000 in six months (38). Ultimately, the 
Police Force numbered 60,000 - as against ^0,000 
soldiers (39).
Transported into the New Villages along with the 
ordinary squatters, within whose society they had 
embedded themseiv's, the members of the MCP found 
themselves trapped within a guarded perimeter, under 
constant and intensive Police observation, unable to 
supply food to the MRLA (it was forbidden to take 
food out of the Villages) and with communication to 
their colleagues outside rendered very difficult 
(all people entering or leaving the village were 
searched). They faced the choice of either fleeing 
before inevitable discovery, or waiting to be 
arrested, caught like a goldfish in a bowl. Either 
result destroyed the party organisation in the 
Village and provided the villagers with security 
against intimidation. Replacements infiltrated into
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the village by the MCP suffered the same fate as fc.ie 
original party agents.
The natural response of the part of the MCP would 
have been to use the MRLA to attack and destroy the 
Villages from without - after all, policemen, even 
if heavily armed, are not soldiers, and cannot be 
expected to perform as soldiers without detriment to 
their primary role. However, this threat was 
obviated by having Army and Home Guard detachments 
at each village to defeat any MRLA attacks.
With the re-establishment of security among the 
people and the concomitant breaking up of the party 
organisation, a.i effective 'Hearts-and-Minds' could 
be, and was, waged, focusing on the government's 
determination to win the war, on the victories of 
the Security Forces, on the wisdom of helping the 
government, etc., accompanied by health and 
education projects, all greatly helped by the fact 
that the Villagers were effectively a captive 
audience.
While the New Village strategy was placing the MCP 
under severe pressure, the MRLA was also receiving 
considerable attention from the Security Forces. 
Routine patrols and ambushes on jungle trails were 
increased. The elite Special Air Service (SAS) were
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re-activated to infiltrate into the jungle (often by 
parachute) to locate the MRLA's bases, which were 
then destroyed - by the SAS itself, or by other 
troops (Gurkhas, paratroops or Marines) guided by 
the SAS, or by air strikes called up by the SAS.
Under these increasing, culminative pressures, the 
will of the MCP broke; in late 1957 all surviving 
members were ordered to retreat to the Thai border. 
Of the once 10,000 or so strong MRLA, only 500 
obeyed: some 6,711 had been killed, 1,289 captured
and 2,704 had voluntarily surrendered (41).
Cnis achievement had, nevertheless, required years 
of great effort, and determination to win, and close 
co-operation between the uniformed Police, Special 
Branch, Army, Military Intelligence, and the Civil 
Service Administration. In order to guarantee the 
necessary co-ordination, the British appointed a 
'Supremo' to command all elements of the campaign: 
General Sir Gerald Templar, appointed in January 
1952 to be both High Commissioner (the highest 
civil-political office) and Director of Operations 
(the highest military office).
The key lesson from Malaya is the necessity, for 
victory, of the destruction of the underground and 
the concomitant re-establishment of security among
d£. w w-
the people? the New villages were a very effective 
means to that end. But they were not the only means
- fortunately, as there are situations in which this 
approach is completely unusable (for example, if the 
peasants to be protected already own their own 
land). Two, proven, alternative means of providing 
security and disrupting the underground will also be 
examined.
The first of these was the United States Marine 
Corps (USMC) Combined Action Platoon (CAP) programme 
in Vietnam (42). South Vietnam was covered, at 
village level, by a militia recruited from the 
peasantry and designated the Popular Forces (PF). 
However, it was of limited effectiveness, being less 
well armed and trained then the Viet Cong (VC), and 
was usually deployed behind barricades nt within 
bunkers - that is, protecting itself, while leaving 
the ordinary villagers open to VC intimidation. As 
Vietnamese villages are composed of a series of 
straggling hamlets, establishing an all-round 
defensive perimeter was impracticable. A United 
States Army attempt at a 'New Village' strategy - 
moving peasants into 'protected Hamlets' - failed 
because the prime purpose of the New village 
strategy was misunderstood, and no effective action 
was taken to destroy the VC infrastructure within 
the new Hamlets.
However, the approach of the USMC was totally 
different. They sought, in the CAP programme, to 
provide the villagers with effective security by 
upgrading the quality of the PP, and so stimulate 
the flow of intelligence needed to break up the VC 
organisation. The means to these ends was provided 
by integrating a squad of Marines into a platoon of 
PP - hence 'Co~hinod Action Platoon'. The Marine 
element of ' ' provided advice, training,
discipline, gement and increased firepower;
the PF element added intimate knowledge of, and 
rapport with, the area and people, and therefore
superior access to possible sources of information.
Most of the training provided by the Marine squads - 
composed of carefully screened volunteers ~ was of 
the 'on the job' variety. The CAP did not reside 
inside defended perimeters, but conducted a mobile 
defence, composed of patrols and ambushes by day and 
especially night, around the villages. By these 
means, the VC's tactical mobility was disrupted, 
greatly curbing their ability to intimidate. The 
GAP's nocturnal activities were especially 
disruptive, as the night was the traditional time 
for VC acf-ivity. With the increased security, the 
villagers became more and more ready to provide 
their neighbours in the PF with information, which 
the PF shared with their USMC colleagues, resulting 
in the arrest of the local members of the
underground - so increasing security, so increasing 
the confidence of the peasants, so increasing the 
flow of intelligence to the CAP, so further 
disrupting the VC infrastructure, and so on. The
great strength of the CAP was that the USMC members 
were permanent residents in the village, effectively 
becoming part of Village life, with the double 
effect that the Marines came to understand the 
people in a way that their compatriots in more
conventional units could never achieve, and provided 
that initial foundation of confidence necessary for 
the construction of the CAP. The attachment of a 
United States Navy Corpsman (medic) to all the c a p 's 
also provided a useful, if basic, element of 'Hearts 
and Minds' into the programme. The programme was 
also extremely effective as a 'force multiplier': it 
employed some 2,000 USMC and U5N personnel, 
equivalent to a USMC battalion, yet it resulted in 
the deployment of no less than 114 platoons - more 
than a 20,000 man USMC division could deploy (43).
Such was the success of this programme that even
after the ultimate (never premature) withdrawal of 
the USMC squadc, the VC was totally unable to re­
establish itself in the CAP Villages. Tragically, 
this programme was not, perhaps could not be, 
adopted all over South Vietnam, which finally fell 
to a conventional armoured onslaught from North, 
after the United States of America had abandoned her
erstwhile ally.
However, the Thai Armed Forces - who had fought in 
Vietnam *• took note of the hard-earned lessons of 
that conflict, and especially of the success of the 
CAP, and adopted a version of their own in their 
fight against Communist insurgents in the remote 
areas of Thailand. The British 'New Village' 
approach was of no value to the Thais as the country 
possesses a land-owning peasantry: forced resettle­
ment would have guaranteed a Communist victory (44),
The Thai strategy involved moving from still secure 
areas outward into insecure areas; it was thus, in 
an important sense, pre-emptive. The process of 
pacifying an infected area began in the most secure 
Village - that is, where the pre-conflict everyday 
sense of security of the people was still largely 
intact. This village would receive a Rural 
Development Team, which would assist the villagers 
in the construction of necessary utilities like a 
school and/or clinic. Where possible, the King 
himself - held in high respect by the people - would 
visit the village to inspect progress or perhaps 
open a school, or irrigation system, with the result 
that the Village would gain considerable prestige as 
a 'King's village'. Throughout this process, and at 
all times, it would be made clear t.,at the Armed
Forces were on hand to help and, if necessary,
defend the Village,
The next phase of the strategy involved the Army 
asking for help in its task of defending the
village. To date, volunteers have not been lacking. 
The resulting Village Defence Force (VDF) is armed 
with the most modern available weapons suitable for 
their role - which has important psychological
benefits in terms of increasing the prestige and
confidence of the VDF. As in the CAP programme, 
each VDF is built up around a nucleus of profession­
al soldiers, this time from the Thai Army, resulting 
in the same beneficial consequences that stemmed 
from the original USMC/PF CAPS. Ultimately, the VDF 
receives greater firepower in the shape of 
additional machine-guns and even mortars, and modern 
communications in the shape of high-capability 
radios, allowing effective contact with the regular 
Army. The VDF is also allowed to keep any weapons 
captured off the insurgents - another prestige 
consideration, though in one case this Army did 
confiscate a weapon captured by a VDF - a PT76 tank, 
taken from the Khmer Rouge! (45)
The result is a simultaneous strengthening of local 
security, disruption of the communist underground, 
and establishment of a successful 'hearts and minds'
jl.
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programme. Moreover, focusing on one village at a 
time creates a powerful 'demonstration effect': the
advantages of supporting the government became 
manifest. This makes the Thai penetration of those 
neighbouring Villages suffering from stronger 
Communist infiltration far easier than would other­
wise have been the case. Naturally, the Communists 
seek to disrupt the programme, but the well armed 
VDF is usually capable of defending the village 
itself. The powerful radios in the Village can 
swiftly summon a special Rapid Reaction Force of 
airmobile troops and combat aircraft should 
assistance be required.
This programme within the Villages is usually
accompanied by an infrastructural development
programme between the villages - that is,
construction of a modern road network. This is for
both military (that is, rapid movement with reduced
danger from landmines) and 'Hearts and Minds' (that
is, increasing local standard of living) purposes.
As a Thai officer summed it up:
"Roads bring trade to a village; trade 
brings prosperity and gives people 
something to lose. our tarmac roads mean 
we can move fast into an area if we have 
to" (46).
Again, the insurgents desperately sought to disrupt 
h programmes - in one province clashes with
insurgents cost the lives of over 110 Thai security
Force personnel before a new road network was
completed; the impact of the Thai strategy is
equally clearly shown by the fact that this province
is now secure (47).
Despite their differing approaches all three of 
these stratp 'es were successful means to exactly 
the same ends; the re-establishment of security for 
the people, thus creating and increasing the flow of 
intelligence to the Security Forces, and creating a 
situation in which government propaganda and 'Hearts 
and Minds' programmes become effective, while
simultaneously disrupting the underground organis­
ation, so destroying the security and support base 
of the insurgents, depriving them of intelligence 
and logistics, and totally discrediting their
propag'.nda. And it is in the achievement of these 
ends, by employment of those means most suitable to 
a given situation, that the secret of a successful 
COIN strategy lies.
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CHAPTER 8: CASE STUDY I
THE SINAI WAR OF 1956
The Sinai Peninsula, which forms the landbridge 
between Africa and Asia, can be described ,s an 
inverted triangle (see Map 1). It is approximately 
2000 kilometres wide in the north, between the Suez 
Canal and the Israeli border, and extends some 400 
km from El Arish on the northern coast to the 
southern tip of Ras Muhammed, between the Gulfs of 
Aqaba and Suez. The terrain of the Peninsula can be 
divided into three zones: in the extreme north,
along the shores of the Mediterranean, there is a 
narrow, flat coastal plain possessing only scant 
vegetation; south of this there is a 'middle zone' 
of arid and rugged ridges, with peaks reaching an 
altitude of some 3,500 ft, interspersed with 
stretches of constantly shifting sand dunes. 
Finally, the southern half of the Sinai is dominated 
by jagged mountains reaching 8,000 ft in height, 
riven with deep, powdery Wadis totally devoid of 
water. From these southern mountains a ridge 
extends northwards, parallel to the Gulf of Suez and 
the Sues canal, and some 30 to 50 km inland from 
them. Pierced by only a couple of passes, it is a 
major obstacle to east-west movement.
All in all, the Peninsula is a most inhospitable
renvicrnment (especially in the south) and, except 
for the narrow coastal plain in the north, is 
extremely sparsely inhabited.
Unsurprisingly, only limited communication routes 
exist in the Sinai (see Maps 1 and 2). on the east- 
west axis, there were (and are) four: in the extreme 
north, the tarred coastal road running from Kanfcara 
on tin; Canal to Rumani, El Arish, Rafah and thence 
on to Gaza. Alongside this road, there was a narrow 
gauge railway line. "his route served as the main 
Egyptian supply line to the Sinai and Gaza Strip. 
The second major east-west axis originates at 
Ismailia on the Canal, skirts the northern edges of 
the high western ridge, and proceeds, via Sir 
Gafgafa, Bir El-Hama, and Abu Ageiia, to the Israeli 
border, and beyond to Nitzana. Further south, and 
roughly parallel to the Ismailia road, was the third 
major east-west axis, which ran from Suez City, 
through the Mitla Pass, thence swung north-east 
through Bir Bl-Haasne and nis«eima, across the 
Israeli border, and ultimately ?.•. join the ismailia 
road near Nitzana. During 1956 this route was only 
partially tarred. The fourth east-west axis - at 
this time often little more than a track 
originated at the Mitla Pass and ran south-east 
through Nakhle and Themed, and thence either north­
east to Kuntilla or south-east to Ras Bl-Naqb and
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thence across the border to Eilat.
North-south axes were also £ew - in the east, a good 
road ran from El Arish to Abu Ageiia and Kusseima; 
from there a dirt road had been driven to Kuntilla 
and Ras El-Naqb. In the centre, a tarred road ran 
from El Arish to Bir Lahfan, Bir El-Hassne and on to 
Nakhle, in the extreme west of the peninsula a good 
road ran from El-Qantara all the way down the 
Peninsula to Sharm El-Sheikh. The only other 
overland route to Sharm El-Sheikh was a camel track, 
along the Peninsula's Aqaba coast, from Eilat (see 
Map 1) {1).
Assigned to Egypt in an agreement concluded between 
the British and Ottoman Empires in 1906, the Sinai 
has been of uategic importance since the rise of 
civilisation u the Nile Valley and the Near East. 
Given the nature of the terrain, warfare in the 
Sinai has always 'evolved around the control of the 
few communications routes across the Peninsula, and 
of the features domina;i"'q them (2). An arena of 
conflict during the First World War, the r^nai was 
thereafter left in peace until the re-establishment 
of the state of Israel in 1948. Egypt was one of 
the five Arab states that immediately invaded the 
infant state in an unsuccessful attempt to crush it 
at birth. An armistice was achieved in early 1949,
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the armistice lines becoming the international 
frontiers. However, during the course of the 
fighting, Egypt bad successfully occupied the Gaza 
Strip, which was not, and had never been, jrurt of 
the Sinai. In fact, the Strip had formed part of 
the Palestine Mandate, and, under the November 1947 
UN partition plan, had been intended to form part of 
the proposed Arab Palestinian State, to exist 
alongside Israel. However, Egypt and Jordan who, at 
the end of the fighting, found themselves in 
occupation of this Arab Palestinian territory, 
refused to allow the establishment of such a state, 
instead taking possession for themselves (de jure in 
the case of Jordan, de facto in the case of Egypt).
.he defeat at the hands of Israel was a major - 
•.hough not the sole - cause of the wave of political 
instability which svept over most of the Arab 
combatants following 194*. The situation in Egypt 
was complicated by the presence of powerful and 
resented British f v c e ®  who were guarding the Suez 
Canal. Anger at c'- • .'at and outrage at the British 
presence combined /uly 1952 to spark a coup by 
young officers, ]. • ;y Lt-Col Gamal abd al Nasser. 
The successful pl-'utrrs appointed General Mohammed 
Naguib as their If-ausr. In June 1953, a Republic 
wau declared, while in April 1954 Nasser replaced 
Naguib as Prime Minister. Soon after this, in July,
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Nasser achieved a major foreign policy success - an 
agreement with Britain whereby the latter undertook 
to withdraw all her forces from Egypt over a period 
of twenty months? an agreement to which Britain 
faithfully adhered. Naguib was finally dismissed 
from the government during November. Throughout 
this, both Nasser and Naguib had been energetic in 
their attempts to revitalise the Egyptian Army in 
order to achieve revenge against Israel (3).
Israel, in the meantime, had been overwhelmingly 
concerned with consolidation, post-war reconstruct­
ion, and the absorption of Jewish immigrants from 
abroad. During the first three years following 
independence, Jewish immigration into Israel 
averaged 18,000 a month, with the result that the 
country's Jewish population doubled between May 1948 
and June 1953 (4). Most of Israel's energies were 
devoted to the absorption of this human flood, with 
the result that few resources were left for defence.
This was despite Israel's very poor geostrategic 
position. Israel was, and is, a long narrow 
country. in the period 1949-67 it shared 330 miles 
of border with Jordan, 165 with Egypt, 47 with Syria 
and 49 with Lebanon. Seventy-five percent of 
Israel's population and industry was concentrated in 
the narow coastal strip from Haifa to Tel Aviv,
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which ranged in width from a mere 25 miles (at 
Haifa) to only 9 miles at Netanya. This strip was 
completely dominated by the Jordanian controlled 
highlands of Judea and Samaria. Access to the 
nation's capital, Jerusalem, was along a narrow 
corridor also dominated by Jordanian positions. 
Nearly all Israel's population centres were within 
artillery-range of Jordanian positions, and all of 
Israeli Jerusalem was within small-arms range. The 
only factor that alleviated this strategically 
appalling situation was that Jordan was weak. 
However, the movement of any other Arab army into 
the so-called West Bank (or Judea and Samaria) would 
pose a mortal threat to the Jewish state. To the 
south-west, the Egyptian controlled Gaza strip 
reached within 30 miles of Tel Aviv, while in the 
north-east, Syrian positions on the Golan heights 
totally dominated the Galilee area and the Hula 
Valley. Israel was also extremely vulnerable to 
attack from the air, Haifa (the country's main port) 
being only seven minutes by jet from Damascus, while 
Tel Aviv was only ten minutes flight from Egyptian 
airfields in the Sinai (5). Given this geostrategic 
position, given the experience of the War of 
Independence with its heavy Israeli casualties (over 
4,000 dead), given the traumatic experience of the 
Holocaust, it is little wonder that the Israelis 
were deeply concerned with ensuring their security,
T  V
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and that they concluded that they could never risk 
fighting a defensive war on their own territory.
That Israeli security concerns were not purely 
psychological was illustrated by the increasing 
belligerency of their Arab neighbours, both in word 
and deed. The Arab states closed all their borders 
with Israel {except at Rosh RaMkrah on the Lebanese 
border, where diplomats could cross, and the Mandel- 
baum Gate in Jerusalem, open to non-Jews) and sever­
ed all communication links with the Jewish State. 
Travellers with Israeli visas in their passports 
were forbidden entry into Arab states, and an econ­
omic boycott was imposed on the country. Arab lead­
ers called openly for revenge against Israel, for 
"the restoration of the stolen rights of the Palest­
inian people", "the liberation of Palestine", the 
reconquest of the "stolen territory", "the liquid­
ation of Zionist aggression" or, quite simply, for 
the Jews to be "pushed into the sea" (6), And Arab 
irregulars crossed /wrael's borders and launched 
attacks on her population and infrastructure.
These raids commenced only a few months after the 
end of the War of Independence, and soon became a 
major problem for the new state. It was against 
this background of continuing instability and 
insecurity that Israel established her basic defence
policy and structure. Lacking the financial 
resources to maintain a large standing army, the 
Israelis adopted a modified version of the Swiss 
militia system, with (initially) two years 
compulsory military service for men and women
(except for rabbinical students - most of whom 
volunteered anyway - married women, mothers and
religious girls) followed by reserve f M n i n g  and 
call-up obligation to the age of 49 (these 
requirements have since been altered considerably). 
Thus, the Israeli Army consisted of a small 'active 
force', composed of the conscripts and the 
professional officers, NCOs and specialists who 
trained and led them, and a large reserve element to 
be mobilised in the event of war. These reservists 
were essential to Israel's whole strategy, as the 
standing army was, by itself, too small to wage war. 
By 1951 Israel's total mobilised strength, active 
and reserve, male and female, had reached 100,000.
In contrast, both the Air Force and Navy, because of
their considerably higher technical requirements, 
became virtual professional forces, only a minority 
of their personnel being provided by conscripts and 
with the reserves being relatively unimportant. The 
Army was divided into three operative-level, geo­
graphically based, operational and administrative 
Commands - Northern, Central and Southern (7).
Three factors gave Israel the time to organise
itself following the 1949 Armistice. First was the
aforementioned political instability in the Arab
world. Second, though the strongest of Israel's
opponents, Egypt at first did not encourage cross-
border infiltration from her territory i n M  Israel
(in fact, up until 1953 Egypt had entrusted the
defence of the entire Sinai peninsula to a single
reinforced Battalion) (8). Thirdly, in May 1950
Britain, France and the United States issued a
tripartite declaration on the Middle East, which
stated that:
“should the three Governments find that 
any one of these states [i.e. Israel and 
its Arab neighbours) contemplates violat­
ing the frontiers of armistice lines, they 
will ... act both within and without the 
framework of the United Nations in order 
to prevent such a violation".
Furthermore, the three countries would provide only 
those weapons which the states of the Middle East 
required for legitimate self-defence (9). This 
declaration and the policies based upon it, provided 
the region with a precarious stability for some 
years afterwards.
This declaration did not prevent Egypt's ban on the 
transit of Israeli ships or 'strategic goods' 
through the Suez Canal - a ban in direct contra­
vention of the 1888 Constantinople Convention and 
the 1949 Armistice agreement. In July 1950 further
regulations banning transhipments to Israel via 
third countries were introduced. Israeli protests 
led in September 1951 to the UN Security Council 
ordering Egypt to halt its blockade. Cairo thought 
it prudent to comply.
Then, as previously related, in 1952 Naguib and 
Nasser seized power, and matters soon began to 
deteriorate again, with a gradual reimposition of 
the blockade. Ultimately, the blockade became 
accepted internationally as a fait accompli, esp­
ecially with the signin'- 'e 1954 Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement on the evacuai British forces from
the Canal zone - an agreement that totally ignored 
Egypt's illegal blockade. Israeli protests were 
ignored, and when the Israeli freighter Bat Galim 
was seized while testing the blockade, there was 
little international reaction (10).
Though this blockade of the Canal hampered Israel's 
trade with East Africa and Asia, even more serious 
was the equally (if not more) illegal blockade of 
the straits of Tiran. These narrow straits, only 
some three miles wide, lie between the mainland of 
the Sinai peninsula and the small islands of Tiran 
and sanafir, and comprise the only navigable channel 
between the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea. In 1949 
the Egyptians had, with the agreement of Saudi
a . ... _, *  _
Arabia, occupied and fortified the two islands as 
well as Ras Nasrani on the peninsula, and had closed 
the straits to all shipping bound for Israel's 
southern port of Eilat. This blockade not only 
prevented Israel from trading with the East - a very 
serious matter for a small country trying to absorb 
many immigrants - but also rendered the development 
of the Negev virtually an impossibility (except in 
the extreme north). A belated Israeli appeal to the 
Security Council in 1954 met, inevitably, a Soviet 
veto (11).
Moreover, Egyptian vigilance in the Gaza Strip
relaxed, making it easier for the locally based
irregulars to cross the border and attack Israel.
On top of all this there was the continually hostile
rhetoric frcm Arab leaders. In November 1954 the
then Egyptian premier told an Arab newspaper,
published in East (i.e. Jordanian) Jerusalem that:
"There will be no solution to this 
problem, nor will there be peace between 
the Jews and ourselves, as long as a 
single crumb of what belongs to you 
remains in enemy hands" (12).
During the same month the Syrian Prime Minister
addressed his parliament stating:
"Peace with Israel is unthinkable. Some 
Arab statesmen are accustomed to saying 
erroneously that there will be no peace 
with Israel before Israel implements the 
UN resolution. I am opposed to such 
statements. There is no connection
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between the return of the refugees and 
implementation of the rest of the UN 
resolution and peace with Israel. Even if 
the refugees are returned to their lands, 
we will not make peace with Israel on any 
account. The Arabs will not agree to 
peace as long as jews live in the heart of 
the Arab states and sow unrest and fear in 
our midst. The first round unfortunately 
was unsuccessful. There is no doubt that 
the Arabs will prepare for a second round 
with all their energy" (13).
With cross-border violence occurring on most of 
Israel's frontiers, Israeli casualties cose steadily
- 137 in 1951, 147 in 1952, 162 in 1953, and 180 in
1954 - the overwhelming majority being civilians
(14).
Given these circumstances - political and economic 
blockade, active violence - plus Israel's lack of a 
great power patron to guarantee her security, and 
the recent traumatic history of the Jewish people, 
it is little wonder that Israel's response was a 
programme of retaliatory raids. These were directed 
against villages which sheltered Arab raiders, or 
against Police Stations and Army Posts of the host 
nations. in the case of the former, homes used by 
the terrorists were demolished, while the latter 
were attacked because of the Arab states' legal 
responsibility for actions initiated from their 
territories.
However, the situation with regard to Egypt
% r
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continued to deteriorate. Whereas before the 
revolution, Egypt had opposed irregular raids across 
the border from Gaza into Israel; now, under Nasser, 
there ocurred a transition from opposition to 
acquiescence and finally to active support. The 
result, inevitably, was increasing cross-border 
activity originating from Gaza. Between May and 
July of 1954, Israel complained nearly four hundred 
times of violations of her frontier by irregular 
raiders. Egypt had become Israel's major opponent, 
and the major sponsor of raids upon the latter's 
people and territory.
Raids were now made deep into Israel, mining roads, 
bridges and waterpipes, disrupting Jerusalem's 
development programme for the southern desert and 
killing and maiming civilian settlers. February
1955 alone saw no less than 45 such incidents {15}. 
Unsurprisingly, Israel retaliated. Due to the 
unintentional deaths of approximately 70 civilians 
during a raid on the Jordanian village of Kibya on 
12 October 1953, Israel had largely ceased to raid 
villages, and focused almost exclusivley on military 
and police posts. So it was, than on 28 February
1955, the IDF launched a large scale attack on 
Egyptian Army headquarters in Gaza, killing 38 
Egyptian soldiers and wounding 24 (16).
' X _
- 249 -
Nasser's reaction was to increase support for the 
fedayeen (as the terrorist irregulars were called), 
as an instrument by which to harass Israel even 
further. Contrary to what one might expect, most 
fedayeen were Egyptians, not Palestinians from the 
Gaza strip. Egypt also provided assistance to the 
fedayeen operating from Jordan to Syria. By the end 
of 1955, approximately 260 Israeli citizens had been 
killed or wounded by fedayeen raids (mainly from 
Egypt) (17). The confrontation with Egypt was 
deepened by Israeli-Bgyptian military clashes over 
the Sl-Auja Demilitarized Zone (DM2) on the Sinai 
frontier. i’hese turned, in October-November 1955, 
into full-scale battles from which Israel emerged 
victorious, Egypt losing some 55 dead and over 60 
captured (18). Even more ominously for Israel, 
given the country's poor geostrategic position, was 
the announcement, also in October, of a new joint 
Bgyptian-Syrian military high command (19). But, 
most ominously of all, in September Nasser had 
publicly announced a major arms deal with Czecho­
slovakia.
Nasser was driven by a dream of a unified Arab 
world, free of 'imperialist' influence, led by Egypt 
under his rule. The destruction of Israel, in his 
view, would be a major step towards the achievement 
of these goals. But Egypt needed arms to carry out
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’ :s ambitions, and the country did not have enough - 
in 1955 Israel enjoyed a rough parity in military 
hardware with Egypt (20). Under the terms of their 
Tripartite declaration, the western powers refused 
to supply anything other than what was required for 
defensive purposes. However, at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference of Non-Aligned States, China's Premier 
Chou Bn-Lai suggested that Nasser approach the USSR, 
which was eager to undermine western influence,
though, for political reasons, the arms deal was 
arranged through Czechoslovakia and not directly 
with the USSR.
The importance of this agreement can hardly be
exaggerated. It provided the USSR with its first 
foothold in the Middle East, ended forever the 
Western monopoly in the region, destroyed the policy 
underlying the Tripartite Declaration, shattered the 
precarious regional balance and pushed the Arab-
Israeli conflict into an escalatory spiral from 
which it never recovered. By the standards of the 
day and the region the Czech arms agreement 
represented a massive increase in Egyptian military 
capacity, both quantitavely and qualitatively. 
Included in the deal were some 300 T-34/85 medium 
and IS-III heavy tanks, 100 SU-100 assault guns, 200 
BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, 500 medium 
field guns and howitzers, 200 57mm anti-tank guns,
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134 anti-aircraft guns, 1000 recoilless rifles,
large quantities of scout cars, trucks, and small
arms; 120 MiG-15 jet fighter-bombers, 50 IL-28 light
jet bombers, 20 transport aircraft; and two Skory-
class destroyers, 15 minesweepers, several
submarines and a number of torpedo boats (22). In
the aftermath of the announcement of the agreement.
Radio Cairo proclaimed;
"The day of Israel's destruction is coming 
closer. There will be no peace on the 
borders, for we demand revenge and revenge 
means death to Israel" (23).
The arms deal came as a terrible shock to Israel.
Ben Gurion was later to recall that;
"The czech-Sgyptian arms deal transformed 
Israel's security situation for the worse 
at one stroke. The quantitative infer­
iority of our military equipment, which 
had existed ever since the War of 
Independence, became a dangerous position 
of qualitative inferiority as well" (24).
Ya'acov Herzog, a senior foreign ministry official,
recalled that
"it really threw us into deep anxiety"
(25).
General Moshe Dayan, then Chief of the Israeli
Defence Force staff, summed up the new situation:
"These arms ... represented a stunning 
acceleration of the pace of rearmament in 
the Mi.dd. j East. In quantity alone, they 
tipped the arms balance drastically 
against Israel; in quality, the tilt was 
even more drastic. We had never imagined 
that we could ever match the size of the 
arsenals possessed by the Arab states.
But we believed we could bridge the gap by
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the uperior fighting capacity of our 
troopd, as long as we could match the 
quality of their weaponry .... The Czech 
arms deal placed in doubt the capabiliy of 
the Israeli army to give expression to its 
qualitative human advantages.
"It was clear to us in Israel that the 
primary purpose of this massive Egyptian 
re-armament was to prepare Egypt for a 
decisive confrontation with Israel in the 
near future. The Egyptian blockade, 
Egyptian planning and direction of 
mounting Palestinian guerrilla activity 
against Israel, Nasser's own declarations, 
and now the Czech arms deal left no doubt 
in our minds that Egypt's purpose was to 
wipe us out, or at least, win a decisive 
military victory which would leave us in 
helpless subjugation" (26?.
The Israeli General staff estimated that it would 
take six to eight months for the Egyptians to absorb 
and digest the major portion of their new arms. As 
the first batch of weapons arrived in Egypt in 
November 1955, that meant that Israel could expect 
an attack any time from late spring to late summer
1956. Little wonder, then, that in October ]955 Ben 
Gurion authorised Dayan to prepare plans for an 
attack on Sharm-el-Sheikh.
In the interim, however, Israel desperately needed 
mociecn arms to balance Egypt's acquisitions. 
Neither Britain nor America was willing to provide 
them. That left only France? the power friendliest 
to Israel since independence. However, France's 
relations with Israel were of a somewhat unorthodox 
nature, in that they were mainly conducted via the
Defence Ministry, not the Foreign Ministry. Indeed, 
while the Defence and Interior Ministries had played 
important roles in ensuring arms supplies to Israel 
during the War of Independence, the Foreign Ministry 
was often cold and aloof to the Jewish state. This 
rather bizarre situation of different state 
departments following different, and at times, 
contradictory foreign policies was the result of the 
political fragmentation and parliamentary 
instability which characterised the fourth French 
Republic. The average life of a fourth Republic 
(1944-58) cabinet was less than seven months, and 
each Cabinet minister tended to treat his own 
department as a private fief, rarely attempting to 
co-ordinate with his Cabinet colleagues. On 
occasion, the Prime Minister had to intervene to 
settle intra-Cabinet disputes on policy - usually in 
Middle Eastern matters, in Israel's favour. This 
French sympathy for Israel originated in the fact 
that many leading politicians of the fourth Republic 
were ex-Resistance or Free French fighters, and had 
forged close links with Jewish underground 
organisations during the Second World War. More­
over, French support for Israel irritated Britain, 
and that, for some ministers, was itself a good 
enough reason to aid Jerusalem (27).
Thus it was that France, from the early fifties,
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began to supply Israel with limited amounts of 
modern arms. However, a 1952 Israeli attempt to buy 
French Ouragan jet fighters failed because of French 
Foreign Ministry opposition - the Quai d'Orsay held 
that it violated the Tripartite Declaration. Having 
accepted this, Paris was chagrined to observe 
Britain sell Meteor jet fighters to Israel, and 
several Arab states, including Egypt. The Quai
d'orsay was finally forced to back down, and Israel 
ultimately received the Ouragans and other arms 
(28) .
From 1954 on, France's ties with Israel, though 
still mainly via the Defence and other Ministries 
rather than the Quai d'Orsay, became closer. It 
appears that this was the result of fears that
Anglo-American manoeuvres were destroying French 
influence in the region, and perceptions within the 
Defence hierarchy which viewed Israel as a 
potentially valuable military ally against the 
perceived common threat of Arab nationalism - a 
perception promoted by considerable active Egyptian 
support for the Algerian rebels fighting for
independence from France. Even Foreign Ministry 
opposition to Israel- eased somewhat as it became 
clear, following 1953, that ex-British Egypt was 
Israel's main enemy, not ex-French Syria (29).
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So it was natural to turn to France in an attempt to 
restore the shattered regional balance. Israel's 
approach met with a sympathetic response? when 
Israeli Foreign Minister sharetfc visited Paris in 
October 1955, he was greeted by Prime Minister Edgar
■I've always been a friend of Israel, but 
now it is not a question of friendship.
It is for reasons of political realism 
that France is called upon to help you 
..." (30).
France offered Israel Mystere IV jet fighters (equal 
to the MiG-15), tanks and artillery, all at cost 
price, Quai d'orsay opposition being overcome
through the simple expedient of pointing out 
France's need for convertible currency the deal 
would bring in. Unfortunately, delivery was delayed 
by the fall of the Faure cabinet and by American
objections to the deal (31).
However, the new Cabinet of Guy Mollet was just as 
friendly towards Israel, and just as hostile to 
Egypt. Indeed, at the end of January 1956 Mollet 
had proclaimed his opposition to territorial
concessions by Israel and his intention to continue 
to supply arms to that country, in order to restore 
the local Balance of Power. To that end, in April 
the first batch of Mystere I Vs arrived in Israel, 
where they were euphorically greeted by Prime 
Minister Ben Gurion (32). Further French arms
followed, Quai d'Ocsay opposition being avoided by 
the simple expedient of keeping the transactions 
secret from it. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister 
Christian Pineau was a full 'member' of the 
'conspiracy". Other French arms began to arrive in
Israel during July. Indeed, early that month 
Foreign Minister Pineau informed Israel that, 
irrespective of British or American policy, France 
would no longer place any limitations on the export 
of arms to Israel.
Thus the Israelis, with French aid, had begun to 
close the arms gap somewhat. However, Israel's 
geostrategic situation had deteriorated alarmingly 
in May, when Egypt and Jordan had reached an
agreement on the co-ordination of their Armed
Forces. And fedayeen raids continued, across both 
the Egyptian and Jordanian frontiers. Despite the 
grave threats that were obviously building up around 
Israel, and despite his preliminary instructions to 
Dayan the previous October, Ben Gurion was extremely 
reluctant to initiate military operations. He was 
acutely aware of his country's isolation in the
world, an isolation that only now, in 1956, was 
finally coming to an end, thanks to France. He was 
heavily burdened by the responsibility of being 
entrusted with the fate of the first Jewish state in 
some 2000 years, and was deeply aware, thanks to
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recent history, of the importance of preserving its
independence and sovereignty. He was determined not
to take premature or unnecessary risks or engage in
hasty action. There is no evidence Ben Gurion ever
read - or even heard of - sun Tzu, but there can be
no doubt that he would have agreed totally with the
letter's grim warnings:
•war is ... the province of life and 
death; the road to survival and ruin"
"A sovereign cannot raise an army because 
he is enraged, nor can a general fight 
because he is resentful. For while an 
angered man may again be happy, and a 
resentful man again be pleased, a state 
that has perished cannot be restored, nor 
can the dead be brought back to life".
therefore
*... the enlightened ruler is prudent and 
the good general is warned against rash 
action. Thus the state is kept secure and 
the army preserved* (33).
Ben Gurion was an enlightened and prudent ruler. 
Then, suddenly, on 26 July Nasser completely 
transformed the political situation in the region, 
and opened a whole new vista of opportunity for 
Israel. Full of confidence as a result of the final 
British withdrawal from Egypt, and his new link with 
Moscow, he nationalised the Suez Canal.
The Canal was owned, as it had been since the 19th 
Century, by Britain and France. For both,
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nationalisation wa» an affront to their prestige and 
a threat to their standing in the Middle East. 
Moreover, the Canal was of great strategic and 
economic importance to the west in general - in the 
case of Britain, for example, nearly a quarter of 
the country's imports passed through the canal, 
while a third of the ships using it were British
(34). Britain and France immediately decided on 
mutual consultations to consider responses to 
Nasser's announcement. The French Defence Ministry 
immediately asked the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to 
provide them with the latest available information 
on the strength and deployment of the Egyptian armed 
forces, infoc :ing the Israelis that the French 
delegation would be accompanied by military experts, 
which suggested the possibility of military action.
Against the background of this new situation, Dayan 
recommended to Ben Gurion that Israel commence 
military operations against Egypt, and proposed 
three atlernatives: either to seize the Sinai
Peninsula up to the Canal, and establish inter­
national control of the waterway? or seize Sharm ei- 
Sheikh and open the Straits of Tiran? or capture the 
Gaza strip, Ben Gurion, however, remained prudent, 
arguing that Israel had not yet received the heavy 
weapons and equipment necessary to fight a war, and 
that to initiate combat before these had arrived and
been absorbed into the IDF would result in 
unnecessary Israeli casualties. Ben Gurion strongly 
felt that it would be better to wait until the IDF 
had been strengthened, so as to be in a position to 
wage a decisive, short, war and suffer as little 
loss as possible. Ben Gurion 'a thinking echoes that 
of Sun Tzu, who argued that "there has never been a 
protracted war from which a country was benefitted"
(35).
Moreover, there was now the possibility of fighting 
with allies. Indeed, as early as 29 July, French 
and Israeli defence officials had begun formal 
contingency planning for joint operations. These
meetings were highly secret - neither country's 
foreign ministry was informed, nor were the British
- and, on the French side, involved only the Prime 
Minister, the Ministers of Defence and Foreign 
Affairs, and about 10 French officers (36). Initial 
French interest focussed on the possibility of 
securing bases in Israel for operations against 
Nasser. Israel, of course, sought arms and, from 
August on, existing arms deliveries were accelerat­
ed, while secret new arms deals were apparently 
entered into. Extremely close co-operation 
developed between the various branches of the French 
and Israel armed forces, while Israeli pilots 
received intensified training on French aircraft.
These French-lsraeli discussions, agreements and 
actions were kept, by Paris, quite separate from the 
simultaneous Anglo-French preparations - though 
Israel was informed of London's hesitations about 
actually using force against Nasser (37).
By September at the latest, Ben Gurion had decided, 
and had informed Paris, that in principle Israel was 
willing to co-operate with France against Egypt. 
However, at Dayan's suggestion, Israel laid down 
three conditions for this co-operation: Firstly, in
order to emphasise Israel's status as a sovereign 
independent state and an equal, France should 
formally invite Israel for discussions on the 
proposed co-operation. Second, France had to ensure 
that Israel and Britain were not drawn into conflict 
with each other, which was by no means impossible 
given the latter's defence treaty with Jordan, a 
country which had become a major base for Egyptian 
backed fedayeen raids. And third, should war occur, 
Israel should be free to rectify its border with the 
Sinai to include such strategically important, but 
largely uninhabited areas such as Sharm el-Sheikh, 
Nakhl, Abu Ageila, and Rafah, in order to ensure the 
freedom of navigation of the Straits of Tiran and to 
guarantee Israeli security vis-a-vis Egypt (38).
However, at the beginning of September and after a
* jM ? ,*awk
period of uncertainty. President Eisenhower's admin­
istration in Washington came out in opposition to 
any Anglo-French military operations against Egypt. 
United States Secretary of State Dulles proposed the 
creation of a Suez Canal Users Association which 
would 'partially manage' the waterway. This concept 
was by no means unacceptable to Britain and France. 
However, the united states made no serious attempt 
to get Egypt to agree to the idea, and this
convinced both London and Paris that the whole 
proposal had never been serious, being intended only 
to disrupt their plans. As a result, they agreed in 
late September, to launch ' M u s k e t e e r a s  the 
operation was code-named, in October.
France thereupon approached Israel on the
possibility of the latter joining the war. On 23
September, Ben Gurion gave a cautious, but
affirmative reply - provided Israel received
immediate extra arms shipments. These being listed,
Ben Gurion also laid down four other conditions for
Israeli co-operation, namely;
"* Israel would not launch war on its 
own. If our friends started, we would 
join. If we were asked to a make a
parallel, start, we would consider it 
sympathetically.
"* The United States should be apprised 
of the impending war and offer no 
objection (or at least express no specific 
opposition). We should be ensured that 
the United States would not impose
sanctions or an embargo against Israel.
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"* Britain should be informed, should 
agree, and should undertake not to go to 
the assistance of the Arab states if they 
should join Egypt.
"* it was our aim to gain control of the 
western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba so as 
to guarantee freedom of Israeli shipping 
throughout that waterway . Consideration 
might perhaps be given to the
demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, 
even under the supervision of an
international force" (39),
To these political conditions, General Dayan added
three military ones:
"* The forces of each country would 
operate in separate sectors - ours in our 
sector, the French in theirs - even if 
there was a single overall headquarters.
This affected primarily the land forces, 
less so the air forces.
"* If we received aid in equipment, and 
if the French forces entered Egypt, Israel 
could take it upon herself to capture the 
eastern' sector of the Suez Canal Zone 
(meaning the Sinai Peninsula).
"* We should ask the French for equipment 
but not make their affirmative reply a 
condition of our participation in the 
operation" (40).
Ben Gurion was especially apprehensive about 
Washington, fearing that the Americans might impose 
sanctions on Israel once war began, and particularly 
suspicious about London, given Britain's complex 
relationship with the Arab world.
The French sought to reassure Ben Gurion. They 
believed, as a result of contacts with Washington, 
that the United States would take no action but they 
recommended that no approach be made to Washington 
for confirmation. France doubted that Britain would
a. ... . *
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take action against Israel unless Israel attacked 
Jordan. Ben Gurion was also anxious over the 
possibility of Soviet intervention in the war. The 
French argued that the shorter the war, the less 
likely was Soviet intervention. However, Soviet 
bloc instructors already in Egypt might very well 
partake in combat.
Further dicussion revealed that France did not 
possess the types of bomber aircraft needed to knock 
out Egypt's airfields, so that if Britain did 
participate in the proposed war, there would be no 
way to prevent the Eastern bloc flying fresh air­
craft to replace any the Egyptians lost in combat. 
Because of this (among other reasons), the French 
wanted Israel to start the war on her own, for Paris 
felt that such an approach would greatly increase 
the chances of British participation, albeit at a 
later date. France expected a final reply from 
Britain in the middle of October, and could not 
finalise her campaign plans until then (41).
Israel's major concern was to avoid being
maneouvred, by Britain, into the role of villain and
scapegoat. The Israelis were convinced that, in
Dayan's words,
"Britain hated the very idea that her name 
might possibly be smeared as partners with 
Israel in military action against Arabs, 
but, at the same time, she could welcome
the chance of exploiting Israel's conflict 
with the Arabs to justify her action 
against Egypt. The most desirable 
development for Britain would be an 
Israeli attack on Egypt. She could then 
rush to Egypt's defence and drive out 
Israel's forces, and since British troops 
would then find themselves in the Suez 
area, they would $automatically stay to 
control the Canal, The Foreign Office was 
convinced that under such circumstances, 
no one could accuse Britain of being 
either anti-Arab or the aggressor" (42).
It was just such a situation that the Israelis were 
determined to avoid. in subsequent, more technical 
discussion, it was more-or-less agreed with France 
that the Israeli Army and Air Force would operate in
and over Sinai, east of Suez, while the small and
weak Israeli Navy would confine itself to the
defence of Israel's coast and to support for the
Army. Operations in the Canal Zone, and air strikes 
in Egypt proper, would be the responsibility of the 
French and (hopefully) the British.
Nevertheless, the possibility of Britain not joining 
the campaign greatly worried Ben Gurion - specific­
ally, the absence of British air power, with its 
ability to 'knock out' Egypt's airfields, alarmed 
him. He feared heavy Egyptian air attacks on 
Israel. Despite reassurance from Dayan, Ben Gurion 
remained apprehensive about the risks of going to 
war - should anything go wrong, the consequences for 
the still infant state of Israel could be 
catastrophic.
x - >
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Nevertheless, Israel's preparations went ahead - on
2 October Dayan had informed the General staff that
20 October was the provisional start date; on 8
October the campaign received its official code-
name: Operation Kadesh (43). Dayan also outlined
his military directives for the war:
"... our task was net to kill a maximum of 
the enemy's forces but to bring about 
their collapse and capture what we could 
of their weapons and equipment. We wv«ld 
do this by seizing at the outset the 
principal targets deep inside enemy 
territory through landings or paratroop 
drops, while our infantry and armoured 
units embarked on a speedy advance. They 
would bypass enemy positions where
poscible, leave them cut off in isolated 
pockets in the rear, and resort to frontal 
attack only when this action is
unavoidable. I also stressed the need to 
organise our forces so that the advance of 
one formation would not be dependent on 
the rate of progress of another" (44).
Also strongly stressed was the need for secrecy, in 
order to preserve the element of surprise. Dayan's 
operational plan can be summed up in one word: 
blitzkrieg. All the elements of this form of 
warfare were present - mobility, deep penetration, 
bypassing strongpoints, collapsing positions by 
maneouvre and so on.
in order to ensure secrecy, given that they could 
not hide their mobilisation of the IDF, the Israelis 
sought to lure the Egyptians into a false sense of 
security, by giving the impression that it was 
Jordan that was to be attacked. To this end, and in
1
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response to a series of terrorist attacks from that 
country, in early October the Israelis launched a 
major raid on Jordanian positions at Kalkilia.
So fierce was the fighting that Amman afterwards 
asked for assistance from both Britain and Iraq, 
consequently London informed the Israelis that an 
Iraqi division was about to enter Jordan, and that 
if Israel responded militarily, Britain would assist 
Jordan I Ben Gurion was, in the circumstances,
understandably angry. He replied that Israel would 
reserve her freedom of action. Not until 16 October 
did Britain finally agree to Israeli involvement in 
the campaign.
This resulted in French Premier Mollet inviting Ben 
Gurion to Paris. Ben Gurion arrived, determined to 
avoid Israel being made the scapegoat for any action 
and also eager to minimize the risk of heavy air
attack on Israel's cities. For these reasons, he
steadfastly rejected the Anglo-French idea that
Israel start the war on her ow;., the others only 
joining in later, under the pretext of separating 
the combatants.
Dayan, however, felt that Israel could not pass up 
an opportunity to fight with allies, and benefit 
from the accompanying mill tar- -*id. Moreover,
London and Paris did not need Israeli military help 
to defeat Egypt. What they needed from Israel was a 
pretext for their operation. So it was that Dayan 
came up with a compromise proposal: Israel would not 
launch a full scale invasion of Sinai, but would 
rather carry out a deep penetration raid, near the 
Suez Canal, apparently in reprisal to fedayeen 
activities. This would provide London and Paris 
with their pretext, while, on the Israeli side, the 
force could either be reinforced or withdrawn, 
depending on circumstances. Such an approach also 
minimised the danger of an immediate, massive, 
Egyptian retaliatory air strike on Israeli cities. 
The French, in turn, offered to ensure Israel's 
security by sending aircraft and warships to Israel, 
in addition to the equipment they would deliver for 
use by the IDF.
On this compromise the British, French and Israelis 
were able to agree. Thus it was, after hard 
negotiations on 24 October, that the three countries 
signed the secret 'Treaty of Sevres', which laid out 
the political and military agreements which had been 
reached. Basically, the scenario was that Israel 
would commence operations at 17h00, local time, 
Monday 29 October; Britain and France would 
subsequently present a joint ultimatum to Israel and 
Egypt, demanding that they withdraw from the Canal
jowl. .nMfe.
Zone; Israel would comply, Egypt could be relied 
upon not to. As a result, Anglo-French air strikes 
on Egypt would commence at dawn on Wednesday 31 
October, followed by an amphibious landing on 2 
November. Britain would not countenance an Israeli 
attack on Jordan, but would stay neutral if Jordan 
attacked Israel. France would defend Israeli 
intersts at the UN. France had already begun to 
pour military aid into Israel. in addition, France 
despatched the destroyers Surcouf, Kersaint and 
Bouvet to Israeli waterr, and three fighter 
squadrons were sent to protect Israel's cities (46).
Israel's political objectives for Operation Kadesh 
could be divided into two categories: maximum and
minimum. The maximum aims included the overthrow of 
Nasser, the achievement of peace between the Arabs 
and Israelis, the internationalisation of the Canal, 
and the demilitarisation of Sinai. These ambitions, 
or aspirations, were largely confined to Ben Gurion 
himself, and would hopefully flow from a successful 
campaign. However, it was the minimum objectives 
that the Iraeiis, in practice, concentrated upon - 
both General Dayan and Shimon Peres, for example, 
did not believe that Israel should get involved in 
the legal dispute over the status of the Canal: 
Israel had her own legitimate motives for war. The 
minimum objectives were more limited, more concrete,
%more realistic. Basically, they were to: clear the 
Straits of Tiran? end fedayeen terrorism; and break 
the Bgypt-Syria-Jordan military alliance, so ending 
the combined Arab threat, by destroying its 
strongest element, the Egyptian Army in Sinai (47). 
To fulfil these political objectives, the IDF would 
have to occupy the Gaza Strip (centre of fedayeen 
activity) and Sharm el-Sheikh (key to the straits), 
and destroy the Egyptian Army and its positions in 
the Sinai.
Thanks to the potential threat from Britain and 
France, Egypt had concentrated considerable forces 
in the Nile Delta, in the process of reducing her 
garrison in the Sinai by half, to a total of 30,000 
men. Most of them were concentrated in static 
defence positions in the north-eastern El Arish- 
Rafah-Abu Ageila triangle (see Map 1). in this 
region was the 3rd Infantry division, with one 
brigade each at El Arish (the 4th), Rafah (the 5th) 
and Abu Ageila (the 6th); in the Gaza Strip was 
deployed the 8th Palestinian Division (86th and 87th 
Palestinian Brigades and 26th Egyptian National 
Guard Brigade), a lightly armed and poorly trained 
unit. In addition, there was a squadron of Sherman 
tanks at Rafah and two more at El Arish. Available 
in support was an Armoured Brigade based at Bir 
Gafgafa with elements at Bir El-Hama. In reserve,
west of the canal, were two infantry and one 
armoured divisions. All these forces came under 
Major-General Ali Amer's Eastern command. Based 
around sharm el-Sneikh, and directly under the 
command of General Headquarters, Cairo, was an 
Infantry Battalion, a National Guard Battalion, 
elements of the paramilitary Border Patrol, and two 
batteries each of coastal and antiaircraft guns. 
Responsibility for the border southeast of Abu 
Ageila was in the hands of Border Patrol (48).
To deal with these forces, and to guard her borders 
against possible intervention by other Arab states, 
Israel mobilised all of the IDF's 18 Brigades. Of 
these, ten were assigned to Operation Kadesh - the 
1st, 4th, 9th, 11th and 12th Infantry Brigades, the 
27th and 37th Mechanised Brigades, the 202nd 
Parachute and 7th Armoured Brigades.
Israeli deployment, and operative plan, were 
dictated by the Egyptian deployments, the geography 
of the Sinai and, of course, political consider­
ations. The forces assigned to Operation Kadesh 
were subordinated to the IDF's Southern Command 
(Major-General Assaf Simhoni) and organised into two 
Divisional Task Forces (DTFs) and two Brigades - or, 
in other words, one formation for each of the main 
axes of the Sinai. In the north, opposite Rafah,
was Brigadier-General Haim Laskov's 77th DTP (1st 
'Golani' infantry and 27th Mechanised Brigades, with 
support available from the 11th Infantry Brigade). 
In the centre, across from Abu Ageila, was Colonel 
Yehuda Wallach's 38th DTP (4th and 10th Infantry, 
and 7th Armoured Brigades, with support available 
from the 37th Mechanised Brigade, in GHQ reserve, if 
needed). Assigned to the southern trans-Sinai axis 
was Colonel Ariel Sharon's 202nd Parachute Brigade. 
In the far south, detailed to occupy Sharm el- 
Sheikh, was Colonel Avraham Yoffe's 9th Infantry 
Brigade. Finally, the 11th Infantry Brigade was 
assigned to occupy the Gaza Strip, while the 12th 
Infantry Brigade was in reserve (49).
The Israeli plan of operations was divided into 
several phases. Phase One would begin on 29 October 
and involved the dropping of a Parachute Battalion 
only some 30 km from the canal? simultaneously, the 
rest of the Parachute Brigade would move overland 
from Israel through the Sinai via Kunfciila, Thamad 
and Nakhle, to link up with the isolated battalion. 
Before dawn on D+l elements of the 38th DTP would 
cross the border and seize the road junction to 
Kusseima. This would allow the swift despatch of 
reinforcements (either via Nakhle or Bir El-Hassne) 
should anything go wrong with the paratroopers,- 
otherwise, Wallach's force would proceed against
their own objectives, although not immediately. 
Instead, there would be a delay until the evening of 
that day (30 October). This was intended to ensure 
that Britain and Prance would enter the war as 
agreed; if they did not then the whole Israeli force 
would withdraw and the action passed off as a 
reprisal raid. In order to add to the impression 
that a raid, not a full-scale invasion, was in 
progress, the activities of the Israeli Air Force 
(IAF) would be very restricted for the first 24 
hours of the Operation.
Should all go well, full-scale operations would 
commence. The 38th DTP would attack Abu Ageila and 
then exploit into Central Sinai. Starting on the 
evening of D+2 (31 October) the 77th DTP would
commence operations against Rafah? once this area 
had been cleard, Laskov's troops would drive on El 
Arish and thence towards the canal. Thereafter the 
11th Brigade would start to mop up the Gaza Strip. 
Meanwhile, the 202nd Brigade would have regrouped, 
and commenced to drive down the west coast of the 
Sinai towards Sharm el-Sheikh. This would be in 
support of the 9th Brigade, which would have begun 
to advance down Sinai's south-east coast from Israel 
to seize sharm el-Sheikh, and open the Straits of 
Tiran (50). This, then, was the plan? and despite 
the near parity of strength between the combatants
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(40,000 Egyptian, 45,000 Israeli), Dayan was 
confident it would work. The Operation was thus one 
in which "policy ... permeateEd] all military 
operations" (51), as elausewitz said - that is, all 
the military objectives were intended to fulfill 
political ends.
Initially, all went according to plan - at 17h00, 29 
October, C-47 Dakota transports of the IAF dropped 
Lt-Col Eitan's First Battalion, 202nd Parachute 
Brigade, at the Parker Memorial near the eastern 
entrance of the strafcegicaly important Mitla Pass 
(52). In addition to serving the political purpose 
of providing a pretext for Anglo-French inter­
vention, this operation also served the military 
functions of isolating northern Sinai from the 
south, and blocking one of the main access routes 
from Egypt proper into Sinai.
Meanwhile, the rest of the Parachute Brigade, which 
had been concentrated on the Jordanian border as 
part of the Israeli deception plan, and which 
possessed a total strength of around 3,000 men, 
equipped with half-track APCs, a company of light 
tanks, and mortar and artillery batteries, had 
commenced its march some ten hours before, in order 
that it could cross the Bgyptian-israeli frontier at 
the same time Eitan's Battalion landed at the
*. -v- . .
Memorial (53). Despite some severe problems - 
including an acute shortage of suitable cross­
country transport and rough terrain, Sharon reached 
the border only 16 minutes behind schedule and, 
though his force had been weakened by mechanical 
failures, he immediately assaulted the fortified 
border post of Kuntilla, which was rapidly captured 
by an assault from the West (i.e. the Egyptians' 
rear) covered by the setting sun. The defending 
Border Guard platoon abandoned its positions? most 
were captured.
Sharon then regrouped his widely spread Brigade. By 
22h00, five hours after the capture of Kuntilla, 
most of the Brigade's 2nd Battalion had been 
concentrated. Sharon thereupon ordered all 
available forces to drive on to the next objective, 
Themed.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian Command first began to 
receive reports of Israeli military operations at 
both Mitla and Kuntilla at approximately 19h00. At 
20h00 the Egyptian Eastern Command ordered the 5th 
and 6th Battalions, 2nd Infantry Brigade to cross 
the Canal and advance against the Israelis at Mitla. 
Further reinforcements, including the 2nd Light 
Reconaissance Regiment and the 1st and 2nd Armoured 
Brigades, 4th Armoured Division, were also ordered
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to cross into Sinai and concentrate for a counter-
in contrast to Kuntilla, Themed was a strongly 
fortified position, surrounded by minefields and 
barbed wire, and located on cliffs on both sides of 
the track; it was held by two companies of motorized 
border troops. Again, mechanical troubles and soft 
terrain had taken their toll of the Israeli force? 
only two tanks now remained. Nevertheless, at dawn 
(06hOO on 30th) the Brigade reconaissance unit, 
spearheaded by the remaining tanks, launched a 
frontal assault (the only kind possible) on the 
Egyptian positions? after a 40 minute battle they 
fell. The only enemy obstacle left was Nakhle, 
Headquarters of the Egyptian 2nd Motorized Border 
Battalion, and a fedayeen training base. Again 
Sharon regrouped his forces, received an airdrop of 
supplies, and suffered a strafing attack by four 
Egyptian MiG-15s, which had also strafed Eitan's 
force a little while before.
Eitan's men had meanwhile detected the vanguard of 
the advancing Egyptian 5th Infantry Battalion, and 
engaged i •, simultaneously calling for air support. 
This swiftly arrived, and subjected the Egyptians to 
heavy attack, especially concentrated on the main 
body of their force, which had begun to enter the
Pass. Repeated air strikes destroyed many of their 
vehicles and, by sunset, the IAF was convinced the 
Egyptians no longer constituted a cohesive fighting
Meanwhile, Sharon had driven on towards Nakhle, 
arriving there around 17h00; an artillery barrage 
proved sufficient to cause the defenders to abandon 
their positions and retreat. Sharon was thus able 
to leave his 3rd Battalion at Nakhle and drive on to 
link up with Bitan at 22h30 on 30 October? since 
crossing the border, he had advanced 250 km across 
difficult terrain in less than 30 hours, a most 
impressive achievement.
Unfortunately Sharon now allowed his success to go 
to his head. The Brigade Commander felt that 
Bitan's position was too open and exposed especially 
with regard to increasing air attacks. So, on 31 
October he requested permission to occupy the 
eastern end of the pass. This was denied, Israeli 
General Headquarters (GHQ) not wishing to trigger a 
major battle in what was now a quiet sector, for it 
would only increase Egyptian pressure on Sharon (who 
was only 30 km from a major concentration of 
Egyptian armour at Bir Gafgafa) and divert IAF 
support from the 38th d t p 's crucial battle at Abu 
Ageila. Sharon, convinced that the IAF had
destroyed most of the Egyptian troops in the Mitla 
Pass, then requested permission to send a patrol
into the Pass. This was approved, but he was again 
warned not to get involved in a major battle. in 
complete disregard of these instructions, Sharon 
sent a full battle group into the Pass. And this 
■up, under Major Gur, swiftly and painfully 
discovered that the Egyptians had not been
destroyed. In fact, significant numbers had been
able to move into the pass on foot and had taken up 
positions in specially prepared defences on the tops 
of the flanking ridges, and in caves in the cliff 
sides. Gur's force ran straight into the midst of 
these defences, came under very heavy fire, and was 
rapidly pinned down, unable to advance or retreat. 
Sharon was forced to send a full Battalion to help 
extricate Gur's men; this Battalion had to scramble 
up the flanking ridges and fight its way from 
position to position in extremely fierce close- 
quarters combat. The battle raged in all for some 
seven and a half hours, finally coming to an end 
around 20h00. The Israelis then withdrew from the 
Pass; they had suffered 38 killed and 120 wounded; 
the Egyptians had lost anything between 100 and 260 
dead. It was a totally unnecessary battle with 
totally unnecessary casualties which achieved no 
purpose at all. Despite his anger Dayan, however, 
did not discipline Sharon - he felt that such a step
could dampen the initiative of subordinate officers, 
and Dayan greatly prized initiative among his 
subordinates. This Israeli withdrawal marked the 
end of the fighting along the southern axis (54).
Meanwhile, on the broader stage, it had become clear 
that the British and French had postponed their 
artack, instead of commencing it at dawn on the 
31st. This news alarmed ien Gurion, who was ill in 
bed with influenza; his immediate reaction was to 
demand the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli 
forces from Sinai. Dayan however, was, with 
difficulty, able to dissuade Ben Gurion from taking 
this step. The Chief of Staff was confident that 
Israel would succeed even without Britain and 
France. As it turned out, Britain and France, who 
had, in accordance with their agreement, delivered 
their joint ultimatum to Egypt and Israel on the 
afternoon of 30 October (Israel, as agreed, accepted 
it; Egypt, as expected, rejected it) commenced 
operations during the evening of 31 October, with 
air raids on Egyptian targets.
The second major Israeli attack in the operation 
Kadesh schedule was that of the 33th DTF against the 
Egyptian defences centred on Abu Ageila. This was 
almost certainly the single most important battle of 
the war, as the Abu Ageila complex was t.ie linchpin
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of the Egyptian defence system in Sinai. Abu Ageila 
gained its importance by virtue of the fact that it 
was one of the few road junctions in the Peninsula 
(see Maps 1 and 2); here, the main east-west road 
from ismailia is met by the northwest-southeast road 
from El Arish and Bir Lahfan. Roughly twelve
kilometres east of Abu Ageila was a second, unnamed, 
f a d  junction where the east-west road was joined by 
th*. road from Kusseima. All these roads were paved.
A further three kilometres to the east of this
junction, the east-west crossed the northern edge of 
the Um Katef ridge. To the north of the road, at 
this point, was an area of sand-dunes which 
stretched all the way to the coast at Rafah. As for 
the ridge, it rtrefcched some six kilometres to the 
south, and possessed by two peaks - Um Shihan, just 
south of the road, and 51m Katef itself, and taller 
of the two, some three kilometres further south. A 
dirt track from Auja, which ran parallell to the 
main road, crossed the ridge between these peaks to 
join the main road near Abu Ageila. Lying west- 
south-west of Um Katef was the considerably larger, 
low hill mass known as Jebel Dalafe. The pass
between Um Katef and Jebel Dalafe contained the road 
from Kusseima. In turn, the Jebel Hilal lay west 
and south of the Jebel Dalafe, the two being 
separated by the bed of the Wadi Arish, the gap
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being known as Daika Pass. The Wadi itself was dry 
most of the year, but flows in the spring. To 
capture these waters, the Ruefa dam had been built 
some three and a half kilometres south east of Abu 
Ageila; the dam was surrounded by high hills (56).
Defence o' this key area was entrusted to Colonel 
Sami Yassa's 6th Brigade with a total of some 3,000 
men. As the sand dunes north of the road were 
assumed to be impassable, they were not defended or 
even patrolled. The core of the Egyptians' defence 
was located on the twin peaks cf. Dm Katef and Om 
Shihan. Both these positions consisted of networks 
of sandbagged trenches and bunkers, with emplaced 
anti-tank guns. Each was garrisoned by an Infantry 
Baunllion, -einforced by a company of tank 
destroye_. . The Um Shihan position actually 
extended across the .oad and into the sand dunes. 
In support, the Brig., le artillery was located just 
to the west of the northern tip of Jebel Dalafe, 
from whence it could give all round supporting fire. 
Concentrated at the Ruefa dam were two companies of 
infantry, both to act as a Brigade reserve and to 
guard the defence complex' rear. At Abu Ageila 
itself was concentrated the Brigade's support units, 
including kitchens, vehicles, etc. protected by a 
strong security detachment; Brigade HQ was located 
just behind the Um Katef position. Finally, the
'v ^
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complex also possessed four principal outposts, each 
normally manned by a squad or platoon? two were to 
the east, on the border and at Tarat ttm-Easis; one 
to the southeast at the Abu Matamir defile overlook­
ing the Kusseima road? and the last to the south, in 
the Daika Pass. Kusseima itself, some 20 km south 
east of Um Katef, was held by an understrength 
National Guard Battalion, and an army independent 
jeep company; these units were not part of Yassa's 
Brigade; however, an army company, reinforced with a 
bazooka antitank unit, and deployed to cover the 
road between Kusseima and Um Katef, belonged to the 
6fch Brigade (see Map 2).
All in all, the Abu Ageila complex was a most 
formidable one, making goou use of the local terrain 
and possessing the capability for all round defence? 
any three of the five main positions (Um Katef, um 
Shihan, artillery base, Ruefa dam, Abu Ageila) were 
mutually supporting. Little wonder it has been 
described as a 'hedgehog'.
As previously indicated, responsibility for pene­
trating this hedgehog lay with Colonel Yehuda 
Wallach's 38th DTF. Unfortunately, under the 
Israeli operational plan, Wallach's best brigade, 
the crack, regular 7th Armoured (Col. uri Ben Ari) 
was not to cross rhe border until late on 31
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October, by which time it would be clear whether 
Britain and France were abiding by the Treaty of 
Sevres. Thus, for a full day and a half, Wallach 
could count only on his two reserve infantry 
brigades, the 4th and 10th. Hio initial tactical 
plan was thus simple; the 4th (Col. Joseph Harpaz) 
would advance on Kusseima, and take it early on 30 
October; the next day, the 10th Brigade would launch 
a full-scale attack on Um Katef, it was necessary 
to swiftly take Kusseima for three reasons; to open 
another line of communications to the 202nd 
parachute Brigade, via Nakhle; to open the road to 
Bir El-Hassne; and to unhinge the Abu Ageila 
hedgehog on its southern flank, so opening the way 
for an envelopment, should the frontal attack fail.
Thus it was on the evening of 29 October that the 
4th Brigade began its advance on Kusseima, even 
though it was hampered by equipment shortages 
resulting from the rapid mobilisation. Like 
Sharon's force, it soon found itself delayed by soft 
sand. The Brigade's 3rd Battalion advanced on the 
forward Egyptian fortified outpost on Jebel Sabha, 
only to find it unoccupied; the 2nd Battalion 
advanced directly at Kusseima. At dawn (OShOO) the 
Israeli Brigade took the defenders of Kusseima 
completely oy surprise, the two Israeli Battalions 
attacking from the northeast and east respectively.
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The Egyptians were swiftly overcome, and retreated 
toward Bir El-Hassne or Abu Ageila. Harpaz 
immediately secured Kusseima, and sent patrols along 
the roads and tracks towards Kuntilla, Nakhle and 
Bir El-Hassne) all were soon reported clear. A 
patrol sent, northward, however, reported that the 
Egyptians were holding the Abu-Matamir defile, on 
the road to Um Katef.
In sntime, however, the Commander of the
soutn. Front, Major-General Assaf Simchoni 
worried at Harpaz' slow progress, had decided to 
disobey Dayan's strict instructions, and at mid­
night, 29/30 October, committed the 7th Armoured 
Brigade, ordering Col. Ben Ari to send forward a
battle group of his Brigade. It must be pointed out 
that Simchoni had no idea of the political reasons 
underlying Dayan's interdict (so secret was the 
Sevres agreement), and thus could not see the sense 
in keeping his most powerful and mobile formation 
out of the battle for a key position. By the time 
the tanks arrived at Kusseima, the Egyptians were 
already in retreat; the Israeli armour was merely
able to hasten them along. But by doing so, it
inescapably revealed its presence in the Sinai. 
Because of this, simchoni concluded that it would be 
nonsensical to try and maintain secrecy about the 
commitment of the armour, so ho ordered the rest of
the Brigade to Kusseima. This, in turn, demolished 
the planned timetable for the attack on Abu Ageila - 
originally scheduled for 31 October. instead, 
Simchoni ordered Wallach to move the 10th Brigade 
immediately, in order to attack Um Katef shortly 
after nightfall.
Meanwhile, Ben Ari pushed his forces on from 
Kusseima and approached Um Katef from the south, the 
Egyptians abandoning Abu-Matamir without a fight. 
The Israelis probed forward twice, on both occasions 
encountering very accurate defensive fire and taking 
casualties? it was obvious that Um Katef could not 
be stormed in a frontal attack by armour. Neverthe­
less, these brief exchanges were enough to deprive 
the- Egyptian Brigade of its commander. Realising 
the situation, Ben Ari sent a Task Group further 
west to probe for alternative approaches, especially 
the Daika Pass. As the Task Group, commanded by 
Lt.col. Avraham Adan, approached the Pass, the 
Egyptians guarding it destroyed the bridge over the 
Wadi and retreated. However, while this halted 
Adan's wheeled supply vehicles, it did not stop the 
tanks, and Adan pressed on and cut the main road. 
Given that he was totally without logistics support 
until the Brigade's engineers could drive a 
motorable route through the Pass, this was a very 
daring move on Adan's part. It also meant that not
only could the Abu Ageila complex now be attacked 
from the rear, but that the whole position had been 
bypassed; the Israelis no longeu needed to take it, 
merely to neutralise those sections which could 
interdict their bypass route. At this point, Abu 
Ageila ceased to serve the primary purpose for which 
it had been designed. in a daring application of
the indirect approach, Egypt's considerable invest­
ment of men and material in the complex had been 
rendered worthless.
Meanwhile, at llhOO, Dayan arrived with Simchoni at 
Kusseima. Sizing up the situation, Dayan ordered 
Harpaz to link up with Sharon's men at Nakhle, 
Wallach to take Um Katef by infantry assault, and 
Ben Ari to drive westwards across Sinai, either via 
Jebel Libni or Bir El-Hassne. Though tactically the 
Egyptians of the 6th Brigade were still very much 
existence and full of fight, strategically and 
operatively they had already been totally defeated. 
Ben Ari proposed to leave Adan's Task Group which 
would then attack Abu Ageila from the rear. Wallach 
agreed, but specified that such an attack be co­
ordinated with the planned assaults by the 4th and 
10th Brigades on Um Katef. In the meantime, 
Egyptian reinforcements were rushing to Abu Ageila 
from E; Arish; arriving at Abu Ageila around mid­
night on 30/31 October. The 6th Brigade's reserves,
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hitherto based at Ruefa dam, were thereupon moved 
forward to reinforce Um Katef and Um Shihan.
Wallach's plan was for the 10th Brigade to arrive 
before Um Katef/um Shihan shortly after dark on 30 
October, deploy and launch a frontal attack; while, 
simultaneously, units of the 4th Brigade would 
attack from the south, and Adan's Task Group would 
advance from the west against Ruefa dam. Hastily 
planned, the attack proved poorly co-ordinated and, 
unsurprisingly, a failure. clausewitzian friction 
was very much in evidence on the Israeli side. 
Adan's Task Group, hampered by poor going, was 
nowhere near Ruefa dam; the 4th Brigade units were 
not alerted to their intended role, so the 10th 
Brigade attacked unsupported and was easily 
repulsed. Adan's Task Group finally attacked Abu 
Ageila crossroads (as a preliminary to the attack on 
Ruefa dam) in the early morning of 31 October, 
despite accurate Egyptian artillery fits. Once the 
defence perimeter at the crossroads was penetrated 
Egyptian resistance collapsed. An attempted 
counter-attack from Ruefa dam was driver, off.
On hearing of the fall of Abu Ageila, the tvmmander 
of the 3rd infantry Division, Brigadier al Qadi, 
ordered an immediate counter-actack from El Arish, 
and further instructed the 6th Brigade (now led by
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Brigadier Mutawally) to launch a simultaneous 
assault against the cross-roads from Um Katef,
Adan, alerted to the danger from El Arish, and 
harassed by fire from Um Katef and jebel Dalafe, 
deployed his forces north of the junction. However, 
the northern prong of the counter-attack broke down 
in the face of an Israeli air raid. The Egyptians 
thereafter contented themselves with long-range 
fire. it was at this time that the southern pincer 
of the Egyptian counter-attack was launched from Um 
Katef. Adan was thus able to concentrate his forces 
and defeat it. The Egyptians failed due to their
lack of determination.
The Egyptians having abdicated the initiative to 
Adan, the latter then launched a co-ordinated attack 
on Ruefa Dam. Fierce resistance led Adan to abandon 
the attack, regroup and await a resupply convoy,
which arrived early on the morning of 1 November. 
In the interim, another Egyptian counter-attack from 
Ruefa dam was repulsed.
Also during the course of 31 October, the 10th
Brigade had launched a second frontal attack on Um 
Katef - without armour or artillery support. Un­
surprisingly, this too was easily repulsed.
Attempts to regroup and prepare yet another attack
took the rest of the day. This necessitated a night 
atfcac'-- - only the Israeli Battalions got lost and so 
in fact, there was no attack at all. This, for 
Dayan, was the last straw and he relieved the 
Commander of the 10th Brigade? he also committed the 
37th Mechanised Brigade to the battle. This 
Brigade, minus its (delayed) tank battalion, arrived 
" "ly on 1 November. Too impatient to wait until 
his tanks arrived, the Brigade Commander, Col. 
Golinda, launched another frontal attack on the
Egyptian position. This, too, was repulsed with 
heavy loss, Col. Golinda being among the dead.
Dayan, on hearing this, cancelled all further
attacks on Um Katef and Um Shihan.
Friction, clearly, had run rampant throughout the 
Israeli forces in the course of this battle. What 
is more, none of these abortive assaults were really 
necessary? the entire Egyptian position had been 
outflanked by Ben Ari and his 7th Armoured Brigade, 
and any threat it could have posed to his rear had 
been eliminated by Adan's Task Group. Nor, thanks 
to the efforts of the IDF Engineers, who drove a 
motorable route through the Daika Pass, did Ben Ari 
have to worry about having secure lines of supply. 
In fact, the Israeilis could vety well have screened 
Um Katef and Um Shihan (as they were ultimately 
forced to do, anyway) and left them alone to 'wither
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on the vine'. The collaps-j of the entire Um Katef- 
Um shihan complex was inevitable once the Egyptian 
Army had been defeated throughout the Sinai. The 
Israelis deviated from the classical blitzkrieg 
doctrine and paid the price - tactical failure and 
unnecessary casualties.
Meanwhile, of course, the Anglo-French ultimatum had 
been delivered. Consequently, at 19h00 on 31
October, Anglo-French aircraft commenced attacks on 
Egypt. Nasser at once ordered all Egyptian troops 
in Sinai to withdraw across the Canal, to avoid
being cut off by the Anglo-French forces; the only 
exception was the garrison at Sharm el-Sheikh. So 
it was that, on the night of 31 october/1 November, 
the Egyptian garrison of Um Katef-Um Shihan
abandoned its positions and heavy equipment and, 
unknown to the Israelis, slipped away across the 
sand dunes. Only half made it to safety, most of 
the rest being taken prisoner, though a number
perished in the desert (58).
But wh,.; of Ben Ari and the 7th Armoured Brigade in 
Central Sinai? Driving rapidly westwards, as 
Egyptian armoured reinforcements (4th Armoured 
Division) slowly moved eastwards (hampered by 
Israeli air attack), Ben Ari's forces rapidly seized 
both Bir El-Hassne and the Jebel Libni crossroads
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and then advanced on Bir El-Hama, all during 30 
October. Just east of Bir El-Hama, Ben Ari awaited 
the advanced elements of the Egyptian armour.
This was not a matter of choice on Ben Ari's part: 
Dayan had ordered all Xsraeli units except the 9th 
Brigade, to go over to a posture of mobile defence. 
Prime Minister Ben Gurion had become convinced, 
because of his co-belligerent's unexpected delay in 
joining the fighting, that Britain intended to 
renege on the Sevres agreement. As a result, he 
ordered a general Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. 
Dayan, however, was strongly opposed to any such 
move, and disobeying his Prime Minister, contented 
himself with ordering a temporary halt to the 
Israeli advance. This incident provides a confirm­
ation of Sun Tzu's dictum: "There are occasions when 
the commands of a sovereign need not be obeyed". 
Indeed, he argued that "there are three ways in 
which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army", 
the first of • being "when ignorant that the
army should noc advance, to order an advance or 
ignorant that it should not retire, to order a 
retirement" (59). It also illustrates Clausewitz' 
warning that: "Policy ... will permeate all military 
operations, and insofar as their violent nature will 
admit, it will have a continuous influence on them 
(60). Dayan well understood that the 'point of no
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return' had passed, that S-irael was committed to the 
war whatever London and Paris did or did not do, and 
that to accede to Ben Gurion's temporary loss of 
nerve would only have catastophic military and 
political repercussions for Israel.
Then, some 12 hours late, came the Anglo-French air 
attacks, and Nasser's withdrawal orders. So it was 
that Ben Ari took off in pursuit of the now 
retreating 4th Armoured Division, mauling its 
rearguard at sir Rud Salim, and capturing the main 
Egyptian supply base for the Sinai that was located 
there. Recommencing their pursuit at dawn on 2 
November, having regrouped and reorganised 
themselves (for the Egyptian forces were still 
formidable), Ben Ari's tanks drove through Bir 
Gafgafa and only met up with the Egyptian rearguard 
at Katib el subha (halfway between Ismailia and Bir 
Gafgafa). The Egyptian force was overwhelmed, the 
survivors escaping to the Canal. Ben Ari, as 
instructed, halted his victorious Brigade ten miles 
from the Canal (61).
The third major battle of the war was that for Rafah 
(see Map 3). The Rafah defence complex guarded both 
the northernmost trans-Sinai road (and railway) from 
Kantara, and the base of the Gaza Strip, and 
comprised no fewer than 26 mutually supporting
4
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MAP 3: The Battle of Rafah 
(Source: Herzog, C: The ftrab-Israeli Wars: War
and Peace in the Middle East, Arms and Armour Press, 
London, 1962.)
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company and platoon positions, disposed to take 
advantage of a series of rocky ridges to the south 
and east of Rafah. Bach position was fortified and 
surrounded by barbed wire and minefields; in add­
ition, south of Rafah, and parallel to the border, 
were two minefields, each about 5 km long." This 
whole network was held by the Egyptian 5th infantry 
Brigade, reinforced by elements of 87th Palestinian 
Brigade, all backed by armour and artillery.
Opposing them was Brig-Gen Haim Laskov's 77th DTP, 
comprising Col, Benjamin Gibli's 1st (Golani) 
Infantry Brigade, reinforced with additional troops, 
including armour, and Col Haim Bar-Lev's 27th 
Mechanized Brigade.
The Israeli attack was due to commence at midnight 
on 31 octoher/1 November, by which time the war had 
been raging for a few days. So there was no 
question of surprise; instead, the planning for the 
operation was meticulous. Laskov's plan was quite 
simple: a double envelopment of the Egyptian
positions (see Map 3): in the south, the 3rd Golani
Battalion would clear a path through the Egyptian 
minefields, whereupon a motorized battalion 
(attached from the 12th Infantry Brigade) would pass 
through and reach the Rafah-Nitzana Road; these 
units could then swing north, and drive up the road
* —  . A   . _
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to the Rafah junction. Meanwhile, in the north, the 
1st and 2nd Golani Battalions would clear the 
fortified hills adjacent to the Rafah-Gaza road, 
while the 27th Mechanized Brigade would drive 
through the old British Army complex of the Rafah 
camps, swing round to the junction, link up with the 
southern pincer, and then drive southwest alor? the 
Kantara road towards El Arish and beyond.
The southern pincer was the first into action, the 
Golani Battalion successfully negotiating the mine­
fields. The motorised batailion was not so fortun­
ate, however, and became trapped in the minefields 
after some vehicles detonated mines. Frantic efforts 
by the engineers, delicate maneouvering by the 
Battalion (all under fierce and heavy Egyptian fire 
aided by searchlights and the burning hulks of 
Israeli vehicles) finally resulted, after five 
hours, in the Battalion breaking through and reach­
ing the Rafah-Nitzana road. Thereafter, the two 
Battalions drove north, stormed the Egyptian 
positions overlooking the Kantara road, and dug in 
to await the tanks of the 27th Mechanized Brigade. 
Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Golani Battalions, backed 
by a platoon of tanks borrowed from the Mechanized 
Brigade, fought their way to, through and beyond t be 
Egyptian positions along the Gaza road, penetrating 
into and clearing the Rafah Camps complex. As for
*
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the rest of the 27th Mechanized Brigade, it 
commenced its attack in the north at 04h0Q on 1 
November, overwhelming two key Egyptian strongpoints 
after some two hours of hand-to-hand fighting, 
before swinging around and driving on Rafah 
junction, linking up with the southern pincer there 
at lOhOO that morning. The Israeli assault may have 
been aided by Masser's withdrawal order - it being 
unclear when this reached the defenders of Rafah - 
either before or after the Israeli assault. what­
ever the case, the retreating Egyptians found them­
selves hotly pursued by the Israelis. Any Egyptian 
rearguards were brushed aside or overwhelmed.
By evening the Israelis were in El Arish. Dayan, 
who had accompanied the 27th Mechanized Brigade 
throughout the whole battle, decided to await dawn 
before entering the town. When the Israelis did so, 
they found it had been abandoned by the Egyptians. 
The pursuit was then resumed, but all that was found 
were destroyed and abandoned Egyptian «•’i.-i.r and 
vehicles, the former victims of the l.-sasli Air 
Force. No less than 385 vehicles, including forty 
T-34 tanks and 60 armoured cars were captured intact 
by the Israelis. By evening, the Israelis had 
reached Rumani, some ten miles from the Canal, and 
halted (62).
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All that was left to do was to clear the Gaza Strip, 
and open the Straits of Ti«.an, The Gaza Strip, base 
for the fedayeen terrorists (who, since the outbreak 
of the war, had stepped up their activities) was 
held by some 10,000 men of the 8th Palestinian 
Division, with the Egyptian 26th National Guard 
Brigade centred on Gaza in the north, and the 
Palestinian 8<ith Brigade concentrated on Khan Yunis 
in the south. Assigned to clearing the strip was 
col. Aharon Doron's 11th Infantry Brigade, 
reinforced by a combat team from the 37th Mechanized 
Brigade. Doron commenced operations at 06h00 on 2
November with an attack on Gaza; once the outer
defences were penetrated resistance collapsed, and 
by early afternoon not only had the garrisons 
formally surrendered, but so had the Gaza Strip's 
Egyptian Governor. Nevertheless, the Palestinian
Brigade at Khan Yunis decided to fight on, so, at 
dawn on 3 November, Doron' men attacked; by early 
afternoon all resistance had ceased. The Strip, so 
long a thorn in the side of Israel, was secure (63).
The operation to clear the straits of Tiran was more 
an epic of physical enf than a combat
operation (see Map 1). assigned the task
was the 9th Infantry Briga. a reserve formation
commanded by Col. Avraham Yoffe, with some 1,800 men 
(all non-essential personnel were left behind)
■4
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carried on 200 vehicles {including 14 half-tracks). 
In addition, a tank unit would be conveyed down the 
Gulf by Naval Landing Craft. The prelude to this 
operation came, on the opening night of the war, 
when the 9th Brigade's reconnaissance company 
advanced £rcm Eilat, crossed the border, seized the 
key road junction just east of Has El-Naqb (from 
which roads radiated to Kuntilla, Themed, and Ras 
Bl-Nagb itself) and thereafter stormed the letter's 
Police post. The rest of the Brigade proceeded to 
concentrate at Ras Sl-Naqb, coming from its home
district in the Jezreel Valley far to the north via 
Kuntilla, and not via Eilat. This was to confuse
the Egyptians as to the Brigades purpose. The
concentration was completed by 1 November and,
before dawn the next day, Yoffe received clearance 
from Dayan to comment'% his advance. The plan, quite 
simply, was for the 9b- brigade to advance along the 
Peninsula's Aqaba coast, employing a camel route 
never intended for motorized transport, through a 
landscape of steep, saw-tooth ridges, deep sand and 
ravines and which was frequently strewn with huge 
boulders. Moreover, ik was extremely hot, and 
largely devoid of water. Given the total absense of 
room to maneouvre, the 9th would have been very 
vulnerable to air attack, which is why Dayan delayed 
his advance until the Egyptian Air Force was no 
longer a threat. The brigade advanced in widely
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spread columns, to reduce dust and prevent traffic 
jams. vehicles frequently had to be manipulated by 
hand to get them through. Despite this, Yoffe's 
advanceed elements reached oahab on 3 November, 
where they brushed aside minor, though unexpected, 
resistance. The Brigade concentrated at Dahab and 
received re-supply from the Navy's Landing Craft. 
At 18h00 on 3 November, Yoffe set out again, 
encountered unexpectedly weak opposition at the very 
narrow Wadi Kid defile and, by the following midday, 
reached the Egyptian fortified complex of Ras 
Nasrani - only to find it abandoned. The garrison 
had, strangely, fallen back to Sharm el-sheikh, 
which was more of a supply base than a fortress. 
Meanwhile, on 2 November, elements of the 202nd 
Parat >p Brigade, having been relieved at Nakhle by 
Harpa men, dropped at El T'Jt on the Sinai's west 
coast and seized the airfi-ald there; while the 
Brigade's 1st Battalion movfld overland to Ras Sudr 
(going around the mountains- and not, unsurprising­
ly/ via the Mitla ^ass) in - m e :  to commence opening 
the Peninsula's Suez coast -•••jd to Sharm el-sheikh. 
By the afternoon of 3 the 1st Battalion
had linked up with the aiz..-jped paratroopers, and 
they then advanced on Shaz.u <?!~Sbeikh.
yoffe fi.ially reached Sharm el-Sheikh during the 
early hours of 5 November, and thereupon launched
4
- 299 -
spread columns, to reduce dust and prevent traffic
jams. Vehicles frequently h 3 to be manipulated by
hand to get them through. Despite this, Yoffe's 
advanceed elements reached Dahab on 3 November, 
where they brushed aside minor, though unexpected, 
resistance. The Brigade concentrated at Dahab and 
received re-supply from the Navy's Landing craft. 
At 18h00 on 3 November, Yoffe set out again,
encountered unexpectedly weak opposition at the very 
narrow Wadi Kid defile and, by the following midday, 
reached the Egyptian fortified complex of Ras 
Nasrani - only to find it abandoned. the garrison 
had, strangely, fallen back to Sharm el-Sheikb,
which was more of a supply base than a fortress. 
Meanwhile, on 2 November, elements of the 202nd 
Paratroop Brigade, having been relieved at Nakhle by 
Harpaz' men, dropped at El Tur on the Sinai's west 
coast and seized the airfield there; while the 
Brigade's 1st Battalion moved overland to Ras sudr 
(going around the mountains, and not, unsurprising­
ly, via the Mitla Pass) in order to commence opening 
the Peninsula's Suez coast road to Sharm el-Sheikh. 
By the afternoon of 3 November, the 1st Battalion 
had linked up with the airdropped paratroopers, and 
they then advanced on Sharm el-sheikh.
Yoffe finally reached Sharm el-Sheikh during the 
early hours of 5 November, and thereupon launched
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his assault. Despite fierce fighting, the Egyptian 
perimeter was successfully penetrated and the defen­
sive outposts overcome; the Egyptian garrison form­
ally surrendered at 09h30 that same morning. Oper­
ation Kadesh was over. Israel \ad seized the whole 
of the Stnai Peninsula, virtually completing her 
operations before those of her Anglo-French allies 
had begun (Sharm el-sheikh, the last objective to 
f ...LI, surrendered three hours after the commencement 
of the Anglo-French landings). It had cost the 
Jewish state 189 killed, 899 wounded and 4 captured; 
Egypt had lost (against only Israel) 1,000 killed,
4,000 wounded and 6,000 missing or captured, not to 
mention large quantities of weapons, equipment and 
supplies that were destroyed or captured (64).
The whole Operation Kadesh stands as a witness to 
Clausewitz' argument that "policy ... will permeate 
all military operations" (65). From the very 
beginning, each aspect, each thrust, of Operation 
Kadesh was designed to, and did, fulfill specific 
political objectives. Thu paradrop at, and 
subsequent overland advance by the 202nd Brigade to, 
the Mitla Pass gave Britain and France the pretext 
they wanted to seize the Canal; it also neatly 
avoided the risk of immediately entangling Israel in 
a full-scale war with Egypt. The attacks on the Abu 
Ageila and Rafah complexes, and the subsequent
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of the Sinai Peninsula, virtually completing her 
operations before those of her Anglo-French allies 
had begun (Sharm el-Sheikh, the last objective to 
fall, surrendered three hours after the commencement 
of the Anglo-French landings). It had cost the 
Jewish state 189 killed, 899 wounded and 4 captured; 
Egypt had lost (against only Israel) 1,000 killed,
4,000 wounded and 6,000 missing or captured, not to 
mention large quantities of weapons, equipment and 
supplies that were destroyed or captured (64).
The whole Operation Kadesh stands as a witness to 
Clausewitz' argument that "policy ... will permeate 
all military operations" (65). From the very 
beginning, each aspect, each thrust, of Operation 
Kadesh was designed to, and did, fulfill specific 
political objectives. The paradrop at, and 
subsequent overland advance by ►.he 202nd Brigade to, 
the Mitla Pass gave Britain and France the pretext 
they wanted to seize the Canal; it also neatly 
avoided the risk of immediately entangling Israel in 
a ful]-scale war with Egypt. The attacks on the Abu 
Ageila and Rafah Complexes, and the subsequent
thrusts deep into Central Sinai, broke the threaten­
ing Arab encirclement of Israel by inflicting a 
severe blow upon its strongest member, Egypt. The 
clearance of the Gaza Strip brought peace and 
security to a vulnerable, sensitive yet important 
area of Israel, making consolidation and development 
possible. Finally, of course, the seizure of Sharm 
el-Sheikh opened Israel's route to Africa and .ne
Roe is this all? for each of the elements of the 
Operation also made eminent military sense: the
paradrop isolated southern Sinai from the north, and 
simultaneously blocked one of the Peninsula's main 
east-west axes, so helping to prevent the advance of 
Egyptian reinforcements. The operations around Abu 
Ageila, Rafah and in the Central Sinai destroyed the 
Egyptian Field Army facing Israel, allowing the IDF 
to 'mop up' the Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh at leisure, 
without fear of interference. And, of course, these 
last operations des^.L yed the fedayeen and opened 
the Straits of Tiran. Operation Kadesh was a model 
Clausewitzian campaign.
Israel now, however, had to consolidate her gains 
politically. The international arena was in uproar 
as a result of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt 
and, as early as 2 Noverni , the United Nations,
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spearheaded by the two superpowers, had demanded the 
unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Egyptian territory. For Israel, this was intoler­
able, because it would restore her previous 
situation of severe insecurity. Yet Israel was 
faced by economic threats from America and implicit 
Soviet threats of war, while action by the ON 
Security Council was averted only by French vetoes. 
Ben Gurion responded with a simple, but effective, 
two-prong diplomatic strategy. To reduce the 
immediate pressure on Israel, he announced a policy 
of a phased withdrawal from Sinai - a withdrawal 
which, however, would only be completed once certain 
conditions had been met. Simultaneously, he
launched a diplomatic offensive to persuade the
world, but especially America, that Israel had had 
legitimate reasons for going to war, quite separate 
from those of Britain and France. Initially, Ben
Gurion's conditions for complete withdrawal were:
i) guaranteed freedom of passage through the
Straits of Tiran;
ii) The non-return of Gaza to Egyptian control?
iii) the demilitarization of the Sinai.
While Israeli diplomats lobbied intensively for
international and especially American support, the
IDF began its phased pull-back - to 30 miles from
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two-prong diplomatic strategy. To reduce the 
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conditions had been met. Simult.*,. s^usly, he 
launched a diplomatic offensive to persuade the 
world, but especially America, that Israel had had 
legitimate reasons for going to war, quite separate 
from those of Britain and France. Initially, Ben 
Gurion's conditions for complete withdrawal were:
i) guaranteed freedom of passage through the 
Straits of Tiran;
ii) The non-return of Gaza to Egyptian control;
iii) the demilitarization of the Sinai.
Wh?le Israeli diplomats lobbied intensively for 
international and especially American support, the 
IDF began its phased pull-back - to 30 miles from
the Canal by 1 December, 60 miles by 21 December, 75 
miles by 28 December, until, by early January, they 
were back to a line running south from El Arish. 
And, all the time, Israel's diplomats were busy in 
international forums and in the United States, 
slowly gaining support for their country's position. 
By mid-January, the Israeli government ordered the 
IDF to vacate all Sinai except Sharm el-Sheikb, the 
coast road to Eilat, and the Gaza Strip. The 
military vacuum left behind could not be filled by 
the Egyptians, given the shattering of their Armed 
Forces by the wars, and the presence of the United 
Nations Emergency Force along the Canal. Thus, 
Israel's withdrawals involved no immediate threat to 
the country's security.
The Israeli campaign was largely, but not entirely, 
successful. Israel's point of view achieved wide 
acceptance in the Western world, but attempts to 
persuade the United States to provide iron-clad 
guarantees for Jerusalem's conditions failed, with 
the result that Ben Gurion had finally to accept a 
Franco-canadian compromise. Under this, Israel 
announced its final withdrawal from the Sinai, 
simultaneously laying down the conditions upon which 
this was based (66). The leading Western and 
maritime states (except the USSR) then publicly 
endorsed Israel's position. In the event, America
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provided only a half-hearted endorsement (though 
balancing this by immediately guaranteeing a 
generous loan from the World Bank). With some 
misgivings, the IDF handed over Gaza and Sharm el- 
Sheikh to the United Nations, and withdrew. 
Operation Kadesh was finally over.
Bad the diplomatic campaign succeeded in consolid­
ating the military gains? By and large, the answer 
is in the affirmative. The ON presence at Sharm el- 
Sheikh kept the Straits open, allowing shipping to 
reach Eilat regularly. The resultant increase in 
trade greatly benefitted the entire country. With 
regard to Gaza, the Egyptians, in violation of 
Israel's conditions, reinstated a civilian governor 
in the Strip only days after the IDF's withdrawal. 
Jerusalem protested but, as it soon become clear 
that the Egyptians were not going to re-militarize 
the Strip, nor permit nor promote further fedayeen 
raids, no action was taken. Indeed, the presence of 
the UN Emergency Force gave Nasser a face-saving 
means of avoiding another confrontation with Isxael, 
with the result that the Peninsula remained, foi all 
practical Intents and purposes, demilitarized.
With the southern border peaceful and secure for the 
first time since independence, with Eilat open to 
shipping and developing new trade, Israel entered a
period of rapid socio-economic growth. Victory had 
also greatly boosted Israeli self-confidence, and 
established Israel internationally as a country to 
be taken seriously. it is true that, eleven years 
after Operation Kadesh, Nasser reinstated con­
frontation with Israel; but it was a far stronger, 
more confident, Israel? an Israel that proved able 
to defeat three Arab powers in ten days? an Israel 
that was the direct result of Operation Kadesh.
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CHAPTER 9: CASE STUDY I X :
SBA POWER IN THE FALKLANDS WAR. 1982
The Falklands {see Maps 4 .md 5) are a group of just 
over 200 islands (2 of them major) located some 300 
miles off the southern Argentine coast, totalling 
some 4,700 square miles in area. They lie 
approximately between 51 and 52 degrees south, and 
58 and 61 degrees west, possessing an open terrain 
dominated by peat-bogs and moorlands, interspersed 
by low ridges and hills, the highest peak (Mount 
Adam on West Falkland) being only some 2,100 feet 
high. The islands are completely exposed and 
continually windswept, and experience, on average, 
some 200 days of rain each year. The population (in 
1982) numbered some 1,800 (1,300 of whom had been 
born on the islands), by far the largest settlement 
being the capital. Port Stanley (population 1,050 in 
1980 J, classified, under the British system of urban 
designation, as a City because of its possession of 
a (rather grand) Cathedral. The basis of the 
economy is sheep-farming, there being some 658,000 
sheep before the war (1).
It is unclear when and by whom the Falklands were 
first discovered, though it is known v. -o was first 
to actually set foot on them - England's Captain 
John Strong, in 1690; Strong also charted and named
the Sound separating the two main islands (Bast and 
West Falkland). What is clear is that possession of 
the islands was a matter of dispute from the first. 
In 1764 a French expedition claimed the islands for 
France and established a small colony on Bast 
•Falkland. In 1765 a British expedition (unaware of 
the French claim or colony) claimed the islands for 
Britain; the following year a colony was established
- and the French discovered. This led to a dispute 
between Britain and France, and between them both 
and Spain. For Spain regarded the islands as part 
of her American territories (though she had never 
explicitly claimed them nor occupied them) 
territories whose integrity has been guaranteed by 
the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht. Madrid thus saw the 
British and French actions as violations of this 
Treaty. The Franco-Spanish dispute was resolved in 
1767 by the sale of the colony to Spain. Then, in 
1769 the Spanish, with overwhelming force, ejected 
the small British garrison of Royal Marines from 
West Falkland. There ensued much diplomacy and 
frequent threats of war by both sides, but after a 
year a compromise was achieved, the British being 
allowed to return to their settlement, while the 
Spanish reserved their claim to sovereignty. Three 
years later, the British abandoned the Falklands, 
but left behind a plaque claiming sovereignty over 
the islands. The Spanish colony remained until
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